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ABSTRACT
This dissertation engages the question of why German political elites accepted the
use of force during the 1990s and started to commit the country’s armed forces to
multilateral peacekeeping missions. Previous governments of the Federal Republic had
opposed foreign deployment of the military and Germany was characterized by a unique
strategic culture in which the efficacy of military force was regarded as negative. The
rediscovery of the use of force constituted a significant reorientation of German security
policy with potentially profound implications for international relations.
I use social role theory to explain Germany’s security policy reorientation. I argue
that political elites shared a national role conception of their country as a dependable and
reliable ally. Role expectations of the international security environment changed as a
result of a shift to multilateral intervention as means to address emerging security
problems after the Cold War. Germany’s resistance to the use of force was viewed as
inappropriate conduct for a power possessing the economic and military wherewithal of
the Federal Republic. Elites from allied countries exerted social pressure to have
Germany contribute commensurate with capabilities. German political elites adapted role
behavior in response to external expectations in an effort to preserve the national role
conception of a dependable and reliable ally.

ii

Security policy reorientation to maintain Germany’s national role conception was
pursued by conservative elites who acted as 'role entrepreneurs’. CDU/CSU politicians
initiated a process of role adaptation to include the use of force for non-defensive
missions. They persuaded Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green party politicians that
the maintenance of the country’s role conception necessitated a reorientation in security
policy to accommodate the changes in the security environment.
The dissertation uses structured, focused and comparative case study
methodology to trace the process of role adaptation in the understandings of German
parliamentary elites. It finds that German policy orientation was a product of external
expectations which increased in their socializing impact as intervention norms became
more concrete and ethnopolitical violence increased in intensity. As a constructivist
account of the normalization of German foreign policy, the dissertation finds that social,
rather than utilitarian considerations were primarily responsible for initiating the
reorientation of German security policy. The finding that social expectations caused a
reorientation in the security policy of a great power strengthens social constructivist
claims about the impact of norms in international relations. The dissertation also
contributes to knowledge on processes of domestic norm promotion and national
compliance.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Puzzle of German Security Policy Reorientation
Since the mid-1990s, the Federal Republic of Germany has deployed combat
forces outside its national territory. German involvement in multilateral peace
enforcement missions of the UN, NATO and EU constitutes a significant departure from
previous policy parameters. Until 1995, German elites had categorically ruled out
participation of their country’s armed forces in any military activity not directly linked to
the defense of NATO territory. As such, Germany’s decision to use military force outside
German and NATO territory is an indication of a major shift in the country’s security
policy orientation since reunification.
The reorientation of a state’s established foreign policy parameters remains an
intriguing phenomenon in foreign policy analysis which routinely emphasizes the pathdependent nature of foreign policy. The German case is particularly interesting because
policy change involved security policy and the use of force. These are considered areas of
‘high politics’ in which states tend to protect their policy autonomy. Germany’s
rediscovery of the use of force also conflicted with the value of antimilitarism that
defined the country’s strategic culture since World War II. Political elites and the general
public shared a negative view on the efficacy of force in international relations. Thus, the
security policy reorientation was the more significant because it contradicted German
1

identity and breached a cultural taboo on the use of force that had existed since World
War II (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006, 1). The antimilitarism in German strategic culture
suggests that policy reorientation was not initiated domestically but, instead, was
primarily a function of external factors. Was Germany encouraged by its allies to
abandon its long-term stance on the use of force in favor of a more active and possibly
militant role in international politics? If so, what was the basis for external expectations
of German security policy and what was the social process by which the majority of
Germany’s political elite came to accept their country’s military responsibilities in global
society?
Germany carried the heavy military burden as the frontline state against the
Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Political elites had promoted the country’s
remilitarization and integration into NATO in 1955 but had categorically ruled out the
use of force for any objective other than territorial self-defense. They viewed the
country’s militant past as a historical burden which established a special responsibility to
eschew military force and promote cooperation through the support of international
institutions and law. This elite view of Germany’s role and appropriate foreign policy
actions in global society is frequently referred to as civilian power role conception (Maull
1990).
Civilian powers are trading states that exhibit a preoccupation with economic
concerns. They rely on international law and consensual policy formulation within
multilateral forums to pursue their interests including those pertaining to national
security. Defense expenditures as percentage of GDP are low when compared to states of
equal power. Foreign policy is characterized by a tendency towards diplomatic reticence
2

and reluctance to engage in high-profile leadership behavior. The civilian power role
differs from the traditional state role in a number of important ways.
Traditional or normal roles of states are defined by two central elements: National
interests and relative power. Normal states take as their natural right the ability to
formulate and pursue their national interests with or without international consent. The
use of force in pursuit of the national interest is considered a state prerogative. As the
relative power of the state increases, a normal state will increasingly value policy-making
autonomy over policy-making influence (Rittberger 2001).1 At the level of a great power
which possesses considerable political, economic, military and cultural wherewithal, the
foreign policy behavior of states will be characterized by relatively frequent divergence
from international standards and recourse to the use of military force. Great powers will
seek out and deploy advanced military technologies for their national defense including
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Within international organizations, great powers
will attempt to control the agendas and processes of norm creation while resisting
constraints imposed by such standards on their own policy autonomy.
The Federal Republic of Germany is considered a great power that plays a civilian
power role. Unlike other powerful states, the country has allowed its foreign policy to be
constrained by the international organizations it is enmeshed in to a degree that the
pursuit of national interests is no longer easily ascertainable. Germany has been a strong
advocate for the expansion of the supranational authority of the European Union. It has

1

Realists argue that the insecurity created by an anarchical system establishes clear state preferences for
security policy autonomy. Less powerful states have more to gain by surrendering some autonomy in return
for gaining influence within international organizations. As the relative power of a state increases, the
search for policy autonomy becomes a more prominent feature of state security policy. See Rittberger
(2001) for a more detailed discussion.
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supported the expansion of international law and shown a preference for multilateral
foreign policy making. The country’s security rests on multilateral arrangements
foremost of which is NATO. Fully integrated into NATO’s force structure, Germany
does not have the independent military command structure that other great powers take as
their sovereign right. Even though Germany does pursue its own interests in multilateral
fashion, the country has been willing to accept an unusually high level of constraint on its
ability to autonomously formulate and pursue national interests. The origin of this ‘odd’
behavior for a great power is generally traced to Germany’s defeat in World War II and
the long period it spent as occupied and semi-sovereign state. Countries like Germany
and Japan are also seen as prototypes of an emerging category of trading states that are
adapted well to conditions of interdependence that are beginning to characterize modern,
global society.
The restoration of German sovereignty which came with the end of the Cold War
allowed its political elites greater leeway to define their country’s role conception.
Growing insecurity and instability accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union also created a strong rationale for elites to shed the civilian role they had
allowed Germany to play in favor of a less restrained, normal role that would allow for
greater policy autonomy in addressing specific German security needs. Conservative
elites quickly seized on the opportunity to normalize German role behavior but the
civilian power role proved resilient even as international pressure mounted to have
Germany contribute in military ways to the maintenance of regional and global security.
The Persian Gulf War of 1991 marked the dawn of a new global security era that
was both less stable than the bipolar order of the Cold War but also offered expanded
4

possibilities for multilateral intervention. American and UN requests for military
assistance to liberate Kuwait clashed with central elements of Germany’s role conception
as civilian power. Parliamentary elites maintained negative views on the efficacy of force
and widespread antiwar demonstrations confirmed the enduring strength of antimilitarism
in German strategic culture. The government declined military contributions on the basis
of a longstanding interpretation of the country’s Basic Law under which extraterritorial
missions of the armed forces were deemed unconstitutional. Under international pressure
to contribute commensurate with capabilities, decision-makers resorted to making
significant financial and material contributions to compensate for their non-compliance
with the request for military assistance. Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher
also promised that they would initiate the necessary domestic changes allowing for
military contributions in the future. Germany’s ‘checkbook diplomacy’ caused
consternation on the part of its closest allies and criticism of being a ‘free rider’ stung
elites who had prided themselves on maintaining the country’s role as predictable,
calculable and reliable member of the Western value community.
Within a relatively short time span, German contributions to international peacekeeping efforts and NATO out-of area missions increased. About 450 Bundeswehr
soldiers were dispatched for medical support functions as part of the United Nations
mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) between 1991 and 1992. Germany deployed 1700 troops
for humanitarian relief operations as part of the United Nation Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II) and Operation Hope in Somalia between 1993 and 1994. The country also
participated in the humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo between 1993 and 1995 and the
German Navy helped enforce a weapons embargo on Yugoslavia during Operation Sharp
5

Guard in the Adriatic Sea in 1992. German crews on NATO AWACS planes helped
monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation Deny Flight in
1993 and fighter jets were deployed for UN reconnaissance missions in Bosnia during the
summer of 1995. These missions had mostly been in support of humanitarian and
reconnaissance objectives with the government taking great care to avoid the possibility
of military combat. Each deployment caused a major debate among elites as opposition
members from the Social-Democratic Party, Alliance 90/Greens and the Reformed
Communist Party heavily criticized foreign policy actions they perceived as deviating
from behavior associated with Germany’s civilian role.
The main divergence from Germany’s tradition of abstaining from the use of
force for non-defensive purposes occurred at the end of the Bosnian Civil War in 1995
when a majority of parliamentarians chose to help enforce the Dayton Agreements by
contributing to NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. This first deployment
of combat troops outside of Germany since World War II marked a turning point in
German security policy after which participation in UN and NATO missions increased
significantly.
Germany supported IFOR’s follow-up mission in Bosnia by contributing combat
troops to NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996. Indicating the formation of a new
elite consensus, the measure was passed in the Bundestag by an overwhelming majority.
Another significant taboo was breached when German fighter aircraft participated in
NATO combat missions during the Kosovo Crisis in 1999. During the 78-day air
campaign Operation Allied Force against Serbia, Germany also performed high profile
leadership and mediation roles for the coalition. Remarkably, German contributions to air
6

combat operations took place under a cabinet controlled by the former opposition which
had vehemently opposed reorientation during the early 1990s.2 After the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center, Germany supported the US campaign against international
terrorism by contributing to the challenging mission in Afghanistan in 2001. As part of
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Germany deployed thousands of
troops in the hostile environment of Afghanistan and took over leadership functions when
the United States passed control over to NATO command. The creation of special
commando forces in the late 1990s and their use in secret combat operations in
Afghanistan also shows German tendencies to assume a more prominent role in world
politics.
Germany now deploys thousands of troops in crisis spots around the world. Like
other powers engaged in international activities the German public has had to get used to
increasing numbers of military casualties. For many outside observers, the acceptance of
the use of force and the growing international deployment of the Bundeswehr as part of
the foreign policy of the Federal Republic has been nothing short of dramatic, if not
revolutionary. The country is developing a new reputation by contributing to international
security management commensurate with its power and by actively seeking out
command-and-control positions.
Change is also indicated by Germany’s more determined diplomatic efforts to
increase its international profile and status. In a clear sign of a growing post-unification
2

In 1995, Germany committed both fighter aircraft and troops to the crisis in Bosnia which did not see
action. At the time, Green Party leader Joschka Fischer criticized the parliamentary decision as the
‘German Rubicon’ (“Letzter Versuch”, Der Spiegel, July 3, 1995, 26). After becoming the Foreign Minister
in a Red-Green coalition government just two years later, Fischer found himself supporting aerial combat
during the Kosovo Crisis.
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self-consciousness, Germany led an initiative to reform the United Nations Security
Council under Chancellor Schröder (Schöllgen 2004, 10). At the core of the series of
proposed institutional and membership-related reforms was Germany’s desire to be
included as permanent member. While the objective failed, Germany has continued to
pursue the goal of ‘taking on greater responsibility’ by securing a seat in the Security
Council as indicated by Chancellor Merkel’s address to the United Nations in 2007
(Merkel 2007).
A final indicator suggesting that German role conceptions might be undergoing
change is Germany’s “absolute deviation from multilateralism and the turn to
unilateralism” (Maull 2004, 17). The unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in
1991, the growing unwillingness to serve as the European Union’s ‘paymaster’ during the
1990s and the confrontational stance taken against the United States during Operation
Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are noteworthy examples of a more assertive German role in
European and global politics. Also significant was the German government’s refusal to
back the US-led invasion of Iraq even if it had been authorized by the United Nations
Security Council (Masala 2004, 2). Elite discourse since 1995 in which national interests
and the country’s power are more openly acknowledged further confirm that some kind
of change is underway (Baumann 2002).
Germany appears to be assuming a new role in international society with foreign
policy behavior increasingly characterized by the tendency to more openly define and
pursue national interests in ways more similar to that of ‘normal’ great powers like the
United Kingdom or France. What prompted this fundamental change in role conceptions
of which the use of force is considered a central aspect? Two major schools in
8

international relations theory provide differing accounts for the observed behavioral
changes with opposing implications for international stability.

The Importance of the Study
For power-based explanations of national policy change including structural
realism, the German security policy reorientation represents the beginning of a process of
normalization with foreign policy behavior adjusting toward the less inhibited pursuit of
national interests. During the Cold War era, residual rights of the quadripartite powers
had restricted Germany’s foreign policy autonomy. The bipolar distribution of power in
Europe further reduced national policy latitude and sustained security cooperation on the
basis of joint alliance objectives. The changes in the international system after the end of
the Cold War and restored German sovereignty are viewed as primary causes for the
normalization of policy conduct. Germany has the inherent capabilities of a great power.
Faced with the less secure, multi-polar order of the post-Cold War era, Germany is seen
as naturally seeking to increase its policy-making autonomy on security issues.3
Unilateral policy actions and the open pursuit of national interests are expected to replace
the emphasis on multilateralism and consensus-seeking that characterized previous
security policy parameters. German foreign policy will become less predictable which
could have profound ramifications for European and international security. Realist
assumptions and the associated connotations for German foreign policy are contested by
liberal schools of thought that emphasize the impact of domestic and international
institutions.
3

Some realists content that the current unipolar world order is relatively stable and will characterize the
international system for many years to come. See Wohlforth (1999).
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Neoliberal institutionalists regard German enmeshment in international
institutions as relatively irreversible condition that will guide the preference formation of
decision-makers for years to come. German participation in international institutions has
greatly benefited the country which derives considerable national benefits from economic
and political integration. Neoliberal institutionalists can claim that Germany has not
abandoned its traditional inclination to support the expansion of the regulatory powers of
international institutions. Germany has consented to additional losses in autonomy to
supranational authority since reunification.4 The continued existence of the most
important domestic institutions of the Federal Republic in the newly unified Germany
further supports the argument that policy continuity rather than change is to be expected.
Germany maintains a ‘semi-sovereign’ political system in which power is decentralized
among different tiers in society. The constitution saw no significant revisions in regard to
executive powers and the constitutional court has repeatedly supported the right of
parliamentary approval in issues of military deployment. Germany maintains the military
institutions created after the end of World War II. The absence of a joint chief of staff,
the unique form of civil-military relations and the reliance on a conscripted rather than
professional army continues to inhibit the development of a more assertive security
policy. From an institutional point of view, the increasing assertiveness found in
Germany’s global role appears as relatively inconsequential. Increasing military
involvement in peace enforcement operations may be viewed as arising naturally from a

4

For instance, Germany supported further economic integration in the form of the European Monetary
Union even though this entailed sacrificing the Deutsche Mark as important symbol of its postwar
economic revival and success.
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trading state’s practical concern for economic and political stability in international
politics.
Realist and institutional approaches employ variants of utilitarianism as main
operative logic informing the foreign policy preferences of politicians. Both approaches
downplay the importance of cultural variables according to which the interests of policy
makers are ‘constructed’ in interactive social processes. Social constructivists cover that
angle by assuming that the relations between actors within the international environment
are structured by common understandings and normative principles about what
constitutes appropriate behavior. This dissertation contributes to the social constructivist
tradition.

A Social Argument for Security Policy Reorientation
Following constructivist logic, I argue that the reorientation of German security
policy that started after reunification was a function of social pressure from the
international community which convinced German political elites to adjust their
country’s role behavior by embracing the use of force to support multilateral peace
enforcement missions.5 Since reunification, leaders of important Western states and
international organizations have confronted parliamentary elites in Germany with
expectations to contribute to international stability through the use of military force.
Conservative elites promoted role adjustment during the 1990s on the basis of external
expectations because they were concerned about their country’s reputation as reliable and
predictable ally. Elites from the center and the left vehemently opposed changes in

5

Rathburn (2004, 3) defines peace enforcement as “the use of military coercion by third parties to impose
peace among conflicting groups or force an improvement in humanitarian conditions”.
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security policy. They argued that the maintenance of Germany’s civilian power role
necessitated the maintenance of a policy stance based on the rejection of the use of force.
They lost their argument against policy adjustment because their role conception was not
affirmed by the international environment.
I propose that the international environment of the early post-Cold War era
constituted a type of social structure characterized by shared security understandings
(threat perceptions and necessary responses) and the specific contributions or role
expectations (functions) of important member states. Role conceptions are used to
encapsulate the understanding shared by policy-making elites about the status of their
state within the social environment and its obligations towards the collective. In short,
elite conceptions of state status and function within the environment can be associated
with understandings of appropriate state behavior.
Normative standards in the early post-Cold War environment changed under the
impact of a significant increase in the number of domestic conflicts and expanding
possibilities for multilateral action.6 An emphasis on state sovereignty and
nonintervention had characterized the Cold War period during which the standoff
between two antagonistic alliances had reduced the possibilities for intervention in the
domestic affairs of sovereign states. The breakup of monolithic societies in Eastern
Europe was accompanied by the temporary surge in the number of ethno-political
conflicts. Domestic instability replaced national survival as preeminent threat. The
normative accent placed on the preservation of sovereignty was qualified by the

6

According to Gurr (2000), the number of ethnopolitical conflicts increased dramatically during the early
1990s and has since then declined substantially.
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increasing acceptance of the principle of multilateral intervention designed to reduce the
threats emanating from the instabilities within states. Changing threat perceptions
coupled with emerging possibilities for military action prompted the development of new
strategic doctrines by international institutions. The principle of deterrence receded into
the background and was unseated by that of rapid intervention. Important system actors
were being called upon to restructure their internal ideational and material capabilities in
line with the evolving consensus on the emergence of a new security environment that
was less stable and predictable than the one that had characterized the Cold War. The
transformation of security perceptions, principles and response capabilities after the Cold
War had a profound impact on German security policy.
Innate material capabilities conferred upon Germany the social status of a great
power. As such, the country was perceived to have special responsibilities for the
maintenance of peace and stability in Europe. During the Cold War, German
responsibilities were met through the country’s unequivocal commitment to the NATO
alliance. Germany served as the frontline state against the Warsaw Pact. German elites
allowed the militarization of German territory and supported the seamless integration of
the Bundeswehr into alliance structures. The emergence and solidification of intervention
standards after the Cold War transformed the nature of responsibility. Within the context
of the altered threat and response perceptions, German responsibilities could only be met
by restructuring and deploying the Bundeswehr in peace enforcement missions outside of
the country’s territory. Since Germany’s traditional role conception of a civilian power
specifically ruled out such behavior as inappropriate, socialization by leaders of
important reference states and institutions occurred to bring German role behavior in line
13

with the altered role expectations. Socialization occurred internationally through a
process of role adjustment in the form of a series of German learning experiences called
role episodes.7 Internally, role adjustment was initiated and pursued by leaders of the
conservative Christian-Democrats (CDU/CSU) who acted as ‘role entrepreneurs’.8
Conservative elites with traditionally Western orientations and ideologically
higher inclinations to use force were able to persuade other members of Germany’s
political elite through the effective use of Germany’s role conception as a ‘reliable and
predictable ally’ within the ‘Western value community’. Role entrepreneurs presented
behavioral adaptation as necessary to maintain the traditional role conception within the
social reference group. They utilized a range of persuasive techniques centered on the
argument that the requirements for maintaining international security had changed and
that Germany had to meet its obligations to alliance and Western community. Failure to
adapt by including the use of force was presented as leading to political and social
isolation. Opponents of reorientation argued for the continuation of the antimilitant stance
of the past. Their role conception of Germany as civilizing power in global politics was
not affirmed by international expectations and an increasingly more volatile security
environment. Eventually, many of the opponents changed their positions and either
supported or acquiesced in Germany’s acceptance of the use of force. Inter-elite
processes of persuasion were significantly influenced by the fluctuating strength of
external expectations.
7

The concept of role adaptation is taken from a theory addressing behavioral change in organizations
(Kahn et al. 1966).
8

Role entrepreneur is an appropriation of the term ‘norm entrepreneur’ used by Finnemore and Sikkink
(1998) to denote domestic actors who promote an externally generated normative standard at the domestic
level. Role entrepreneurs promote new behavioral sets in the foreign policy orientation of their states.
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The ability of social messages to affect actor behavior - the effectiveness of
socialization - is influenced by factors of message coherency and consistency. The
socializing power of normative standards increases as these become more concrete
through the process of codification and their systematic application by an international
organization. The natural tendency of other state actors to interpret standards according to
their national interests and produce ‘normative noise’ to exert influence diminishes as
standards of appropriate action become more clearly defined and more consistently
applied. Variance and potential delays in actor socialization are to be expected as
normative standards evolve. Intervention standards and response mechanisms became
more concrete after the Cold War as the emphasis shifted from deterrence to addressing
internal insecurities through multilateral intervention. The pressure on German politicians
to comply with expectations steadily increased over the observed time period. Social
messages became effective in modifying the security policy behavior of the Federal
Republic only after advanced degrees of codification and application of intervention
norms had been reached.
Additional factors important in understanding variance in compliance with
external demands are the interests of domestic elite actors themselves. Socialization
initially involves the transformation of elite behavior. Elite actors may also internalize
new values and develop different identities which result in altered behavioral preferences.
Identity change is difficult, complex and characterized by internal conflicts. The
transformation of established identities and policy preferences may be supported by
utilitarian considerations. External demands of behavior create political opportunities for
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some elite actors which then make the adoption of new standards desirable from an
instrumental point of view.
The decades of the 1980s and 1990s produced important changes in Germany’s
party landscape. The three-party system that had defined much of the post-war era began
to give way to a five-party system. A virulent Green Party and a reformed communist
party (PDS) emerged on the left while the extreme Republikaner Party gained support on
the far right. As a general disillusionment with politics (Politikverdrossenheit) was
undermining membership in the main catch-all parties, Christian-Democratic
(CDU/CSU) and Democratic Socialist (SPD) parties struggled to redefine themselves in
the changing landscape. External expectations of Germany’s proper role in global politics
during the early 1990s influenced the process by which the main parties sought to
redefine their policy platforms. Foreign expectations established standards of appropriate
foreign policy behavior that influenced perceptions of electoral viability
(Regierungsfähigkeit). Increasingly, political elites embraced the externally generated
demand for the use of force to establish themselves and their parties as viable contenders
for governance. In sum, the dissertation investigates the relationship between externally
generated role expectations and the micro-level interests of parliamentary elites. It
primarily focuses on the socialization of state elites but also considers the process by
which elites contribute to the evolution of social environments through role performance,
role avoidance or role challenges.
Within the constructivist agenda, the contribution of this study is found in the
application of a cultural model to understand the process of behavioral change. Cultural
models generally view social constructions as independent variables. This tends to lead to
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a preoccupation with stability coupled with the neglect of factors explaining normative
transformation. I am proposing that a combination of insights culled from foreign policy
analysis, strategic culture, role theory and norm diffusion literature allows us to better
understand the important phenomenon of foreign policy reorientation.
Foreign policy analysis illuminates factors that influence the behavior of states.
The field consists of an often eclectic mix of theories operating at one or several levels of
analysis. Characteristics of the international system including the distribution of power,
the level of institutionalization and the cultural components of international society have
been considered as influences on state behavior at the structural level. At the state level of
analysis, internal processes including bureaucratic politics, intra- and intergroup
dynamics and the cognitive processes and personal attributes of high-ranking decisionmakers are just some of the elements that are routinely examined for their influence on
state foreign policy formulation. Two puzzles, in particular, have occupied researchers in
the field. The first one is the relationship and relative influence of internal and external
factors on processes of state foreign policy formulation. The second puzzle is the
explanation of policy restructuring which is thought to occur relatively infrequently due
to constraints imposed by domestic path-dependencies created by culture and institutions
on one hand and constraints imposed by the external environment on the other. This
dissertation contributes to both problems through the use of a social theory which
employs the concepts of roles and role behavior.
Roles are important concepts within the context of the turn to culture, ideas and
norms in international relations theory. Role theory offers a complementary account of
the constructed nature of international politics to Wendt’s (1992; 1999) emphasis of
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identities, Onuf’s (1989) consideration of speech acts or Kratochwil’s (1991) use of law.
As properties of the collective, roles establish behavioral expectations on the basis of an
actor’s status, functions or responsibilities within a social environment. When actors
internalize the behavioral patterns associated with certain roles, the behavior becomes
part of their identity. Role-related actions then constitute appropriate behavior and
deviation from the socially validated behavior becomes ‘psychological painful’. By
linking security policy conduct to state roles and viewing policy changes as a type of role
adaptation occurring in response to altered role expectations, the dissertation contributes
directly to the current constructivist research agenda on state socialization.
Socialization is defined as the adoption of the norms, values, attitudes and
behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system (Sigel 1970, vii). By showing
that Germany underwent behavioral changes in the paramount area of security in
response to external socialization processes, the dissertation supports constructivist
claims about the impact of international norms on state behavior. By considering the
impact of strategic culture on elite role conceptions, I also add to the knowledge on
processes of international norm diffusion and domestic resonance. Normative standards
are transferred to the state level through the adaptation of elite role conceptions. This
allows for an explanation of norm diffusion even in the absence of resonance with mass
publics, institutions or strategic cultures.
The contemporary debate between rational and reflectivist approaches in
international relations theory finds utilitarian-rationalist approaches including realism and
liberalism on one side and social constructivism on the other. The approaches suggest
two competing decision-making logics. Rationalism assumes that actors weigh costs and
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benefits of potential policy actions. Behavior is motivated by utilitarian and self-serving
considerations. It is considered instrumental because it is based on the logic of
consequences. The position of reflectivism is linked to the logic of social appropriateness.
Here, actors consider the validity of their actions within the context of cultural
constructions including morals, norms, or community values. By focusing on
socialization processes, I intend to contribute primarily to the tradition of reflectivism.
However, I reject the position of pure reflectivism in favor of one that views the actions
of actors as being motivated by both types of logic. This raises the question of how the
adaptation of role behavior was ‘useful’ to German elites pursuing a range of
instrumental objectives during the ongoing process of international socialization. By
including the domestic dimension of elite interests, this dissertation bridges the divide
between the two positions in an effort to contribute to greater clarity about their
relationship in actual policy situations.
Strategic culture is part of the category of foreign policy approaches that views
state behavior as consequence of domestic characteristics. The central premise of
strategic culture is that states exhibit differential foreign policy behavior due to value sets
generated by unique historical and cultural development trajectories. These value sets
impose broad cultural restraints on elite and public preferences. They define standards of
acceptable foreign policy behavior. A central issue in the study of strategic culture has
been the utility of the concept given that national foreign policy may at times deviate
from the culturally defined value set. Germany’s rediscovery of the use of force is an
excellent example of this problem.
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German strategic culture is widely acknowledged to have changed profoundly
after World War II. The collective trauma incurred by two lost world wars is believed to
have generated a new national culture informed by the central value of antimilitarism.9
Since 1945, political elites and the general public view the efficacy of military force as
negative with a smaller part of the population rejecting force under any circumstance.
Antimilitarism in German culture produces a dilemma for strategic culture approaches
attempting to account for the turn to military force during the 1990s. Did German culture
change in important ways after reunification or does the policy divergence from the value
of antimilitarism indicate problems within the paradigm? Strategic culture studies of the
‘third generation’ suggest the possibility of culture as “the product of more recent
practice and experience” (Johnston 1995a, 41).10 Newer approaches also assume the
existence of separate strategic cultures whose values may inform particular institutions or
groups and act as intervening variables in policy formulation processes.11
The use of elite role conceptions has several advantages for the study of strategic
culture and its use in foreign policy analysis. Elite role conceptions allow for the
differentiation between the value-sets of political elites and society in Germany.
Separating elites and society creates the potential to illuminate processes of domestic
9

Antimilitarism refers to the cultural rejection of militaristic and nationalistic norms held responsible for
what is widely regarded as the ‘German catastrophe’. The term catastrophe conjures up a cluster of
collectively shared negative and traumatic memories. These memories include the elements of
authoritarianism, militarism and jingoism (which expressed itself in a unique form of foreign policy realism
called Geopolitik). The conjunction of these elements is generally perceived as dotting a unique
development path (Sonderweg) which culminated in the disrespect for international law, internal
suppression, genocide and war. See Markovits and Reich (1997) on the importance of collective memory in
structuring cultural parameters in modern Germany.
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Johnston (1995a) categorizes strategic culture studies in three generations of scholars.
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Kier (1995), for example, has compared military cultures in France and Germany during the interwar
period.
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value transformation occurring through elite leadership. Elites also act as interface
between external and domestic cultures. Showing that socialization occurred effectively
shows how strategic cultures - long viewed as generated by internal elements - may be
influenced and even reshaped by external factors. The inclusion of elite actions and
external influence suggests that strategic cultures of states ought to be viewed as much
more malleable and temporary constructions than previously thought.

Methodology and Case Selection
The dissertation employs a structured, focused and comparative case study
methodology to investigate the impact of external expectations on the role conceptions of
German elites between 1990 and 1995. The term structured refers to a method in which
cases are compared by asking the same general questions to guide data collection. This
allows for a systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings. The method is
focused because it investigates specific aspects of the cases as determined by a theoryguided selection in the analysis of cases.12 It differs from a rich historical account in that
it is based on an analytical explanation in which some of the richness of the account is
lost. In return for disregarding some of the case details, the researcher should be able to
verify or falsify the processes among variables as established by the research design. The
combination of rigor in comparison and detailed context in qualitative case studies allows
for the identification of variables and hypotheses, the testing of causal mechanisms as
well as the development of typological theories, or contingent generalizations involving
differentiated types of variables, cases and outcomes (George and Bennett 2005).

12

Notable contributors to the method of structured, focused comparison have been Lijphart (1975), George
(1979) and George and Bennett (1997; 2005).
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Three cases between 1990 and 1995 were chosen for analysis. Each case involved
an important security policy challenge after the Cold War in which German decisionmakers were confronted with external expectations of appropriate foreign policy conduct.
Each case represents a role episode which consists of a complete cycle of role sending,
the response by the focal actor, and the effects of that response on the role senders (Kahn
et al. 1966, 277). German elites had the option to comply with, avoid or reject role
expectations. Throughout the examined period, pressure on German elites to conform by
participating in peace enforcement missions increased steadily as newly arising security
challenges generated organizational responses in the form of revised strategic doctrines.
The concretization of these doctrines increased the normative pressure on elites to give in
to expectations regarding their country’s military contributions. In each case, German
actions or inactions were vital enough to the international social environment to attract
international attention and incur criticism. Finally, during each role episode, elites were
concerned about their country’s role in international politics but also wrestled with
different diplomatic or domestic issues of their own which influenced their ultimate
policy behavior. The social argument for reorientation is tested on the cases of the
Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (19911992) and the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995).
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 created the first major security
challenge of the post-Cold War era. The United States and important NATO allies
quickly developed a consensus on militarily reversing Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.
NATO allies and the UN repeatedly requested German military assistance in the
multilateral effort. Foreign policy elites advocated a new role for Germany through
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formal and informal channels. The country was to show greater responsibility by
militarily contributing to international peace and stability. Germany was expected to act
more commensurate with capabilities, deploying its resources in ways similar to other
great powers. External expectations of German policy behavior ran counter to traditional
role conceptions which disallowed decisive and military engagement in international
politics. German elites were caught between international expectations to alter the
country’s functions in international relations and the tradition of maintaining the civilian
power role conception which had served the country well since 1945. Normative pressure
to alter German behavior coming from important allies and the UN remained relatively
ineffective. Intervention standards were only just beginning to change and German elites
generally failed to grasp the profound changes occurring in the international security
environment that necessitated the use of force.
Conservative elites attempted to meet international expectations and promoted
role behavior changes on the basis of alliance solidarity. They quickly backed down
when challenged by their own coalition-partners and politicians from the left on the basis
of elements of the traditional role conception. FDP politicians articulated concerns with
the legal aspects of German participation while the SPD leadership emphasized negative
views on the efficacy of force. Elite unity was maintained on the basis of the traditional
role conception. Germany declined military assistance and practiced checkbook
diplomacy by contributing considerable amounts of financial assistance. Troops were
deployed to defend NATO ally Turkey from a potential Iraqi attack but only after a
diplomatically damaging domestic discussion. The rise in the number of conscious
objectors and widespread demonstrations for peace throughout Germany indicated that
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the general public continued to reject the use of force. The decisions of political elites
were also influenced by important domestic concerns which made the maintenance of the
traditional role conception advisable from a utilitarian point of view.
Concerns and issues pertaining to the reunification of Germany trumped all other
areas of politics in 1990. The Persian Gulf War could not have occurred at a more
momentous time in the country’s history. At the core of the complicated reunification
process was the negotiation of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty which restored full sovereignty
but had to be ratified by each one of the quadripartite powers. Elites were concerned
about being perceived as playing too assertive a role at a momentous time when the fate
of Germany was decided by foreign publics many of which remained apprehensive about
renewed German strength and national ambitions after reunification. With little guidance
from international intervention norms, a somewhat euphoric mindset about newfound
possibilities of international governance after the Cold War and the need to complete
German reunification, elite role conceptions coalesced on the basis of the country’s
civilian power role. The Persian Gulf War episode marked the beginning of the process
of role adaptation.
In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia.
Nationalistic constitutions were passed that insufficiently protected the rights of the
sizable Serb minority still residing in the newly independent states. Civil war broke out as
the Serb-controlled Yugoslav army intervened to safeguard the territorial integrity of the
state of Yugoslavia and protect the rights of the Serb minority. The international
community withheld recognition of the two breakaway republics while hostilities
intensified. German policy reactions first remained within the international consensus to
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maintain Yugoslav unity. In the fall of 1991, German politicians diverted from that
consensus and mounted an intense diplomatic campaign to recognize Croatia and
Slovenia. Chancellor Kohl and his foreign minister Genscher made informal assurances
of official recognition to the leaders of the states. Germany began to play an increasingly
more assertive role which eventually forced the European Union to move towards
recognition. Having achieved its diplomatic objectives, Germany still found it necessary
to extend recognition unilaterally in early 1992. This diplomatic act stunned international
observers and alienated the country’s close allies. Heavy international criticism over the
assertive role followed Germany’s first major unilateral action after the Cold War.
The recognition episode saw international norms of sovereignty and state
recognition clash with those of national self-determination and intervention. Normative
latitude allowed individual countries to pursue their national interests. German elites
bandwagoned on the recognition train after politicians noticed that dramatic political
action to stop the violence in Yugoslavia resonated with the electorate. Germany’s
unilateral recognition may be understood in terms of elite electoral interests and the need
to resolve a major crisis without recourse to the use of force within the context of
underdetermined normative standards regarding intervention that characterized the
international social environment at this time.
The Bosnian Civil War between 1992 and 1995 constituted the central period of
German security policy reorientation. Here, lessons learned from the previous role
episodes, in conjunction with the ongoing concretization of global security norms
translated into increasing social pressure on German elites to change their country’s
position on the use of force. Massive human rights violations in Bosnia and the failing
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efforts of international institutions also contributed to changes in elite perceptions. The
civilian power role conception based on the rejection of military force became
increasingly untenable. The civil war featured a series of smaller role episodes including
the 1993 decision to allow German crews to stay on NATO-run AWAC monitoring
missions over Bosnia, the deployment of Tornado fighter jets for reconnaissance missions
in June of 1995, and the eventual deployment of troops as part of the multilateral
Implementation Force (IFOR) enforcing the Dayton Agreement. The 1994 decision of the
Constitutional Court to allow German military participation in out-of-area actions as part
of allied peace enforcement operations was widely regarded as historic, as was the
country’s deployment of the largest contingent of troops outside of German territory
since World War II. During the episode(s), Germany also joined the high-profile Contact
Group which sought to negotiate an end to the conflict in Bosnia. Finally, the country
developed a strong interest in gaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security
Council.

Conclusion and Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation explores a fundamental reorientation in security policy in the
case of Germany since reunification. The central principle under investigation is the use
of force although the more general focus is on the conceptions elites hold about their
country’s role in international relations after the Cold War. The main process of
reorientation occurred between 1990 and 1995 when Germany sent significant numbers
of combat troops outside of its territory for the first time since World War II. Since then,
Germany has become a major contributor to international peace-keeping missions under
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UN and NATO auspices. The country has also sought to increase its diplomatic profile as
indicated by the country’s persistent attempts at acquiring a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council. Domestic institutions have been reshaped to accommodate role
adaptation and long-standing interpretations of strategic doctrines have been challenged.
The German Constitutional Court supported out-of-area missions in 1993 and 1994 and
the Bundeswehr has been restructured to develop the capabilities for rapid deployment
outside of German territory. Germany’s embrace of the use of force remains at odds with
its strategic culture that emphasizes the importance of unique post-war values and
institutions inhibiting the use of force outside of German territory. This study proposes
that security policy reorientation occurred as a function of new elite understandings of
German responsibilities after the Cold War. These were generated by new understandings
of the international security environment which established new role-specific
expectations of important actors within the system.
The dissertation will proceed in the following way: Chapter 2 presents the context
and the outlines of a social theory explaining the process of security policy reorientation
between 1990 and 1995 as well as the methodology employed. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 apply
the theory to three cases which are considered as role episodes because of their social
nature: The Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-1991), the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia
(1991-1992), and the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995). The Bosnian Civil War is crucial
to understanding reorientation because international expectations became concretized and
role pressure to conform eventually forced German compliance. Because of its
importance to the argument, the case is presented in greater detail with an emphasis on
the following policy situations and debates: Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic Sea,
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Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia-Herzegovina, Operation Deliberate Force and the
enforcement of the Dayton Agreements through NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR).
Chapter 6 revisits the theory, presents the findings, addresses contributions to ongoing
debates in the research areas of norm diffusion, strategic culture and foreign policy
analysis and concludes by suggesting an agenda for further research.
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CHAPTER II
SOCIALIZATION THROUGH ROLE EPISODES
Introduction
Understanding the behavior of states is one of the most complex undertakings in
political science. The over-simplified view of states as both unitary and rational actors
reacting to systemic challenges has long ceased to be of much use in foreign policy
analysis. Approaches that focus on the interplay of domestic actors, institutions and
processes frequently downplay or neglect the impact of the external milieu. More useful
approaches will account for the unique characteristics of the state under observation
while also considering the impact of external factors. A more complex theory “that
considers…multiple levels and that grabbles with the intricacies of the link between
domestic and international factors in foreign policy analysis is by nature more
cumbersome and messier” (Haar 2001, 8). The theory of foreign policy reorientation to
be presented combines the quest for generalization with the need to include the unique
details of processes within Germany.
I begin by presenting a brief overview of the context of German security policy
including a historical account of security policy during the Cold War period and the
discussion of unique cultural and institutional factors. After that, this chapter will cover
the main theoretical approaches to German foreign policy from which hypotheses about
foreign policy preferences can be deduced. I then lay out a social theory of German
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foreign policy reorientation. The chapter ends by presenting the methodology employed
including a list of research questions used for comparative analysis and the consideration
of data sources.

The Context of German Security Policy
German Security Policy during the Cold War
Germany has played a crucial role in the history of the world. Divided into a
patchwork of independent states, modern Germany was proclaimed after a war with
France in 1871. The comparatively late consolidation of the state was followed by a fastpaced modernization process. In the interest of national unity and power, democracy and
liberal values were sacrificed by some and systematically suppressed by others. The
nationalistic strategies pursued by the powerful state would weigh heavily on future
generations. Associated with Germany’s modernization between 1864 and 1945 were
aggressive wars, millions of military and civilian casualties as well as millions of murders
perpetrated as part of the genocidal policies of the Third Reich. World War II resulted in
Germany’s total military defeat, sociopolitical bankruptcy and utter physical destruction.
Two newly emergent superpowers had finally dealt with the problem of unbalanced
hegemony in Central Europe. The division of Europe resolved the German problem by
keeping the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down.13

13

The original statement attributed to Lord Ismay was that “NATO was designed to keep the Americans in,
the Russians out and the Germans down” (quoted in Ash 1993, 389). Ash (1993, 358) writes that “both the
Atlantic Alliance and the European Community were to save Europe from itself - that is, from reverting to
the bad old ways of warring nation states -, to protect all of Western Europe from the Soviet Union and to
protect the rest of Western Europe against Germany”.
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The Federal Republic of Germany came into existence in 1949 when British,
American and French occupation zones were merged and a new capital was established
in Bonn. Also that year, the German Democratic Republic emerged from the Soviet
occupation zone as a communist client state of the Soviet Union. Two central objectives
determined the foreign policy of the Federal Republic during the early post-war years:
The desire to reintegrate the country into the world community as a sovereign state after
the total defeat and the reunification of the German nation.
The historic burden created by the aggressive and nationalistic policies of the past
weighed heavily on the new republic. To overcome this burden, Chancellor Adenauer
pursued a foreign policy aimed at reestablishing trust with Germany’s former occupiers.
The policy of Western integration (Westbindung) clearly prioritized the unequivocal
positioning of Germany as part of the emerging Western alliance and, only to a secondary
degree, involved efforts aimed at reunification. As part of Westpolitik and the goal of
reintegration, German political elites pursued their country’s membership in international
organizations. Support for multilateralism and international governance would become a
defining characteristic of post-World War II German foreign policy. Germany signed the
Treaty of Paris in 1951 which established the European Coal and Steel Community,
joined NATO in 1955, and also signed the Rome Treaty of 1957 which established the
European Economic Community. The decision to rearm and join NATO was
controversial given a profoundly altered strategic culture characterized by the central
value of antimilitarism. Opposition parties used moral, financial and even constitutional
arguments to prevent rearmament (Lantis 2002b, 73). In the end, rearmament and NATO
membership was achieved with unique provisions assigning the Bundeswehr’s 340,000
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combat forces to NATO rather than German central command. The German military
became an alliance army, designed to play its part in maintaining a credible deterrent. It
was not intended to be a fighting force employable for the pursuit of Germany’s national
security policy objectives. In return, allied countries stationed troops in Germany as
defense against Soviet aggression and pledged to protect Germany through both
conventional and nuclear means (Ibid.). Germany also renounced weapons of mass
destruction in 1954 and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975. When
the Adenauer cabinet agreed to the stationing of US nuclear warheads on German soil, a
contentious campaign against the decision erupted between 1957 and 1958. The nuclear
weapons debate ended when the Social Democratic party dropped its resistance to
Germany’s Western orientation. Elite preferences prevailed over public concern about
stationing weapons of mass destruction.
Compared to the diplomatic flexibility and innovation of Westpolitik, policy
towards East Germany and Eastern Europe had appeared stilted and dogmatic. Political
gestures including the use of the term Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the new constitution
to indicate the open-ended nature of German state building could not disguise the fact
that German policy towards the East was dictated by Western priorities which, in turn,
became increasingly subjected to the imperatives of the Cold War.
Between 1955 and 1969, the Federal Republic attempted to isolate and
delegitimize the communist regime in East Germany through the use of an exclusive
mandate to representation known as the Hallstein Doctrine. The policy directive
threatened the termination of diplomatic relations with states that chose to recognize the
Democratic Republic. It was applied inconsistently and alienated governments in many
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parts of the world. It also prevented the establishment of relations with Eastern European
countries because it ran counter to the interests of the Soviet Union. To correct that
problem, Adenauer’s successor Erhard attempted to revitalize German foreign policy in
1963 by starting a diplomatic initiative to conclude friendship treaties with Eastern
European states designed to isolate East Germany. However, the Soviet Union quickly
countered these efforts by signing a mutual assistance treaty with East Germany in 1964.
Even the successful establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania in 1967 would
do little to validate a policy that had clearly failed in its primary objective to reestablish
ties with Eastern Europe without surrendering the claim to the exclusive mandate. A
fundamental reorientation of foreign policy was needed. It would not be achieved until
the cabinet of Willy Brandt in 1969. Chancellor Brandt’s foreign policy initiative known
as Ostpolitik was designed to reconnect West and East through a series of important
agreements.
Brandt quickly moved towards a realistic acceptance of the territorial status in
Europe by signing non-aggression treaties with Poland and the USSR. After that, the as
yet unsolved status of Berlin was finally settled through the Four Power Agreement of
1971 which affirmed joint quadripartite rights and responsibilities for Germany. With
East Germany, the Federal Republic signed a comprehensive Basic Treaty in 1972 which
extended de facto recognition to East Germany as ‘German state of the same nation’. As
such, sovereignty of the East German regime was not fully recognized - a distinction that
was lost on the rest of the world which quickly recognized the German Democratic
Republic. The foreign policy reorientation was possible because the period of détente
during the early 1970s had increased the policy latitude of German politicians. In turn,
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German Ostpolitik became the centerpiece of superpower détente. The period culminated
in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 in which 35 European countries and the US established a
range of important provisions including the inviolability of borders and respect for
territorial integrity. The norms supporting sovereignty were highly useful because they
allowed for the peaceful coexistence of diametrically opposed regimes during the Cold
War. They would only be challenged when the Cold War ended and its associated
security environment was superseded by one characterized by greater instabilities.
The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 effectively ended the period known
as détente. Additional tensions had emerged over Soviet efforts to modernize its theatre
nuclear forces in Europe. With the deployment of the intermediate range SS-20 missiles
in 1977, the growing imbalance in tactical missiles became a major cause for concern in
Western Europe because the strategic arms control agreements SALT I and SALT II had
neutralized US superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles.14 When NATO addressed
the imbalance through the Double Track Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces in
December 1979, Chancellor Schmidt agreed to have Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) stationed in Germany. The Bundestag would approve Schmidt’s initial decision in
1983 but the prospect of stationing large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in
Germany again created major problems given the country’s antimilitant culture. A vocal
peace movement opposing the deployment of INF weapons developed.15 The vehement
public resistance would soon raise questions abroad about German reliability within the
14

NATO, Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers, The “Double-Track” Decision on Theatre
Nuclear Forces, 1979, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm, accessed October 13,
2009.
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A petition against INF deployment called the ‘Krefeld Appeal’ had received over 1.5 million signatures
by 1982 (See Boutwell 1983, 80).
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alliance. The emergence of the movement was part of more fundamental processes of
change within German society that had been ongoing since the late 1960s.16 The
consequences of these social and political changes were now beginning to affect the
traditional party spectrum and the positions of parties.
The German peace movement had its roots in the anti-nuclear energy campaigns
and the rise of environmental concerns of the 1970s. The political leadership of the
diverse movement was provided by the Green Party. Formed in the 1970s as an
antiestablishment party, the Greens were quickly gaining prominence among voters
dissatisfied by the centrist consensus maintained by the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP. In the
early 1980s, the party greatly benefited from its firm pacifist position and the stance
against nuclear proliferation. Electoral support for the Green Party increased and in 1983,
Greens first achieved parliamentary representation by garnering 5.6 percent of the
electoral vote. By 1987, party support had soared to 8.3 percent as increasing numbers of
formerly social democratic voters switched to a party that better represented their core
concerns. Voter realignment processes also affected the CDU/CSU as main party on the
right spectrum.
In 1983, disenchanted members of the CSU formed the right-wing populist party
Die Republikaner. Languishing for a number of years, the party’s electoral fortunes
improved when Germany faced a surge in the number of refugees and illegal immigrants
during the late 1980s. During the 1989 Berlin elections, the party took 7.5 percent of the
vote, followed by 7.1 percent in the European elections (Betz 1993, 415). The federal
elections of 1990 were relatively disappointing for the party because it failed to gain
16

See Boutwell (1983) for a more detailed overview of the origins of the peace movement.
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parliamentary representation. However, successes continued at the regional level where
the rightwing party continued to siphon electoral support from the CDU/CSU by
appealing to conservative voting groups. In April 1992, the Republiker Party received
almost 12 percent of the vote in the state of Baden-Württemberg (Ibid.). Rightwing
successes at the regional level had the potential to reduce CDU/CSU power in Germany’s
upper house. Both SPD and CDU/CSU leaders were eager to prevent the other party from
becoming a co-governing force in Germany’s federal system through control of the
powerful Bundesrat. In sum, the successes of more radical parties on both sides of the
spectrum generated pressure on established parties to reexamine their programs in an
effort to maintain voter appeal.
For the Social Democrats as traditional advocates for peace, the programmatic
challenge posed by the Greens initiated discussions about abandoning centrist policy
orientations maintained since Chancellor Schmidt. Influential party members began to
argue that the party ought to move further to the left in order to regain the support of
young voter groups who had been lost to the Greens (Berger 1998, 164). CDU/CSU
politicians responded to pressure from the right wing by embracing the issue of
immigration reform which they saw as fuelling support for more extreme positions. Both
CDU/CSU and SPD were also struggling with considerable membership declines as
citizens increasingly preferred grassroots engagement to active participation in the catchall parties.17 For liberal politicians of the FDP, the most pressing issue was the potential
loss of their kingmaker position in coalition governments which was in danger of being
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See Kvistad (1999) for a more detailed overview of changes in participation and party membership
during the early 1990s.
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usurped by the Green Party. Thus, the years preceding reunification were characterized
by realignment processes in the traditional party system which increased elite concerns
about maintaining electoral support. These processes coincided with the dramatic chain
of events that would radically transform international politics.
Mikhail Gorbachev took control of the Soviet Union in 1985. He ended the Cold
War dynamic between the superpowers through a series of bold foreign policy moves.
Perhaps most momentous among those decisions was his abandonment of the Brezhnev
Doctrine which had threatened independent regime change in Eastern European countries
with military intervention by the Soviet Union.18 A series of earthshaking transitions
swept across Europe. The changes began with the legalization of the Solidarity
Movement in Poland in April 1989 and culminated with the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in December 1991. The Cold War effectively ended and its relatively stable
bipolar security environment soon gave way to more uncertain conditions and new
security threats. Nationalist conflicts, disintegrating states, genocide and large-scale
refugee problems reemerged as security problems in Europe. The challenges of the new
security environment created the need for revised threat definitions, response doctrines
and capabilities to address the emerging problems associated with domestic instabilities.
International organizations including NATO, UN, OSCE, EU and WEU responded by
strengthening the emphasis on the principle of multilateral intervention. Rapid
intervention doctrines and the expanding peacekeeping agenda of international
18

The Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 justified the external suppression of anti-socialist developments in
socialist countries. It was articulated by the Soviet Union in response to liberal reforms in Czechoslovakia
commonly known as the Prague Spring which were ended through the invasion of the country. For a full
text of the speech given by Soviet Leader Brezhnev see
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/pgc.asp?page=mod/1968brezhnev.html (accessed May 19, 2009).
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organizations required new national capabilities thus prompting both reorganization and
modernization of national militaries to accommodate the new mission spectrum. The
required changes produced particular problems for Germany.
Germany’s ‘alliance army’ was a blunt sword designed for little else but territorial
defense against a massive attack. Antimilitarism had made achieving rearmament and
NATO membership a heavily contested process in 1955. Now that the Cold War had
ended, Germany’s public expected a ‘peace dividend’. Powerful antimilitary institutions,
widespread pacifist attitudes and negative views on the efficacy of military force all made
reorganization and modernization of the Bundeswehr a politically difficult goal.
Nevertheless, the changing requirements created by the international security
environment exerted pressure on the country’s elites and its public to consider the basis
for a new consensus on Germany’s role in world politics.
The overview of German security policy until reunification reveals three central
contextual elements important in understanding the security policy reorientation of the
1990s. The first element is the persistence of the value of antimilitarism characterizing
the strategic culture of the Federal Republic. The public’s rejection of the use of force
resulted in repeated challenges to government policy during the 1950s and early 1980s.
The profound skepticism about both appropriateness and usefulness of military force
present in strategic culture imposed constraints on elite decision-making in issues or
policy actions involving the use of force. A second element is Germany’s strong
preference for multilateral foreign policy and regional integration coupled with the
aversion to having the country assume a leadership role in international political affairs
(Hyde-Price 2003, 187). Political elites have literally been obsessed with having the
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country appear as calculable and reliable partner who honors international commitments
(Duffield 1999, 782). Lastly, the survey of Germany’s security policy during the Cold
War period indicates the crucial role played by parliamentary elites. Elites redirected
security policy at important junctures in the history of the Federal Republic. They
pursued German remilitarization, firmly committed the country to the NATO alliance and
consented to the stationing of nuclear weapons. At times, elite actions went contrary to
public opinion and even deviated from central values established by strategic culture. It is
plausible to view political elites as promoters and agents of the security policy
reorientation process that took place during the 1990s. Germany’s decision-makers
reacted to external demands generated by a transformed security environment.

Strategic Culture and Institutions
A central problem for any explanation of foreign policy reorientation is the strong
inertia attached to institutions and processes characterizing the domestic realm of policymaking which makes radical and durable shifts in foreign policy comparatively rare
phenomena (Volgy and Schwarz 1991, 617). A domestic ‘web of constraint’ is created by
factors such as bureaucratic processes, the path-dependencies generated by prior
decisions and institutions, ideological commitments and limitations imposed by national
resources. This web restricts the ability of leaders to effectuate fundamental foreign
policy change (Volgy and Schwarz 1994, 27).19 In part, the problem is due to a tendency
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Insights from organizational theory, in particular, suggest that institutions are more stable than the
environment they operate in. Resource constraints and high transaction costs associated with changes in
organizational parameters tend to reduce the pace and extent of adaptation. Organizational inertia is further
maintained through behavioral standards, selection biases in recruitment and socialization, tasks and
operating procedures, rituals, jargon, perceptions and shared memories (Welch 2005, 32-33).
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in foreign policy analysis to focus on stable patterns and to “treat breaks in patterns as
exceptions, as nuisances which complicate our task” (Rosenau 1976, 371).20 National
policy path-dependencies are frequently the result of values contained within strategic
culture which suffuse existing institutions and constrain individual preferences. German
strategic culture and security policy institutions are characterized by a set of unique
values which provided the context for policy reorientation of the 1990s.
Strategic culture has been defined as “ideas, conditional emotional responses, and
patterns of habitual behavior” (Snyder 1977, 8) or “a limited, ranked set of grand
strategic preferences” (Johnston 1995, 38). The concept refers to enduring national
tendencies that arise from unique and prolonged historical experiences (Longhurst 2004,
17; Gray 1986, 36-7). Strategic culture acts a collectively shared framework, filter or
prism which determines individuals’ interpretation of reality (Poore 2004, 50). It suffuses
society and its political institutions. It imposes constraints on elite action by establishing
standards on what is considered natural and common sense (Kier 1995, 78; Duffield
1999, 772). Crucial elements in strategic culture are the “modes of thought and action
with respect to force” (Gray 1986, 36-7; Johnston 1995; Longhurst 2004, 17). In its
rejection of military force, German strategic culture since 1945 is considered unusual.
Germany underwent a permanent shift in its strategic culture after World War II
(Berger 1998; Duffield 1998; Longhurst 2004; Malici 2006). A history of state
repression, unilateral diplomacy and external aggression associated with values of
militarism and hyper-nationalism culminated in two lost world wars which devastated the
20

The statement retains considerable validity even given the democratic transitions of the 1990s and the
studies of these regime changes. See Bunce (2000) for an overview of factors affecting democratic regime
changes.
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country. These extreme and traumatic events produced a discontinuity in strategic culture
(Longhurst 2004, 25). A condition of ‘collective infancy’ resulted during which Germans
had to relearn “affective and evaluative schemes” including matters related to the role of
the armed forces in society and the use of military force (Ibid.). The value of
antimilitarism came to dominate Germany’s transformed strategic culture.
Antimilitarism is the belief that war is generally indefensible and that military
force is an inferior and preventable means of addressing disagreements between states.
This negative view on the efficacy of military force results in critical predispositions
towards military institutions and ideas within society. Antimilitarism as measured in
terms of public attitudes on the utility of force has characterized German society since
1945. Heated domestic debates over rearmament during the late 1950s, the INF
deployment during the 1980s and the Bundeswehr ‘out-of-area” missions of the 1990s
indicate the powerful influence of antimilitarism in German culture. Even with the
expanding military commitments since 1995, the German public continues to exhibit a
profound skepticism about both appropriateness and usefulness of military force
(Haumann and Petersen 2004, 316; Hyde-Price 2003, 187).21 Peace is considered an
absolute value and the presence of gross injustices or violations of international law in
other countries does not automatically generate popular support for military action
(Duffield 1999, 780). The power of antimilitarism in German state and society is further
enhanced by the relative weakness of nationalism. Nationalism is perceived as enabler of
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A survey conducted in 1999 by the Allensbach Institute on the question of humanitarian intervention
revealed a majority of young Germans (ages 14-19) opposing war under any circumstances (Haumann and
Petersen 2004, 316).
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militarism and major cause of war. Until the 1990s, the use of nationalist appeals and
arguments in politics, common in other countries, was considered inappropriate.
Antimilitarism and negative views on the efficacy of military force explain the
public’s persistent opposition to increasing national defense spending. The majority of
citizens supported reductions in defense expenditures after the Cold War. It has since
favored keeping defense spending at the comparatively low levels of the post-Cold War
era and even decreasing it (Berger 1998, 155). As percentage of GDP, defense spending
has consistently declined since reunification and remains low in comparison with other
great powers.22 The low military budgets and public resistance to even minor increases
have acted as constraints on elite efforts directed at modernizing and reorganizing the
Bundeswehr.
Calculability or predictability is the second key value in German strategic culture.
Outside observers have frequently commented on the obsession of political elites to have
Germany appear as calculable and reliable partner who honors international commitments
- a concept Germans call Berechenbarkeit (Duffield 1999, 782). Multilateralism, defined
as “the practice to co-ordinate national policies in groups of three or more states”
(Keohane 1990, 731), is a behavioral manifestation of the value of calculability. A second
behavior type is elite aversion to having Germany assume a leadership role in
international political affairs (Hyde-Price 2003, 187). The central strategic values of
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In 1990, Germany spent 2.8 percent of GDP on defense, compared to 3.4 percent for France, 3.9 percent
for the United Kingdom and 5.3 percent for the United States. By 1995, those numbers were 1.6 percent for
Germany, 3 percent for France and the United Kingdom and 3.8 for the United States. German defense
expenditures as percentage of GDP have continued to decline, reaching 1.3 percent of GDP in 2006
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4 (accessed March
15, 2009).
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antimilitarism and calculability are sustained by important national security institutions
created after the militaristic institutions of the past had been abolished.
The German constitution or Basic Law, promulgated in 1949, plays a crucial role
in the country’s security policy because it constrains options of both decision-makers and
outlines the basic functions of the armed forces. The constitution explicitly prohibits the
use of force for aggressive purposes by making the preparation of aggressive war
unconstitutional and perpetrators punishable (Article 26a). This makes the military
accountable for its actions on the basis of national and international law. The constitution
allows the use of the German armed forces other than for defense only if explicitly
stipulated by the Basic Law (Article 87a) and also establishes a citizen’s right to refuse
military service for reasons of conscience (Article 66). In addition to supporting
antimilitarism, the document creates the basis for German multilateralism in security
policy by allowing for the country’s participation in collective security organizations as
long as these institutions serve the maintenance of peace (Article 24). The unusual
inclusion of this article is viewed as an indicator of a preference for the pursuit of
multilateral security policy (Baumann 2001, 146; Berger 1998, 31). Germany’s
constitution strongly influences the organization and institutional culture of its armed
forces.
The organizational structure of the German military supports the multilateral and
antimilitant tendencies observed in other institutions. Completely integrated into NATO’s
military structure, the Bundeswehr was established as alliance army (Baumann 2001,
147) without a general staff (Paterson 2000, 27). The multilateral security orientation and
the firm integration into NATO’s command structure was upheld after the Two-plus-Four
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Treaty in 1990 restored full German sovereignty in military matters (Duffield 1999, 783).
The Bundeswehr remains an alliance army that is ill-suited to unilateral and nationalist
policy objectives. The organizational culture of the Bundeswehr is defined by a unique
philosophical concept referred to as inner guidance (Innere Führung).
Inner guidance is the foundational element of German civil-military relations. It
conceptualizes German soldiers as citizen in uniform (Bürger in Uniform) who serve the
state in the capacity of a soldier but remain citizens throughout the time of service. This
preserves the soldier’s full rights and establishes individual responsibilities on the basis
of the values and norms enumerated in the German constitution. A soldier’s primary
obligation rests with constitutional principles guaranteeing inviolable and inalienable
human rights rather than the military command. Institutionalized respect for
constitutional principles and the maintenance of the soldiers’ connection with society are
intended to strengthening liberal-democratic values in the armed forces (Hyde-Price
2003, 186). The resulting military has been characterized by a critical orientation towards
the use of force which mirrors the general antimilitant predisposition of society. Civilmilitary connections are also maintained by the institution of national military service
which is viewed as preventing the emergence of a military controlled by a particular
group or class (Kohl 1996; Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999, 35 and 43).
The brief overview of German cultural and institutional characteristics indicates
that considerable societal impediments to security policy reorientation existed during the
1990s. But these factors also offered unique possibilities for policy transformation. The
value of antimilitarism and its associated behavioral preference for non-military actions
in global politics would not remain uncontested given the value of calculability which
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established the need for compliance with multilateral policy decisions. Germany’s
advanced levels of integration in multilateral security institutions created opportunities
and settings for agents pursuing the objective of policy reorientation. The country’s
reliance on external sources to validate its post-Cold War identity as calculable and
reliable member of the Western alliance established foreign expectations of German
contributions to international security as significant factors that would create both
obligations and incentives for elites to engineer changes in the country’s central foreign
policy principles.

Foreign Policy Analysis: Internal and External Factors
Security policy reorientations are durable transformations of the traditional
security policy patterns of a state actor. Alternatively called policy restructuring, policy
shift or policy redirection, reorientation involves the revision of a state’s traditional
stance on important issues or challenges emanating from the environment. Reorientation
differs from but usually affects specific policy decisions, general guidelines or strategic
doctrines, observable behavior or verbal pronouncements.23 Within mature democracies,
shifts from established parameters of foreign policy behavior may also be related to
changes in public opinion, political institutions and a country’s collectively shared
security values or strategic culture. Reorientation is a foreign policy phenomenon. As
such, the central questions in the field of foreign policy analysis also pertain to this class
of events. Nothing is more central in the field than the debate about the relative influence
of internal and external influences on state behavior.
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This definition is an adaptation of that of foreign policy used by Kaarbo, Lantis and Beasley (2002, 4).
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The question of what drives national foreign policy - domestically generated
interests or structural constraints - comes with the territory. States are bounded entities
within the international environment. Leaders of states act as liaisons between the
domestic and external sphere and deploy foreign policy “to mediate the impact of the
external on the domestic and to find ways of projecting a particular set of concerns in a
very intractable world” (Hill 2003, 31). The nature of foreign policy as gateway between
two connected worlds suggests that it can be influenced from either direction. Many
approaches have concentrated on illuminating one or the other side of the relationship.
Domestic-level approaches have been very prevalent in foreign policy analysis
(Fearon 1998).24 Some noteworthy studies of important domestic factors include the
impact of decision-makers, their personalities and cognitive processes (George 1969;
Volgy and Schwarz 1991; Hermann et al. 2001; Steinbruner 1974; Axelrod 1976; Rosati
2000; Malici 2006; Hagan 2001), elites and elite turnover (Brunk and Minehart 1984),
bureaucratic processes (Allison 1999, Halperin and Clapp 2007, Drezner 2000), regime
changes (Bunce 1976; 1981), coalition behavior (Lantis 2002; Putnam 1988), party
ideology (Rathburn 2004), state-society relations (Risse-Kappen 1991; Katzenstein 1977;
1997), military doctrine (Kier 1997, Legro 1995), strategic culture (Gray 1981; Johnston
1995; Hudson 1997; Berger 1998; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006), and public opinion (Burstein
2003; 2006; Holsti 1992). Governments ultimately make foreign policy decisions. The
strength of domestic level approaches lies in uncovering the actors, institutions, doctrines
and cultural values impacting processes of foreign policy decision-making. Domestic
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Fearon (1998, 290) notes that between 1987 and 1996, slightly more than one-third of 193 abstracts from
International Organization invoke domestic-political factors as independent or intervening variables.
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level approaches have been criticized for being reductionist because they either neglect or
downplay the importance of stimuli and constraints emanating from the international
system (Waltz 1979). Environmental influences are captured in theories of international
politics. Three international relations paradigms are routinely used to develop hypotheses
on state foreign policy conduct.
The neorealist paradigm views the international environment in Hobbesian
fashion. Anarchy defines the international system which imposes the primacy of survival
as state security objective. States are the preeminent actors which view gains in relative
terms. This limits their ability to engage in cooperative and multilateral behavior.25 The
distribution of power within the system, known as polarity, directly affects state behavior
because the differential state capabilities establish power-based categories of states. The
foreign policy behavior of a great power is deemed to be characterized by a tendency to
preserve its foreign policy autonomy while states with less capability will tend to seek
influence (Rittberger 2001; Baumann 2001). State conduct deviating from this standard is
viewed as temporary occurrence because the international environment will have a
tendency to ‘normalize’ state policy to reflect inherent actor capabilities.
Neo-liberal institutionalist approaches to understanding foreign policy and foreign
policy reorientation consider the impact of international institutions on state conduct.
Representing this perspective, Keohane states that “the nature and strength of
international institutions are also important determinants of expectations and therefore of
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Multilateral arrangements do not necessarily provide evidence for multilateralism. Even within the
European Union, states have jealously guarded their national sovereignty by refusing to shift real power
from the intergovernmental European Council to truly supranational institutions such as the Commission or
the European Parliament (Hacke 1998). Consistent French support for European integration may well be
understood as a means to control Germany or the desire to amplify its own influence (Loriaux 1999).
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state behavior” (Hoffmann, Keohane, and Mearsheimer 1990, 193). States are
conceptualized as rational utility-maximizers that value cooperation over the costs
imposed by conditions characterized by unregulated relations. States will adapt their
foreign policy behavior to international rules in an effort to better pursue a range of
utilitarian objectives. As rules evolve and connect actors in increasingly more complex
networks of interdependence, multilateral policy conduct and the reliance on international
organizations to pursue collective, international goals become widespread (Keohane and
Nye 1977). Neoliberal institutionalists contend that after bipolarity, interdependence
remains the single most important structural feature of the international system (Peters
2001).
Social constructivists see the international environment as possessing a cultural,
interactive quality in which social relations create normative understandings between
actors which lead to the coordination of values, expectations and behavior (Finnemore
1996, 192). States adopt international norms, understandings or principles and redirect
their foreign policy out of a desire to comply with standards of behavior that are
generally considered socially acceptable or appropriate. Changes are pursued by domestic
norm entrepreneurs who have “strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior”
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896).26 Initial compliance with externally generated norms
may be the result of utilitarian considerations as leaders perceive benefits for ‘doing the
right thing’. Over time, decision-makers may internalize what they now consider as
appropriate behavior and it becomes associated with identity or role. In advanced stages
26

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896) define norm entrepreneurs as “agents having strong notions about
appropriate or desirable behavior in their community”. The authors see them as playing a crucial role in the
norm building process.
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of socialization, actors assume new identities and the transformed behavioral patterns
become ‘second nature’. Deviation from the norm will become less likely as norms
reconstitute interests and reshaped domestic institutions lock in the changes.
International relations paradigms suggest general preference patterns for states
including tendencies towards maximizing power (neorealism), pursuing cooperation
(neo-liberal institutionalism) and valuing social compliance (constructivism). Theories of
international politics do not explain differences in state foreign policy conduct resulting
from internal factors. The suggested policy preferences for power (neo-realism),
cooperation (neo-liberalism) and social compliance (constructivism) constitute broad
guidelines of state action and rarely determine foreign policy directly.27
A third path taken in foreign policy analysis involves attempts to reconcile the
close relationship between the domestic and the international sphere by explaining
foreign policy as the result of conjunctions of external and internal factors. Hanrieder
suggested that foreign policy was a “continuous process bridging the analytical barriers
between the international and the domestic political system” (1967, 977). Feasible
foreign policy goals were those that were both compatible with the “strictures and
opportunities of the international system” and enjoyed a sufficient degree of domestic
consensus on the ends and means of foreign policies (Ibid.). Responding to Waltz’s
criticism of state-level explanations of foreign policy, Gourevitch proposed his ‘second
image reversed’ in which domestic outcomes are seen as shaped by international factors
(1978). Other important contributions include the prolific research on two level games in
which rational decision-makers are viewed as negotiating international agreements that
27

Waltz (1979, 121) wrote on the issue that “it is an error… to mistake a theory of international politics for
a theory of foreign policy”.
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enhance the power of supporting coalitions on the domestic side (Putnam 1988; Evans,
Jacobsen, and Putnam 1993). More parsimonious models have also been constructed.
Alons, for example, argues that factors understood as internal and external polarities
determine a states’ foreign policy direction (2007). Frequently, crises or external shocks
are seen as playing an important role, particularly in accounting for foreign policy
reorientation. Hermann, for instance, views dramatic international events as accounting
for the majority of foreign policy change (1990, 14). For Krasner, crises force the
adaptation of policies that are “no longer feasible” (1976, 341). Lantis sees decisionmakers reacting to ‘strategic dilemmas’ which he defines as “regional or international
crises that demand a response from great powers and may prompt realignment in foreign
policy” (2002a, 5). Ikenberry considers the effect of particular historical moments that
empower specific expert groups who redefine state conceptions of the national interest
through new policy approaches and philosophies (1993, 59).
More recent attempts to connect external with internal variables have evolved out
the social constructivist research agenda which investigates the impact of international
norms, understandings and principles on domestic politics. Notable investigations of
successful or unsuccessful norm diffusion include studies of human rights norms (Risse,
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996), the taboo on
weapons of mass destruction (Price and Tannenwald 1996), conceptions of state
citizenship (Checkel 1999; 2001), liberal-democratic institutions (Flockhart 2005;
Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig 2001), and policy towards ethnic minorities (Kelley
2004). Increasingly, the constructivist research focus has moved to an examination of the
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sociopolitical processes by which transnational and domestic actors utilize international
norms and promote transformations in state laws, policies and principles.
The proposed theory follows in the tradition of explaining foreign policy change
as the result of a conjunction of external and internal factors. It contributes to the social
constructivist tradition that views state policy changes as a result of the diffusion of
international norms and understandings. I hypothesize that Germany was socialized by
the international system, understood as international organizations and important allies, to
assume the rank and to exhibit the behavior of a great power. Social expectations
prompted German security policy reorientation, not changes in the distribution of power
as postulated by realist approaches. Germany was pressured to play the role of a
responsible ally in the global system by contributing commensurate with capabilities
which included the use of force. Changes in foreign policy behavior were the result of
transformations of the conceptions held by political elites about Germany’s appropriate
role within the international system.

National Role Conceptions
The focal point of the current constructivist research agenda is the study of social
and cultural variables. A key variable deemed to affect the behavior of actors is that of
identity. Succinctly stated, identity may be understood as an actor’s conception of itself.28
Identities emerge as the result of a combination of internal factors including inherent
capabilities, unique development processes, formative experiences and external
conditions such as material contexts and the social expectations of other actors embedded
28

Wendt (1992, 397; 1999, 21) defines identity as relatively stable, role-specific understandings and
expectations about self.
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in the same culture. Many authors believe that states maintain identities not unlike
individuals (Rosenau 1987; Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1997, 174) and that these
identities generate motivational and behavioral dispositions (Wendt 1992; 1999, 224).
State identities are deemed to be the product of material factors, elements that Wendt
refers to as “rump materialism” and social interaction with other actors in the
international system (Wendt 1999).29 Communities of states create and maintain social
expectations and behavioral prescriptions for members. These expectations establish
categories of proper or appropriate behavior which are maintained and reinforced through
socialization processes between states. A different way of thinking about identity and its
associated behavior is to conceptualize it as a social role and role behavior, respectively.
Roles are the main means by which social collectives organize the behavior of
their members.30 Roseau defines them as “attitudinal and behavioral expectations that
those who relate to its occupant have of the occupant and the expectations that the
occupant has of himself or herself in given situations” (1990, 220). The use of roles
creates the possibility “of treating individuals not as concrete, identifiable persons, but as
complexes of roles and statuses…that so fully account for the expectations to which they
respond that nothing meaningful is left over as the quintessentially unique person”
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Material influences may include a state’s location or available resources while social influences refer to
the prevailing culture of the external environment which establishes specific types of appropriate and
inappropriate identities which, in turn, make certain state actions appear as either appropriate or
inappropriate. For instance, within a security community, armed force is considered inappropriate conduct
(Adler and Barnett 1998). Wendt (1999) distinguishes between Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures
that each are characterized by different ‘logics of appropriateness’. Thus, power-seeking and military
conflict appear appropriate in a Hobbesian but not in a Kantian culture in which multilateral consensusformation is considered more appropriate conduct.
30

Holsti (1970, 239) writes that “the foundations of human behavior … are both the position and the norms
and expectations the alter projects on the position”.
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(Rosenau 1987, 45). Like individuals, states maintain relatively stable roles within
international society which determine behavioral predispositions in specific contexts.31
The theoretical concept used to describe this tendency is that of a national role
conception.
National role conceptions (NRCs) are social constructions of “the policy-makers’
own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable
to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis
in the international system or in subordinate systems” (Holsti 1970, 245-46). This
includes perceptions of the nation’s position in international society and understandings
“of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, and associated long-term international
functions which are associated with these positions” (Wish 1987, 96). The NRCs of
policy-makers constitute a type of cognitive “image of the appropriate orientations or
functions of their state” (Ibid.) and “a set of norms expressing expected foreign policy
behaviour and action orientation” (Aggestam 1999, 2).
Role conception theorists claim that states are actors that exhibit behavioral
orientations consistent with specific roles with which they identify (Chafetz, Abramson,
and Grillot 1997, 174). National role conceptions specify what foreign policy goals
should be pursued, what tasks must be accomplished, and what performances are required
in a given regional or issue-specific context. State roles are reproduced through the
combination of subjective elite understandings of what behavior a role requires (role
conceptions), external demands of international society (role expectations) and the
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The extrapolation of the role concept from individual to state actors can be justified because role
understandings, as cultural constructs, can be shared by the decision-makers commanding the state.
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particular context in which the role is acted out (role performance).32 In short, state role
performance is a function of domestically generated role conceptions and externally
formulated expectations. National role conceptions held by elites come under pressure
and may experience adjustment when role performance is no longer validated by other
states through intersubjectively grounded practices or shared meanings (Wendt 1999).33
National role conceptions are ideational variables. The perceptions, values and
attitudes of the actor occupying a position become the crucial independent variables
explaining the role performance of the national actor (Holsti 1970, 240-241). In
developing their national role conceptions, policy-making elites consider a range of
elements which can be broken down in internal and external as well as material and
ideational elements. Figure 1 illustrates the elements believed to affect role conceptions
with internal and external ideational factors represented in bold font.
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Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1997, 174.
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Social constructivists view the end of the Cold War as important example showcasing their argument for
social variables and the importance of intersubjective understandings in international relations. They argue
that the Cold War ended when President Gorbachev failed to affirm its existence. Thus, the most important
transformation in international politics of the last 50 years is explained by ideational rather than material
changes. See Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994).
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Figure 1: Internal and External Origins of National Role Conceptions
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NRCs are primarily the product of a state’s history, memory, and socialization (Krotz
2001, 3). Socially constructed elements at the domestic level include the values and
historical memory of the state’s strategic culture, institutions, and patterns of public
opinion. Externally generated ideational elements consist of community norms and
understandings as well obligations incurred as part of a state’s alliance or treaty
commitments. Material elements include a range of national capabilities and the
distribution of power within the international system.
The relationship between the various elements is complex. An attempt has been
made to list the main influences on national role conceptions but the list is by no means
exhaustive. Material factors influence the development and maintenance of role
conceptions at a very basic level but they are mostly excluded from the focus of this
study. National role conceptions may differ depending on changing regional and issue55

specific contexts. The inclusion of the situational context is beyond the scope of the
dissertation. Keeping in mind these important qualifications, what do we know about
German national role conceptions understood as a function of both internal and external
ideational variables?
Germany’s national role conception has been described by the term of civilian
power or trading state.34 The central values deemed to compose this role are
responsibility, reliability, predictability, calculability and antimilitarism (Krotz 2001).
This constellation of values makes Germany unique compared to other powers with
comparable capabilities. The core values also represent a major departure from those of
previous German regimes. They developed as a result of the two lost world wars which
were themselves perceived as logical consequence of the unilateral ‘catastrophe’ of
German history.
The key value in the role conception of the Federal Republic is foreign policy
stability. Alternatively understood as reliability (Zuverlässigkeit), predictability
(Berechenbarkeit), calculability (Kalkulierbarkeit) and continuity (Kontinuität), these
concepts denote the ‘obsession’ of German politicians with having their country perform
a stabilizing or supportive rather than destabilizing role within the international
environment. Germany wants to be seen as calculable and reliable partner who honors
international commitments (Duffield 1999, 782). This value constraints the development
of unilateral tendencies in foreign policy. Instead, multilateralism in foreign policy is
34

Maull is credited with developing the concept of the civilian power (Maull 1990; 1995; 1999) which
builds upon Rosecrance’s (1987) concept of the trading state. Both roles are viewed as the product of a
globalizing environment in which new types of power, especially economic power become more useful and
prevalent. However, Maull emphasizes the importance of historical factors in Germany and Japan in
explaining the emergence of the role although the maintenance of the role is still seen as function of the
altered environment.
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preferred to cast German interests and actions within the legitimacy of international rules
and conventions. The emphasis on policy stability also explains the continual support for
the increasingly more precise legal framing of international relations (Krotz 2001) and
Germany’s “self-confident self-integration in larger political contexts” (Haftendorn 1993,
41). Unlike the decision-makers of other great powers, German elites perceive the
expansion in scope and application of international law and norms not as restraints but
opportunity for the legitimization of foreign policy. Thus, Germany allows international
institutions to play their classic function of placing restraints on action in return for the
self-confidence achieved as consequence of the adherence to appropriate rather than
instrumental action. The prospect of social rewards trumps material advantages in
Germany’s utility function.
The statements of German foreign ministers from different legislative periods and
parties indicate a desire for stability, reliability and continuity. Genscher, for instance,
was well-known for his commitment to maintain Germany’s foreign policy traditions,
values and calculability (Genscher 1995, 62). His successor Kinkel reiterated this
position after reunification and promised that “Germany’s policy will remain consistent
and calculable” (Kinkel 1994, 7). Fischer added in 1998, that “continuity is the main
focus of our policy” (Fischer 1998) and went on to deny claims that Germany’s military
participation in airstrikes over Kosovo signaled any fundamental change in policy
(Hertkorn 2001, 62). Germany’s emphasis on policy stability is closely intertwined with
the value of responsibility.
Responsibility (Verantwortungsbewußtsein), frequently referred to as ‘politics of
responsibility’ (Verantwortungspolitik) in official discourse, is understood as the need to
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honor Germany’s commitments to the NATO alliance and the Western value community.
The Western orientation (Westbinding) of the Federal Republic since 1945 is considered
permanent. It differentiates present-day German policy from the unilateralist, selfcentered stance (Schaukelpolitik) of past regimes. Membership in the Western value
community entails a domestic commitment to democracy (Demokratische
Grundordnung) and the rule of law. In addition, official phrases frequently invoke terms
of Germany’s ‘co-responsibility for peace’ (Hacke 1996, 6) indicating that the
international dimension of German responsibility requires the support of multilateral
peacekeeping efforts. The emphasis on efforts to contribute to international peace and
stability is also closely associated with the country’s historical burden. The militarism of
the past is viewed as establishing special responsibilities for strengthening international
human rights regimes. Until the 1990, both the efforts directed at maintaining peace and
preserving human rights were strictly understood in nonmilitary fashion. Military force
was categorically rejected in favor of efforts directed at improving global governance.
Germany’s predisposition towards peaceful means of conflict resolution and
aversion to the use of force is an important characteristic of elite role conceptions since
World War II (Berger 1996; 1998; Maull 1990; Markovits and Reich 1997).35 The
general public shares the profound skepticism about both appropriateness and usefulness
of military force (Berger 1996; 1998; Hyde-Price 2003, 187). Antimilitarism developed
as result of a collective learning process following the devastation of the world wars and
the deliberate actions of policy elites since 1945 (Berger 1996, 1998). Political
35

In his investigation of German chancellors and foreign ministers since reunification, Malici (2006) finds
that the operational codes of German leaders tend to differ from a mean score of world leaders in terms of
their tendency to prefer diplomacy, cooperation and peaceful means to conflict resolution.
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institutions placing restrictions on the use of force help maintain the cultural aversion to
militarism and military force (Duffield 1998; Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999). German
role behavior emphasizes ‘soft power’ - the reliance on economic, trade-related and
normative tools to pursue national objectives. The allocation of significant proportions of
GDP towards defense is viewed negatively by both policy makers and the general public
(Berger 1996; Maull 1990; Harnisch and Maull 2001). The country continues to
disappoint expectations of important allies to increase its national defense expenditures.
International organizations and mediation efforts are strongly supported while the use of
military power is regarded as unacceptable option.36 Germany’s tendency to avoid
leadership roles in international affairs (Hyde-Price 2003, 187) is indirectly linked to its
antimilitarist stance because global leadership functions still require the ability to deploy
force as a final resort in deterrence and diplomacy. German values of stability,
responsibility and soft power fit the role of a mediator state in international politics.
Mediator or integrator roles in world politics are based on decision-makers’ desire
to reconcile differences between other nations (Walker 1987, 273-275). Policy elites of
mediator states prefer to play a go-between role as an honest broker. They engage in
international conflict resolution and support peacekeeping efforts through multilateral
efforts. The concern with the welfare of other nations ranks high and tends to be viewed
as a function of one’s own welfare. Economic concerns outrank military ones. The
mediator role also involves a non-assertive foreign policy with a low diplomatic profile
characterized by multilateral policy conduct and the fostering of mutual understandings
36

Maull disagrees somewhat when he writes that civilian powers are not pacifist in the strict sense because
the role does not exclude the military implementation of international norms and decisions, particularly
when conducted within a multilateral setting (Maull 1990; 1999; 2004).
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(Ibid.). Most distinctive is a mediator’s concern with its reputation which causes political
elites to try to stand behind their policy commitments. Mediator roles are frequently
performed by states with relatively weak national capabilities. The assumption of such
roles by weaker parties may be understood as an attempt to address deficiencies in power
relative to other states.
Germany’s traditional tendency to support global governance and act through
multilateral organizations, to maintain a low diplomatic profile in international relations,
to value economic over military concerns and to reject the use of force as a way to
resolve conflict in world politics establish its civilian power orientation as a type of the
mediator role. Germany’s out-of-area debates revealed that the mediator role was by
preferred by many members of the political elite and the general public. Germans viewed
countries like Sweden as more appropriate role models than assertive powers including
the United States, the United Kingdom and France even though the country’s national
capabilities would identify it as member of the aforementioned group. In short, in
maintaining a mediator role conception in spite of its national ability to assume a
leadership role, Germany maintains an unusual foreign policy predisposition that varies
substantially from that of other great powers (Duffield 1998).

Parliamentary Elites
The degree of elite decision-making autonomy in foreign policy questions
continues to be one of the important questions discussed in foreign policy analysis. No
definitive answer on the issue has emerged. I assume that political elites possess
sufficient policy autonomy from both public opinion and institutions to merit being
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viewed as the initiators of German foreign policy reorientation. The research focus on
political elites is motivated by a number of important considerations.
Political elites are routinely viewed as carriers and modifiers of national role
conceptions.37 Through their interaction with leading officials of other governments and
international organizations, policymakers become aware of role expectations emanating
from the international environment (Holsti 1970, 335). Policymaking elites also possess
the ability to influence state role performance through their command over institutions
and their knowledge of political issues and processes. Because of their higher awareness
and knowledge of political issues, elites tend to frame these issues and dominate debates
about them. As such, they control the political agenda (Checkel 1999, 88; Bachrach and
Baratz 1963) and their actions and opinions are likely to shape those of the public
(Brettschneider 2001, 245-6; Holst 2001, 260).38 The focus on elite conceptions is
particularly relevant for issues pertaining to foreign policy and national security. Public
influence on foreign policy decision-making is minor unless an issue achieves a high
degree of salience (Burstein 2003; 2006). Elites perform liaison functions between
domestic and international politics. They are the product of their domestic environments
yet they respond to international challenges and opportunities on behalf of their societies,
striving “to minimize costs and maximize opportunities” (Rosenau 1981, 50). Even in
consolidated democracies, the degree of elite policy-making autonomy expands on topics
37

The research on NRCs has concentrated on “responsible, legitimated decision-makers” acting as
representatives of the state (Gaup 1983, 15), political elites (Wish 1987, 99-102) or the highest-level policy
makers (Holsti 1970, 256).
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Higley and Burton (2006, 27) see non-elites establishing parameters for elite action but that these are
“quite wide … [and] leave elites with a range of choices, and these choices are normally decisive for
political outcomes”.
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new to the national agenda and during conditions characterized by rapid change (Putnam
1976, 140).39 Elites may elaborate and propagate new political concepts under these
conditions (Ibid., 139). They may be particularly influential during situations marked by
crises (Dogan and Higley 1998), external challenges or strategic dilemmas (Lantis
2002a), during which elites change policy traditions, reinterpret doctrines or redesign
political institutions. Observed changes in the role conceptions of political elites,
therefore, are significant for understanding fundamental changes in foreign policy.
Critical junctures in the history of the Federal Republic are characterized by elite
leadership: The rearmament of Germany after World War II, the subsequent integration
of the country’s armed forces into the NATO alliance as well as the long-term policy of
Western integration; the decision to deploy mid-range nuclear weapons; the swift
German reunification in 1989, the introduction of the Euro and persistent support for
European integration all represent policy situations in which political elites forged ahead
of the consensus of the general public. The current reorientation of foreign policy may be
seen as part of a similar pattern in which political elites, in an ongoing, top-down process,
pass their opinions down to the general public (Lantis 2002a; Lutz 2003, 31;
Brettschneider 1998, 245-246). The argument for the elite-focused analysis of foreign
policy reorientation is further supported by a number of factors specific to German
politics including the existence of a high level of elite consensus on questions of national
interests and policy objectives.
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The degree of elite autonomy varies between countries. See, for instance, Risse-Kappen (1991) on the
relationship between public opinion, domestic structure and foreign policy.
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German political elites exhibit ideological tendencies towards the moderate center
and general civility in their way of social interaction. Parties with extreme positions
regularly partake in the formation of governments in Italy. In France, powerful fringeparties influence debates and issues at the center. In contrast, German ruling elites since
World War II have come from just four main parties: The CDU/CSU, the SPD, the FDP
and, since 1998, the Alliance 90/Green Party. Relations between political elites in
Germany’s multiparty system are predominantly characterized by a consensual and
cooperative deliberation and policy-making style. The comparatively high proportion of
unanimously passed bills indicates that opposition parties seek “to exercise control
through cooperation in legislation rather than confrontation in debate” (Katzenstein 1987,
43).
Cooperation and consensus on important issues are possible because political
elites in Germany hold a “distinctive, widely shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs
and values” in regards to foreign policy (Duffield 1999, 779; also, Hoffmann and
Longhurst 1999, 38). As a result, “there are few disagreements in concrete foreign policy
issues in this discourse among social scientists, political advisors, foreign policy decision
makers, and opposition politicians” (Hellmann 1997, 25-27). The elite consensus on
central foreign policy dimensions stems from cultural cohesion which, in turn, is
primarily a function of collective memories of national defeat and destruction (Markovits
and Reich 1997).40 The strength of the elite value consensus becomes evident in
processes by which dissenting individuals perceived as deviating from the accepted
40

Examples of major elite division include the struggle and eventual adoption of Ostpolitik as well as the
out-of-area controversy over of the use of the military which is the subject of this dissertation. See
Hoffmann and Longhurst (1999, 37-38).
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cultural consensus are shamed or ostracized.41 In short, a focus on the national role
conceptions of policy-making elites in Germany is justified given the elite’s generally
greater awareness of political issues, the relatively high degree of decision-making
autonomy in foreign policy as well as the crucial function of elites during times of crisis
and policy innovation, all of which have been observed in past German foreign policy
behavior. However, the focus on elites as modifiers of German foreign policy also
presents a number of scholarly challenges. They emanate from the nature and application
of the elite concept itself which remains as yet slippery and under-defined.
The use of the elite concept in political science has been plagued by definitional,
empirical and methodological problems (Zuckerman 1977). There is no shortage of
definitions. In his classic study, Mosca saw elites as comprising a ruling class that
“performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that
power brings” (1939, 50). Pareto considered as ‘governing elite’ all “those who directly
or indirectly play a significant part in government and political life” (1966, 248). Dahl
advanced a more limited notion of “a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly
prevails in cases of differences in preference on key political issues” (1958, 269) while
Putnam defined political elites as “those who in any society rank toward the top of the
presumably closely related dimensions of interest, involvement, and influence in politics”
(1971, 651). More recently, Bill and Hardgrave have defined elites as minority group
possessing most political power and making the most important political decisions within
society (1981, 144) with Higley and Burton considering elites as “persons who are able,
41

Among the shared elite value consensus also is the condemnation of anti-Semitism. In 2003, the
publication of a leaflet critical of Israeli actions that was deemed anti-Semitic ended the successful career
of FDP politician Jürgen Möllemann. He subsequently committed suicide.
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by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect
political outcomes regularly and substantially” (2006, 7). The definitional variations of
the term have in common the concern with “the behavior of a relatively small number of
decision-makers, rather than the formal and institutional apparatus of government” (Bill
and Hardgrave 1981, 143). The problem of conceptual vagueness can be reduced through
greater specificity on the individuals to who ought to be included in elite analysis. For the
purposes of role conception analysis, a conceptually and empirically useful way of
defining important individuals is to focus on the specific subset of German parliamentary
elites.
Parliamentary elites are defined as key decision-makers within the German
political system whose actions regularly influence foreign policy. This includes
individuals occupying positions in government. This group is considered as cabinet elites.
Cabinet elites within Germany’s parliamentary system include the chancellor, the
ministers and the heads of their respective bureaucracies as well as important advisors.
Additional individuals considered as carriers and potential modifiers of national role
conceptions include the President of the Federal Republic. German presidents exert
general influence on role conceptions by establishing moral imperatives and guidelines.
These help define German identity and conceptions of appropriate role behavior. Leaders
and important policy advisors of opposition parties are also considered key decisionmakers because of the nature of the German political system. The Federal Republic has a
multi-party system with two major and three minor parties. It is a strong federal system
with a bicameral parliamentary structure. These structural characteristics allow
opposition leaders to influence the process of foreign policy formulation, particularly in
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times of ‘co-governance’ during which the opposition controls the upper house
(Bundesrat).
The German chancellor plays the key role in foreign policy making. Article 65 of
the constitution (Grundgesetz) grants him/her the right to set general policy parameters.42
The chancellor’s power to direct and redirect policy is supported by the institution of the
chancellery which functions as a kind of super-ministry generating information
independent from that of the other ministries. Advice produced by this institution allows
the chancellor to challenge the policy suggestions made by ministers in the cabinet.
Finally, unlike conventional prime ministers, the German chancellor is protected by the
institution of the constructive vote of no-confidence which allows for his/her removal
only in the case of the existence of a fully functioning opposition government. The
formation of such a counter-coalition has proven to be difficult in the multi-party system
of the Federal Republic. For these reasons, as well as the traditional tendency for
chancellors to remain autonomous in the foreign policy field (Korte 2000), this position is
a key to understanding foreign policy redirection within the context of Germany’s role
conception. Notable decisions made by past chancellors, frequently against popular
opinion, include Germany’s rearmament and joining of NATO, the deployment of
intermediate range nuclear missiles and the adoption of a swift reunification plan after the
collapse of the East German regime.
Cabinet members play important roles in policy formulation. The ‘departmental
principle’ establishes a minister’s authority and responsibility for independently
conducting the affairs within the respective ministry with the chancellor resolving
42
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interdepartmental differences. The institutional structure suggests that the cabinet
members directing foreign policy and defense are the key players in security policy
formulation. The importance of the position the foreign minister is underscored by the
fact that in the past, chancellors performed this function themselves or made the foreign
minister the vice chancellor.43 Foreign ministers including Genscher, Kinkel and Fischer
have played leading roles in directing the external policy orientations of the Federal
Republic.44 Performing a bridge function between state and foreign interests through their
frequent official contacts, foreign ministers tend to be very conscious of the expectations
of other governments of German policy conduct. Defense Ministers also play a crucial
role in security policy through their supervision of the Bundeswehr which does not
possess a central command structure. In conjunction with the General Inspector
(Generalinspekteur) of the army, defense ministers influence the capabilities of the armed
forces through decisions regarding procurement, organization and defense doctrines as
indicated in internal memos and the White Papers of the Bundeswehr. Due to Germany’s
multilateral commitments, defense ministers also are closely tied into the European
security organizations including NATO, the EU and the WEU as well as the OSCE. Here
again, the minister plays a bridge function in constantly having to reconcile German
national interests with those of foreign actors. Foreign minister Rühe, for instance, was
both credited and criticized for his ‘Salami-tactics’ by which he incrementally committed
43

During the first cabinets of the Weimar Republic, the positions of chancellor and foreign secretary were
actually performed by Gustav Stresemann.
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For instance, Foreign Minister Genscher played a key role in the process leading to Germany’s unilateral
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Evidence seems to suggest that Genscher redirected the antirecognition position of the entire ministry. In so doing, he acted against the interests of the ministry which
was engaged in multilevel European negotiation over the upcoming Summit of Maastricht which would
mark one of the most important points in the evolution of the European Union.
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the Bundeswehr to increasingly more dangerous foreign mission types and helped change
foreign policy parameters through a series of decisional faits accomplis. Foreign and
defense ministers are important cabinet actors in German security policy. However, the
network of important decision-makers extends beyond them. Frequent cabinet reshuffles,
unanimous decision-making principles which require consensus-building, information
procurement as well as party connections and even personal loyalties requires the
inclusion of other individuals in the policy-network surrounding each security policy
decision. The influence of these persons has to be ascertained on a case by case basis.
The President of the Federal Republic is among the group of individuals
considered as carriers of the country’s role conception. Federal Presidents do not actively
participate in day-to-day policy formulation but influence the contours of policy making
by setting agendas, formulating national aspirations and articulating a consensus on
national values. Speech acts of the German head of state are important indicators of the
country’s role and desired role changes and are vital for any cultural understanding of
foreign policy redirection. President von Weizsäcker’s 1985 speech commemorating the
40th anniversary of the end of World War II cast Germany’s devastating defeat in terms
of liberation from the inhumanity of the tyrannical Nazi regime. The President validated
Germany’s transformed post-war identity and went on to articulate a special German
responsibility for addressing inhumanity in current times. President Herzog’s 1995
speech to the German Society on Foreign Affairs included the now famous line “the end
of free riding has been reached” (1998, 27). The President used the role conception value
of responsibility to argue for a more engaged German role in support of international
peace and stability.
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The leadership cadre within opposition parties constitutes a final category of the
parliamentary elites playing a role in foreign policy formulation. This includes the party
leaders, faction heads, party whips, federal managers (Bundesgeschäftsführer) and
foreign policy experts. Opposition party leaders are important for a number of reasons.
Germany’s federal democracy is a party state (Parteienstaat) in which all major political
decisions are shaped by political parties (Schmidt 2003, 6). Parties connect the various
“tiers, arenas and corporate actors in the Federal Republic’s decentralized state…”
(Saalfeld 2005, 46). The Christian Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party are
catch-all parties with moderate programs that are accustomed to government by coalition
and a style of policy-making which emphasizes cooperation through committee work and
legislative specialization rather than adversarial confrontation (Katzenstein 1987, 39-43;
Saalfeld 2005, 49-50; Schmidt 2002).45 The consensus-oriented policy style within
Germany’s multiparty system also enhances the role of the smaller party heads as socalled ‘king-makers’.46 The increasing tendency of opposition parties to take control of
Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat, in a strong federal system frequently makes the
opposition a co-governing power.47 Finally, there are cultural and institutional traditions
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The role of political parties is so pronounced that researchers have employed the term party-state
(Parteienstaat) or the conjoining of state and party (Wagschal 2001) to describe a structural reality in
which Germany’s main parties have interpenetrated the branches of the government as well as the civil
service. They receive substantial subsidies from the state and their role as linkage institutions between
public demands and policy-making is anchored in the constitution. They are relatively cohesive, and wellorganized institutions that remain at the very center of policy-making even though membership has been
declining and the linkage between parties and social organizations has loosened somewhat during the last
30 years (Saalfeld 2005, 67).
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This differs from a majoritarian policy style which is based on the articulation of competing policy
models by opposition parties and the tendency of ruling parties to pursue their policies in partisan fashion.
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With an average of four regional elections per year, Germany’s federal system frequently allows for
opposition control of the upper house. Between 1990 and 1999, the Bundesrat was controlled by the
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of inclusiveness, solidarity and corporatism that support the concept of co-governance.
German politicians have a tendency to feel more comfortable with pursuing policies
supported by the majority of participating actors - a tendency that has frequently been
used to explain incrementalism in policy making. Tracing the process by which a new
elite consensus developed after reunification will be crucially important to understanding
foreign policy reorientation during the 1990s.
The focus on the understandings that parliamentary elites hold of their country’s
role in the world is a reasonable approach to assessing changes in national role
conceptions. It also offers the possibility of tracing social interaction processes between
leaders of countries and between German elites engaged in debates about their country’s
foreign policy in the period immediately following reunification. Such a research focus
offers the advantage of theoretical parsimony but involves a significant degree of
oversimplification of political processes. The institutional literature on Germany’s semisovereign political system suggests that society - including public opinion - ought to have
considerable influence on state processes and policy output. I view public opinion as
having indirect rather than direct influence on elite policy preferences. That position is
supported by the current state of research on the public’s influence on foreign policy
decisions in advanced industrial societies which remains inconclusive.48 Some systems
appear to be more responsive than others and domestic structure matters as intermediate
opposition for 32 months (30 percent) of the time (Saalfeld 2005, 63). Since the Bundesrat addresses
primarily regional concerns, the interests of regional parties may diverge from those of the federal parties.
48

The question of whether foreign policy makers are responsive to the public continues to be debated in the
field. One position is based on the assumption that affective components drive an otherwise uninformed
public (Holsti 1992). An opposing school of thought views the public as both rational and stable offering
the possibility of policy maker accountability (for instance, Page and Shapiro 1992). As yet, no study has
conclusively linked public opinion to specific foreign policy outcomes (Burstein 2003; 2006).
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variable (for instance, Risse-Kappen 1991). Survey studies have found repeated and
consistent gaps between public sentiment and foreign policy actions of governments
indicating that political elites enjoy significant degrees of policy autonomy. This justifies
an elite-centric research focus coupled with the consideration of public opinion as part of
the multidimensional and instrumental calculus of elites. Public opinion matters as part of
the electoral concerns of elites but is not viewed as affecting foreign policy outcomes in
the form of an independent variable.

A Social Theory of Security Policy Reorientation: Role Pressure and Adaptation
The Role Episode: Role Pressure and Adaptation
The general argument thus far conceptualizes German foreign policy reorientation
leading to the incorporation of the use of force during the 1990s as a function of changes
in the role conception of parliamentary elites. A logical extension of the focus on role
conceptions held by policy-makers is the use of role theory to understand changes in such
role conceptions and, in so doing, illuminate the process of security policy reorientation.
Role theory assumes that elites share “a set of ingrained beliefs about the role, function,
mission and obligations of their country in international affairs” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006,
21). The German change in policy conduct can then be conceptualized as resulting from
transformations in elite role conceptions. Roles are products of social environments. The
adaptation of actor role behavior occurs in response to changes in the normative
parameters of the environment. Actors adapt role behavior through social learning
processes called role episodes.
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Role episodes are policy-making situations characterized by intense social
message exchanges between actors. They occur within social environments in which
actors attempt to affect each other’s role or behavior on the basis of shared perceptions
about reality and understandings of appropriate conduct. Role episodes capture the logic
of appropriateness that accompanies policy contexts during which political elites convey
social expectations. A role episode is a social process which gives rise to an actor’s
behavioral response. It consists of a complete cycle of role sending, the response by the
focal actor, and the effects of that response on the role senders (Kahn et al. 1966, 277).
Figure 2: General Model of the Role Episode (Adapted from Kahn et al. 1966, 277)
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Role senders maintain expectations about the way in which the focal role should be
performed and the actual performance of the focal actor (Ibid., 277). In the case of
incongruence between expectations and behavior, social pressure is exerted to bring the
two in line.
Social pressure on the focal actor is exerted through persuasion efforts by role
senders. Persuasion to change actor behavior in line with the expectations held by the
collective may take the form of a range of interpersonal influences including rhetorical
processes or speech acts. Social rewards including the possibility of maintaining or
elevating social status within the group is frequently invoked as a way to positively
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reinforce the desired behavioral change. Persuasion and status cooptation as a type of
socialization may instigate a process of value and identity change within the focal actor.
Initially, social demands for role adaptation may lead to certain maladjustive responses
(Kahn et al. 1966, 277).
It is plausible to expect socialization attempts to frequently engender maladjustive
responses as the actor learns to play the as yet unfamiliar role and tends to be fraught
with internal conflict and ambiguity over the definition of personal and appropriate
interests. This is particularly likely in the case of a state which is not a uniform actor.
States are constituted by individuals and institutions whose ‘micro-level’ interests interact
with social demands coming from the outside reference group. Internal ambiguity and
maladjustive behavior may also be the result of muddled social messages.
Figure 3: Model of Factors in Role Adjustment Processes (Adapted from Kahn et al. 1966, 280.)
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Response

Inconsistent messages coming from a social environment in transition may make
the maintenance of uniform role expectations difficult. Such environments introduce
wiggle room that allow for challenges or avoidance instead of compliance. Muddled
messages may also be the result of a divergence between group standards of appropriate
behavior as practiced multilaterally and the expectations of individual states pursuing
their own agendas. Under such circumstances, the micro-level interest of elites may
make the difference in how the role is interpreted. This may lead to anomalous foreign
policy conduct.
The focal actor’s response completes the role episode. A response may involve a
challenge of the role expectations. Acts of avoidance or compliance represent additional
options for the actor. Any type of response carries with it the possibility of influencing
the development of group norms. If the actor complies, the question emerges of whether
such compliance is purely instrumental or occurs as a result of the internalization of
normative standards. The element central to processes of socialization and subsequent
German role adaptation after the end of the Cold War was the shared understanding of
the post-Cold War security environment which generated new expectations of German
role conduct.

The International Security Environment
The international security environment changed dramatically after the end of the
Cold War. The bipolar distribution of power that had characterized the Cold War period
ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The countries of Eastern Europe
gained their freedom from communist control and democratized. Soon, many of them
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would join international and regional institutions. The existential threat to humanity
posed by the system of mutually assured destruction had ended. But the changes did not
usher in a more peaceful global order. Instead, the emerging environment was
characterized by a host of unexpected security challenges. Ethnic warfare in failing and
failed states, uncontrolled refugee flows, economic threats emanating outside of state
borders, drug trafficking, environmental decay, terrorism and pandemics of untreatable
and deadly diseases were just some of the threats characterizing the new security
environment which quickly distinguished itself from the Cold War era through the fluid,
unpredictable and interrelated nature of the challenges to state security. These challenges
required new responses.
Governments, militaries and international organizations responded to the changes
in the security environment by revising their strategic doctrines. As early as 1991 and
even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO’s new strategic concept
recognized the new security threats as ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘multi-directional’ in nature,
arising from “adverse consequences of instabilities”.49 This assessment was shared by the
European Commission’s 1993 White Paper on Security which identified many of the
diverse security problems that would emerge as focus in future years.50 In their 1992
Petersberg Declaration, WEU member states agreed to develop national capabilities for
European rapid-deployment forces that would engage in humanitarian assistance,
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NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, July 1991, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/4995/c911107a.htm#IV (accessed November 5, 2007).
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European Commission, “European Security Policy”. Draft Recommendation on European Security
Policy, Submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur. 24th May, 1993,
http://www.cec.lu/pub/history/military/a-weu/document (accessed April 22, 1996).
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peacekeeping operations, crisis management and prevention as well as peace enforcement
operations.51 Within the EU, the more earnest pursuit of a Common Foreign and Security
Policy and a European Security Identity within NATO were partly motivated by the
desire to more adequately address the multi-faceted threats of the new security
environment.
German foreign policy elites shared the threat perceptions of the transformed
security environment that were emerging in international circles. Commandeering the
most powerful state in Europe, they became both architects and promoters of multilateral
security arrangements to address the emerging threats. In part, German concern for global
instability stemmed from the country’s role as one of the world’s leading trading states
that had a strong interest in guaranteeing the security of both trade and resource
acquisition. But more importantly, the enmeshment of German elites in the multilateral
security institutions and German participation in the process of fashioning new threat
responses dramatically increased the pressure on Germany to support multilateral
peacekeeping capabilities that its own politicians had helped develop. As strategic
doctrines and response mechanisms became more articulated, generating and increasing
capabilities for rapid intervention and as it became increasingly clearer that the new
security environment did, indeed, require the use of these capabilities, German elites
were caught in a normative trap of their own making. They had helped develop the new
standards and were obligated to support institutional capabilities in the spirit of alliance

51
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solidarity.52 Not participating commensurate with the country’s capabilities which
included the use of force would have entailed reputational losses, the loss of influence
within the international organizations so important to Germany and worse, the risk of
sociopolitical isolation. To avert that danger, parliamentary elites would adapt their
country’s national role conception.

Norm Diffusion and Elite Socialization
The importance of external demands as potential explanation for German foreign
policy reorientation has been suggested by a number of observers and authors (i.e.
Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999, 38; Baumann 2001; Lutz 2003; Clement 2004; HydePrice 2003; Noetzel and Schreer 2008). Expectations about a more engaged international
role for Germany were voiced by President George Bush who called for West Germany
and the United States to be ‘partners in leadership’53 and who personally requested that
Chancellor Kohl consider the deployment of troops to join Operation Desert Storm in
August 1990 (Lantis 2002b, 82). Similar expectations were conveyed by President
Clinton54 in 1994 and by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali who urged “Germany to
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The Strategic Concept of the NATO alliance of November 7, 1991 states under Principles of Alliance
Strategy: “The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity
and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the
Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well
as the benefits, of common defence” (NATO, “New Strategic Concept”, 1991).
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President Bush (2009, 52-3) expressed these expectations in his important speech in Mainz in May 1989
in which he recognized Germany’s role as Europe’s preeminent economic and political power and saw the
US and Germany as ‘partners in leadership’ in responsibly grasping ‘the promise of the future’ created by
Gorbachev’s initiatives.
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This position was reiterated by President Clinton in 1994 during his visit to Germany when he stated that
“I do hope that we will have the benefit of the full range of Germany’s capacities to lead…I do not see how
Germany, the third biggest economic nation in the world, can escape a leadership role…[it] has no other
choice but to assume a leadership role. Germany cannot withdraw from its responsibility” (SZ, July 4,
1994, quoted in Haar 2001, 23). Clinton also said “anything that can be done to enable Germany to fulfill
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be fully responsible and engaged in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacemaking”
during a visit to Bonn in 1993.55 Equally important in their socializing effect on German
policy elites was criticism conveyed when German behavior failed to live up to
expectations. This occurred during and after the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 and
during the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 when Germany was
widely criticized in international circles.56 The consistent foreign expectations of
Germany to take on a role commensurate with its capabilities within the system constitute
a type of social pressure that routinely characterizes processes of socialization.
Political socialization is the process by which actors “learn to adopt prevailing
norms, values, attitudes and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system”
(Sigel 1970, vii). Norms are cultural constructions that generate and maintain a
collectively agreed upon standard of appropriate behavior (Finnemore 1996, 22;
Schimmelfennig 2001, 6; Coleman 1990, 242; Checkel 1999, 83). As such, normative
standards create behavioral expectations between members (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink
2002, 14).
State socialization within international society occurs when norms are transferred
to the national level in the form of new understandings, values, attitudes or types of
behavior. States can be impacted by environmental socialization in either regulatory or
constructive ways (Schimmelfennig 2001, 10). In the first instance, norms constrain actor
the leadership responsibility it is plainly capable of filling is a positive thing” (Tom Heneghan, Reuter
News Service, Western Europe, July 11, 1994, quoted in Haar 2001, 23).
55

FBIS-WEU 1993, “Wörner Urges FRG Role in Peacekeeping Missions”, January 11, 1993, 10, January 8
1993, quoted in Lantis 2002a, 83.
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During the Persian Gulf War, for instance, Germany was stung by censure from its allies by acting like a
“teutonic, double-headed European ostrich” (Sked 1991, 51-60).
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behavior without affecting deeper interests or identity (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink
2002, 14; Johnston 2001, 495).57 In the second instance, norms can provide actors with
new understandings of their role or identity (Checkel 1999, 84). At that point, norms have
been internalized and the interests of actors have changed permanently.58 Regulation and
sanctioning by an external institution is complemented or even superseded by internal
sanctioning (Coleman 1990, 293) which makes the violation “of an established norm
psychologically painful” (Axelrod 1986, 1104). As part of identity, norms assume a
‘taken-for-grantedness’ character and the gains from behavioral compliance are evaluated
in abstract social rather than concrete and consequential form (Johnston 2001, 495; Risse
1997, 16).59 Identification between actors supports norm internalization. By identifying
with the socializing agent a focal actor takes the agent’s interest as his own (Coleman
1990, 295).
Identification processes create similarity of interests through the need of one actor
to associate with another. The need for association or affiliation is the fundamental
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The utilitarian benefits of regulatory frameworks for rational state actors have been extensively discussed
in the literature under the heading of neoliberal institutionalism and regime theory. See, for example,
Keohane (1988) and Krasner (1983). Socialization has also been addressed by realists. Waltz (1979, 128),
for instance, writes about socialization that “states will display characteristics common to competitors:
namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system…The socialization of
nonconformist states proceeds at a pace that is set by the extent of their involvement in the system”. This
view of socialization is based on rationalist assumptions about the nature of a competitive environment in
which state actors are compelled, like corporations, to emulate each other’s most effective strategies in
order to survive. Strictly speaking, this is not socialization but natural selection (See Johnston 2001 for a
detailed discussion).
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Klotz (1995) uses the now familiar phrase “norms reconstituting interests” to describe the process of
internalization.
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Schimmelfennig (2002, 10) argues that the degree of internalization can be evaluated objectively by
investigating the extent to which a norm has been translated into a state’s domestic political institutions and
political culture as well as the degree of rhetorical challenge of the norm within society. In advanced stages
of internalization, norms will generally result in “convergence between discourse, formal institutions, and
behavior” (Ibid., 12).
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objective that creates and sustains all social collectives. Like individual actors in families,
peer groups or societies, states identify with one another to organize their knowledge
about reality and their place within it (Druckmann 1994). The psychological need to
become or remain a member of the group will assure compliance with its principal norms
(Axelrod 1986, 1105).60 Thus, membership within a social group provides a normative
context for what constitutes proper behavior and attitudes (Flockhart 2005, 46). Social
groups will control the behavior of their members through social pressure.
Social pressure to achieve compliance may be exerted through a variety of means
with the most general types being persuasion and social influence. Persuasion involves
the changing of minds, opinions and attitudes about causality and affect without the use
of overt coercion (Johnston 2001, 496). Central to persuasion are language and
argumentation which may cause actors to adjust views of reality or adopt new values
(Majone 1989, 2). Arguments will have a more persuasive effect when they can be
related to information coming from in-groups rather than out-groups (Johnston 2001,
497).61
Socialization may also occur through social influence based on the distribution of
social rewards or punishment (Ibid., 499). Rewards include psychological well-being
derived from conforming to role expectations, status, honor or prestige and a sense of
belonging. Punishments include shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning as well as
cognitive dissonance resulting from actions inconsistent with role and identity (Ibid,
60

Thus, democratic transitions in Eastern Europe were successful in part because of the desire of domestic
policy-making actors to identify with the group of democratic states constituting the European Union (See,
Schimmelfennig 2005; Flockhart 2005).
61

For a more comprehensive discussion on the complex topic of persuasion see Johnston (2001, 496-499).
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499).62 Shaming government decision-makers into compliance through the use of
international norms is a common and powerful way of changing actor behavior (Risse,
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 15). Shaming becomes more effective an instrument of
socialization when states have publicly committed themselves to upholding a certain
norm. In this case, rhetorical action−the strategic use of norm-based arguments to evoke
norm-compliant behavior−may effectively be used to draw on a state’s desire to remain
consistent with past commitments to avoid hypocrisy.63 All types of social influence tend
to become more effective in influencing state behavior as the need for a state to belong to
a particular group increases.64 The elements pertaining to socialization presented above
allow a number of preliminary conclusions about national role expectations.
Role expectations of German contributions to international security after the Cold
War were based on three central elements: Generally held threat perceptions of the
environment, effective responses to those threats that developed into standards of
62

In the United States, an amendment to the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act was passed in 1996.
The objective of the burden-sharing amendment was to increase the financial support for foreign US
military presence by 11.5 Billion over six years. The amendment was approved by the House in May 1996
by a 353 to 62 margin. After the amendment passed, Barney Frank’s press release contented that “this
year’s extraordinary support demonstrates the importance of requiring our wealthy allies to pay their fair
share of common defense costs and ending the defense subsidy that American taxpayers give to wealthy
nations of Western Europe and the Pacific (Burdensharing Press Release, May 16, 1996, quoted in Haar
2001, 3).
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Schimmelfennig (2001) demonstrates the salience of reputation in shaping national interests by showing
how EU norms of inclusiveness persuaded member states who were initially opposed to Eastern
enlargement to change their position without receiving tangible benefits.
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Schimmelfennig (2005) sees the desire of Eastern European states to belong to the EU as important
reason for the strengthening of liberal-democratic institutions in those countries. Paradoxically, social
influence as a means to control German behavior may have become more effective after Germany regained
its full sovereignty. As long as Germany was fully integrated into NATO and semi-sovereign, the social
bond between it and its allies was unbreakable and uncontested from either side within the context of the
Cold War. With independent status, German elites had to worry about the maintenance of the social bond
which protected their country. Full sovereignty within the context of a more uncertain security environment
produced the potential for policy disagreements but also raised fears of abandonment which increased the
effectiveness of external socialization.
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appropriate behavior for states and a state actor’s specific function and status within
international society. The scope of the allocated functions is based on perceptions of a
state’s relative power or capabilities. More is expected of stronger actors than of weaker
ones. The functionally differentiated nature of states is sustained through intersubjective
validation processes.65 States that disregard their capabilities and do not act according to
the role assigned to them by their reference group because of domestic inclinations
towards certain types of behavior will become targets of socialization. Group pressure
will be applied to make the behavior of the state conform to the role assigned to it by the
collective. Regional instabilities emerging after the Cold supported the concretization of
multilateral intervention standards. This generated new behavioral expectations and
social pressures on Germany to abandon its cultural aversion to the use of force. External
demands of German military contributions proved effective in socializing the country
because they created pressure on political elites to preserve the country’s reputation as
dependable, calculable and reliable ally.

Domestic Concerns and Elite Persuasion Processes
Socialization processes taking place between actors at the domestic level are
similar to those that occur within the international realm. Again, persuasion and social
influence are the key elements to consider. To a considerable degree, the establishment of
a consensus between elites on behavioral changes in foreign policy is a function of
65

Neorealism assumes that states are not functionally differentiated but differ on the basis of capabilities
(Waltz 1979). But states are functionally differentiated in that they play different roles in international
politics which are maintained through external expectations. Functions are likely to be related to material
conditions including the distribution of power which determine an actor’s capabilities. However, the
behavior of a state cannot be deduced from those capabilities alone. Rather, behavior as based on external
influences is likely the result of social function as well as perceived capabilities which establish the level of
expected contributions.
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persuasion through effective argumentation pursued by individuals determined to affect a
change in role behavior. Interpersonal persuasion is “a two-way interchange, a method of
mutual learning through discourse” (Majone 1989, 8). A persuasive argument is more
than a logical demonstration involving a rational response to a policy problem. A vital
function of public deliberation and of policy-making is defining the normative standards
on the basis of which specific conditions become policy problems that require a response
(Ibid, 24). Within the social environment of the Bundestag, parliamentary elites engage
in argumentative processes during which they will attempt to connect their preference for
policy behavior with a generally accepted normative standard. The values of the national
role conception constitute a basis for what is considered appropriate conduct. A crucial
function in the argumentation process leading to role adjustment is that performed by role
entrepreneurs.66 These individuals possess strong notions about appropriate national role
conceptions and are willing to initiate a process of role adaptation. Role adaptation is
essentially a process that establishes new shared conceptions of appropriate behavior and
interests. Role entrepreneurs may use a variety of strategies to challenge existing
standards of appropriate behavior. They will, for instance, construct new cognitive frames
consisting of language designed to name, interpret or dramatize issues in an effort to
create alternative conceptions of both appropriateness and interest (Ibid., 897). Role
entrepreneurs may also clandestinely use the old standard of appropriateness to promote
new behavior (Ibid.). Alternatively, they may challenge the existing standards through
foreign policy actions or commitments considered ‘inappropriate’ that both prepare
opposing groups for the changes and hollow out existing standards.
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Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896) use the concept of norm entrepreneurs to denote “agents who have
strong notions about appropriate behavior within their community”.
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I propose that in the social environment shared by Germany’s parliamentary
elites, conservative elites acted as role entrepreneurs by employing the above strategies.
On issues of international instability, they constructed a cognitive frame consisting of
solidarity, reliability and calculability which they linked to their preference for role
normalization, including the use of force. In addition, they used their control of
government to incrementally commit the Federal Republic to extraterritorial missions in
what was frequently labeled as ‘Salami tactics’. These high-profile behavioral
commitments hollowed out the accepted anti-militant meaning of the civilian power role
and further increased the effect of international socialization.67
Figure 4: Elite Persuasion in the Domestic Environment
Domestic Social Environment
Role Senders (entrepreneurs)
(CDU/CSU)

Experience
Role/Behavioral
Expectations;
evaluations

Focal Actors (FDP, SPD,
Alliance 90/Greens)

Role Pressure
Responsibility
Solidarity
maturity

Experience

Response

Psychological
Conflict,
ambiguity

Coping
efforts,
compliance
noncompliance

Human beings are not social automatons who blindly follow normative
parameters of action. Within existing social environments, elites also pursue a range of
interests and concerns that are not necessarily social in nature. These will include
utilitarian concerns about resolving important domestic issues, electoral prospects and
even personal career goals. Individual concerns are pursued against the canvass created
by the ongoing domestic and international socialization processes. Domestic concerns of
67

Addressing the effectiveness of persuasion, Cialdini (1984) argues that new, high-profile behavioral
commitments increase the persuasiveness of a new set of attitudes.
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elites must have affected the degree of compliance with international expectations during
each role episode. Thus, Germany’s eventual compliance on the use of force may have
been facilitated through some degree of convergence between external expectations and
the domestic concerns of major players. Conversely, the lack of convergence should
explain non-compliance. In short, the final piece of the investigated puzzle is the
domestic context of policy-making and its influence on German policy responses to
external expectations during each role episode.

Evidence Collection and Data Sources
Research Questions for Comparative Investigation
The debate about German foreign policy normalization after reunification has not
yet generated a strong theory that explains reorientation by relating the complexity of the
post-Cold War period to domestic processes. This dissertation employs a comparative
case study design to investigate whether German foreign policy was reoriented by its
elites as a result of changing expectations and altered role conceptions after the Cold
War. Qualitative case studies with small numbers of cases are particularly well suited for
uncovering a potential causal path for which there is no pre-existing theory (George and
Bennett 2005, 221). Such studies have the potential to identify variables and causal
mechanisms culminating in the development of contingent generalizations. The main
methodological approach used is process tracing which involves the search for a causal
link between independent and dependent variables. Key to a successful application of the
process tracing method is the specification of a set of questions that guides the collection
of evidence. This allows for a focused and structured comparison.
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The central areas under investigation in this dissertation are 1) perceptions of the
international security environment prevalent within important international organizations
charged with security functions 2) the evolution of norms within those organizations
addressing the new security threats emerging after the Cold War 3) the behavioral or role
expectations of member states, 4) the role pressure exerted on German elites, 5) the
persuasion processes initiated by domestic role entrepreneurs, 6) the interests of domestic
parliamentary elites, 7) the resistance or constraints, if any, established by strategic
culture and institutions. These areas generate a set of ten questions for comparative
research that will be utilized for each of the role episodes under investigation.
Threat perceptions are generally assumed to have changed after the Cold War.
This process is investigated through a focus on the official output and internal debates of
international organizations with particular focus on statements of NATO, UN, EU, WEU
and OSCE (Q1). It is assumed that a qualitative change occurs over the time period under
investigation with perceptions of greater instability becoming universally shared by the
elites commanding states and international security organizations. New threat
assessments of the international security environment which frame perceptions of
appropriate responses should be reflected in official statements, summit reports and
agreements.
The evolution of responses to the newly defined security environment in the form
of security norms is the focus of a second set of questions. Revised strategic doctrines
and declarations established new standards of appropriate state contributions (Q2). These
behavioral expectations are viewed as generating pressure to adapt Germany’s role
commensurate with capabilities (Q3). Foreign leaders and heads of international
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organizations conveyed new expectations of German role behavior through formal and
informal requests for military contributions, public demands for greater involvement in
peacekeeping operations and criticism in cases when Germany failed to comply (Q4).
The next area under investigation is the domestic context of argumentation and
persuasion between elites. I start by assessing the initial role conceptions held by
parliamentary elites (Q5). Then, I address the question of whether parliamentary elites
shared the threat perceptions of the international environment as one characterized by
greater instability (Q6). Also, did elites generally share the understanding that Germany
had special responsibilities to the international community because of its position as great
power in terms of status and national capabilities (Q7)?
Next, I ask the question of how a particular subset of parliamentary elites
instrumentally deployed both threat perceptions and externally generated role
expectations to pursue the process of role adaptation by promoting the use of force in
support of multilateral peacekeeping missions (Q8). Role entrepreneurs needed to
persuade non-compliant elites. This was accomplished through two central means: First,
role entrepreneurs constructed an effective argument for role adaptation by linking
external expectations to alliance solidarity and Germany’s responsibilities. Thus,
concerns about reputational and status losses were combined with the threat of political
isolation after reunification.68 Second, role entrepreneurs used their control over existing
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The threat of political isolation carries special weight in German politics because of the elite consensus
on maintaining a national identity that is intrinsically tied to Western values and membership in a Western
value community. This makes isolation or ‘special paths’ politically unacceptable.
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institutions to prepare other elites and the public for the use of force by incrementally
committing the Bundeswehr to out-of-area mission with escalating risk levels.69
The last area considered is the domestic context of elite interests (Q9). How did
parliamentary elites relate their electoral and party interests to external role pressure on
one hand and the domestic antimilitarism of strategic culture on the other? This aspect is
seen as crucial in explaining variation and timing of compliance during each role episode
(Q10). Elite autonomy from external expectations declines as expectations of behavior
become more consistent with the concretization of intervention standards. As such,
external expectations are seen as reconstituting domestic elite interests by the mid-1990s.
Table 1: Questions for Comparative Research
Q1: What were the threat perceptions of leaders of international security organizations?
Q2: What types of normative responses were generated within these organizations?
Q3: What behavioral obligations for Germany can be deduced from the norms?
Q4: What type of role pressure was exerted on German elites?
Q5: What were the role conceptions of parliamentary elites?
Q6: What were the threat perceptions of parliamentary elites?
Q7: Did elites share an understanding of German great power responsibilities?
Q8: How did role entrepreneurs use external role pressure to pursue role changes?
Q9: How did concerns or interests of parliamentary elites interact with role expectations?
Q10: What explains variance in compliance with role expectations?

The question set outlined in Table 1 will be used for each of the three role episodes under
investigation. The episodes are characterized by variance in compliance. Elites partially
complied during the Persian Gulf War 1990-1991, failed to comply during the unilateral
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 1991-1992 and complied at the end of the Bosnian
Civil War in 1995.
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Among the ways in which role entrepreneurs used existing institutions to promote the adoption of the use
of force was the quest to seek an institutional amendment to allow participation in out-of-area peacekeeping
missions, the creation of rapid intervention capabilities within the Bundeswehr which was promoted under
the heading of force ‘modernization’, the development of new strategic concepts to facilitate deployment
and the increase in cabinet autonomy for running military missions.
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Data Sources
The dissertation study will analyze the statements of international organizations
and those of important national and international foreign policy elites. International
organizations issue publications, proclamations, announcements and briefs. Elites
exerting their influence at national and international levels of governance convey their
positions through formal and informal statements in proclamations, debates, media
interviews and memoirs. Document analysis of the elite discourse during specific role
episodes will be used to establish general threat perceptions, the external expectations of
German role behavior, the role conceptions held by parliamentary elites and the nature of
persuasion processes occurring between states and within them. Content analysis should
also reveal the electoral concerns of domestic-level elites. Four major categories of
primary sources will be utilized.
Official charters, pronouncements, declarations, programs, strategies, doctrines
and national white papers indicating shared perceptions of the international security
environment after the Cold War constitute the first category of primary source
documents. This includes the joint declarations following important NATO, EU, WEU
and OSCE summits as well as important internal debates recorded in organizational
journals including NATO Review. The statements of the heads of these organizations are
considered significant as well, particularly in regards to developing an understanding of
external expectations of German conduct.
A second important category of primary sources comprises elite position
statements from the national level of foreign policy formulation. It includes the official
records of parliamentary debates between 1990 and 1995. Parliamentary records
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(Plenarprotokolle des Bundestags) provide comprehensive accounts of parliamentary
proceedings, hearings, debates and resolutions. They document voting behavior by a
parliamentarian’s name and party and provide sufficient detail to allow for an
investigation of discursive practices, speech acts and rhetorical persuasion efforts
between elites.70 Position changes of parliamentarians can be ascertained and associated
with the effects of argumentation and persuasion. Parliamentary records are detailed
enough to chronicle nonverbal actions by individuals and party factions.
Transcripts of official statements and speeches of parliamentary elites are also
considered. Of particular importance for this time period were statements and speeches
made by Presidents von Weizsäcker (CDU) and Herzog (CDU), Chancellor Kohl (CDU),
foreign ministers Genscher (FDP) and Kinkel (FDP), defense minister Rühe (CDU) as
well as opposition leaders including Vogel (SPD), Scharping (SPD) and Fischer (Alliance
90/Greens). Elite interviews in newspapers or periodicals are also considered as primary
sources. Other primary sources indicating role conceptions are the German Defense
Ministry’s irregular series of Bundeswehr White Books (Weiβbuch der Bundeswehr),
particularly the 1994 edition. Debates about role conceptions and appropriate German
behavior after the Cold War were particularly important within the opposition parties.
The information service of the Social Democratic Party (Informationsdienst der SPD)
will be consulted to establish internal debates and concerns.
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The parliamentary logs record more than just the speeches or presented party positions. By indicating
outbursts, commotion or general versus party-line support for speeches, the logs allow for the study of
discourse practices and the relative support for particular arguments. The logs even take notice of unusual
actions including individuals breaking with party lines by clapping when their party does not.
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Primary evidence indicating foreign and German elite positions will be
complemented by information derived from biographical accounts. The autobiographies
and memoirs of Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Genscher, U.S. Secretary of State
Baker, US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Zimmermann, US Ambassador and Chief Bosnia
negotiator Holbrooke, to name just the important ones, will be consulted to reveal
underlying motivations, interests and concerns. Additional episodic records will be
included as they become available. Media interviews should also shed light on positions,
motivations and understandings of lower-rank decision-makers of the German foreign
policy establishment.
Final primary sources to be consulted are media reports. Articles, editorials and
reports in newspapers and journals establish a true record of events. Journalistic accounts
also tend to capture the general political and social climate of their time. As such, they
should record the existence of social variables including threat assessments, international
expectations of German foreign policy conduct, role conceptions and strategic culture.
Journalistic accounts will also indicate important policy debates and elite controversies
during the 1990s. The editorial statements of authoritative newspapers are considered
important influences on public opinion and indicative of external role pressure.71
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The main focus will be on the New York Times, the BBC, The Times, as well as any other newspaper
carrying editorials that can be shown to have some impact on debates between German elites. The main
German papers included in the research effort are Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Die Welt, Der Focus and
Süddeutsche Zeitung, among others.
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Conclusion
This chapter presented the historical, cultural and theoretical context as well as a
theory of German security policy reorientation during the 1990s. The history of German
foreign policy since the end of World War II shows the importance German elites have
attached to their country’s continued membership in a community of states characterized
by liberal values. As such, parliamentary elites were prone to undertake changes in their
country’s foreign policy behavior if such behavior conflicted with the expectations
coming from that community. Antimilitarism in strategic culture and institutions would
present obstacles to policy reorientation. The following cases will show that conservative
elites, acting as role entrepreneurs, were able to persuade opposition parties and
circumvent cultural antimilitarism to successfully adapt their country’s role performance
on the basis of foreign expectations of German contributions to international peace and
stability after the Cold War.
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CHAPTER III
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR EPISODE
Introduction: A New Script
On November 9, 1989, the East German regime under its recently appointed and
what was to be its final authoritarian leader Egon Krenz, announced the forthcoming
opening of additional border check points in Berlin. Under duress, the regime was
acceding to the demands of its citizens for greater freedom of movement including travel
to West Berlin. Tens of thousands of East Berliners forced their way past the existing
border crossings later that memorable night. The Iron Curtain had divided Germany and
Europe for 28 years. It would pass into history within weeks. The German Democratic
Republic conducted its first and only democratic election in March 1990. Less than a year
after the fall of the wall, the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic of Germany
reunited in October 1990.
Germany’s reunification process took place against the backdrop of international
efforts directed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The escalating Persian Gulf
crisis and the demands it placed on the international society of states caught German
parliamentary elites off guard. They were addressing the immense domestic policy
agenda resulting from the objective to complete the merger of two dissimilar social,
economic and political systems. The speed of the unification process presented a
challenge as did a concern with preserving some degree of socioeconomic equality
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between citizens from the different parts of Germany. In addition, foreign policy elites
were engaged in the complicated process of negotiating the critical Two-plus-Four
Treaty. The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was intended to
formally conclude the system established at Potsdam in 1945. Its successful conclusion
required a diplomatic consensus involving the United States, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and France. A delicate diplomatic balancing act would commence.
Parliamentary elites quickly joined in the chorus of international diplomatic
statements condemning Iraqi aggression. German politicians were quicker and more
decisive in their initial, official criticism of Iraqi actions than those of many other states.
This was due to the fact that Germany had no strategic interests in the region. The
country’s relations with Iraq had been kept to relatively minor level contacts.72 Soon,
however, the country’s actions began to be out of step with the direction taken by the
United States, France and the United Kingdom who chose to act swiftly and decisively by
militarily countering Iraqi aggression. In comparison, German elites and their population
appeared strangely out of touch with the crisis management requirements created by a
more complex security environment emerging with the end of the Cold War. Cultural
resistance against the impending military solution to liberate Kuwait was widespread and
frequently, the German public seemed more concerned with the plight of Iraqi civilians
than with the victims of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.73 Germany’s financial contributions
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Revelations about the extent to which German firms had contributed to Iraq’s war making capabilities
would become a major embarrassment for the government later on during the crisis.
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Addressing parliament on the eve of the expiration of the UN ultimatum on January 14, 1991, Chancellor
Kohl found it necessary to remind members of parliament that war would be the direct result of Iraqi
actions from August 2 rather than the ultimatum issued by the United Nations (Asmus 1992, 10-11; PB
12/2, January 14, 1991, 21)
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to the coalition were offered belatedly and after much prodding by President Bush,
Secretary of State Baker, President Mitterrand of France, Prime Minister Thatcher and
others. German politicians declined the national and international requests for troops and
categorically ruled out military participation from the start. Germany was considered a
great power with the economic wherewithal of France and the United Kingdom put
together. It had loyally served alliance objectives during the Cold War. Now, Germany
rejected the duty call coming from its closest allies during the first major crisis of the
post-Cold War era.
The German policy response to the Persian Gulf War was more than a simple case
of domestic concerns trumping foreign policy. The crisis in the Gulf was the first in a
series of role episodes by which German foreign policy was reoriented in the early 1990s.
The episode still found German elites adhering to their country’s traditional civilian role
conception. Political elites viewed the use of force as counterproductive method to
resolve international crises and generally considered foreign deployment of the military
for purposes other than territorial defense as unacceptable. Strategic culture remained
vehemently antimilitaristic and a powerful antiwar movement quickly developed to
constrain elite actions in regards to a potential military involvement of the Federal
Republic. Opposition politicians were able to effectively draw upon the public’s
antimilitarism to forestall the desire of conservative elites to act as role entrepreneurs by
adapting role behavior in line with external expectations. The case for role adaptation
would strengthen as regional instabilities were beginning to establish the need for
operations outside of alliance territory. The emergence of the new threats would change
the Cold War emphasis on territorial defense and non-interference in internal affairs
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which had stabilized relations between the superpowers during the Cold War. The Gulf
War marked the beginning of this transformation. The old system norms were undergoing
change but had not solidified into the comprehensive regime of strategies, doctrines and
response capabilities that would characterize the later 1990s. German elites were caught
up in the euphorically optimistic times of the ‘winds of change’ blowing in Europe that
had made possible the country’s reunification. The nature of the post-Cold War security
environment appeared as yet undetermined. Foreign expectations of German military
contributions lacked persuasive power because they were not supported by strong
intervention standards. In this context, Germany’s traditional role conception continued
to set the parameters of appropriate national conduct. Hence, elites were genuinely
surprised and taken aback by the international criticism they received about their
country’s inappropriate conduct during the Gulf War.
In addition to the inertia produced by traditional role conceptions, elites also were
preoccupied with completing the most important project in Germany’s post-war history
which was the unification of their country and the restoration of full sovereignty. This
clearly affected their decisions during the Gulf crisis because the international crisis had
the potential to disrupt the constructive relations between the quadripartite powers upon
which successful conclusion of the Two-plus-Four Agreement depended. Elites also
sought to allay international fears about German national intentions after reunification by
playing the traditional role of the civilian power.74 International apprehension about
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An (2005) argues that British foreign policy towards Germany during this time was not as obstructive as
was generally perceived and the rhetoric of Prime Minister Thatcher and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office has to be differentiated from the active and constructive role British diplomats played in devising
workable solutions to the process by which Four Power rights over Germany were terminated. However,
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reawaked German power and ambitions on one side and the demands to contribute
militarily on the other produced contradictory role expectations. This led to role conflict
which elites resolved by having foreign policy conduct during the Persian Gulf War be
consistent with the normative expectations generated by the Cold War environment.
Playing the old role in a new play produced problems because the elements of reliability,
calculability and solidarity that crucially defined the country’s role conception were
beginning to take on a new meaning within the environment of the Post-Cold War world.
Role adaptation was required to meet expectations and elites struggled with coming to
terms with the new expectations.
In short, the combination of contradictory expectations and as yet underdeveloped
intervention norms produced confusing messages about expected role behavior for
political elites engaged in domestic and international projects of the highest national
order of importance. Elites maintained the foreign policy orientation associated with the
traditional role conception to pursue all of these objectives. Germany incurred substantial
international criticism for non-compliance with the expectation to contribute militarily to
extraterritorial security threats. The elite decision to not contribute commensurate with
capabilities caused Germany to be perceived as ‘free rider’ in the new security
environment. This produced social pressure on German elites to adapt their country’s
policy orientation to international expectations.75 Cabinet elites reacted by
acknowledging and confirming the validity of external demands even though they
the majority of German elites must have been under the impression that their country’s reunification was
met with a high degree of apprehension in many parts of the world.
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initially did not share the threat perceptions of the security environment. They decided to
pay for a considerable part of the war costs incurred by the Gulf alliance. Conservative
elites also promised to adapt institutional conditions to allow for future military
contributions. German ‘checkbook diplomacy’ was not a rejection of external demands
but represented a compromise between foreign expectations, traditional role conceptions
and strategic culture.
The Persian Gulf War marked the beginning of the process of German foreign
policy reorientation. Political elites would eventually come to accept the necessity of
using force outside of German territory. The crisis substantiated a less optimistic
perception of international security in which it was both possible and necessary to
address regional instabilities through multilateral interventions. Elite recognition of new
systemic requirements and the international expectations to contribute militarily
generated role pressure to adapt foreign policy conduct in regards to the use of force.

The Invasion of Kuwait and the International Response
The devastating, eight-year long war between Iran and Iraq ended in 1988. Iraq
and Kuwait had been close allies during the war. Kuwait had served as Iraq’s main port
after fighting had shut down the harbor of Basra. Kuwait had also provided Iraq with
about $14 billion in loans (Hayes, NYT, September 3, 1990). The war left Iraq
impoverished and its economy in ruins. Iraqi financial problems would become crucial
issues in the escalating conflict between the former allies.
Claiming that Iraq had protected the Arab world from aggression by the Shiite
theocracy in Iran, Saddam Hussein announced that he expected Kuwait to forgive Iraqi
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debt incurred during the war. The Kuwaiti government rejected this demand. A number
of meetings held in 1989 were ultimately unsuccessful in resolving the differences
between the two countries. On a separate track, Iraq attempted to address its economic
problems through diplomatic efforts aimed at increasing its oil production quota within
OPEC. Iraqi oil industry had suffered greatly during the war and the country’s oil
production had been reduced substantially. The vast Rumaila oil field, located between
Iraq and Kuwait, had been mined to protect it from a potential seizure by Iran.76 The
reduced production capacity had been taken over by Kuwait which had also been able to
expand its exploration efforts in the field. By 1989, Kuwait was exceeding its OPEC
quota by 700,000 barrels a day (Ibid.).77 Hussein’s diplomatic efforts to achieve an
increase in Iraq’s OPEC quota were unsuccessful. He also failed to coerce Kuwait into
compensating Iraq for allegedly undermining world oil prices through violations of the
country’s OPEC production quota. An emergency session of the Arab League in May
1990 ended on Hussein’s ominous statement that “we cannot tolerate this type of
economic warfare'' and ''we have reached a state of affairs where we cannot take the
pressure'' (Ibid). Iraq’s final warning was issued in a letter to the Arab League on July 16
in which Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of
direct aggression. A day later, Hussein warned that something effective must be done in a
speech commemorating the twenty-second anniversary of the Ba’ath Party’s revolution
(Baker 1995, 271).
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On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The armed hostilities ended within two
days and resulted in the complete occupation of the Kuwaiti state. Hussein went on to
exploit unresolved territorial and political issues surrounding the emergence of both
territories from colonial rule. Iraq had long questioned Kuwaiti sovereignty by
considering the country a former part of the Ottoman province of Basra. On August 8,
1990, Hussein declared portions of Kuwait to be part of the Iraqi province of Basra and
designated the rest of the occupied territory as Iraq’s 19th province.
Within hours of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council passed
resolution number 660. It condemned the aggression, called for the withdrawal of Iraqi
troops and instructed the two parties to resolve their differences peacefully.78 NATO and
the European Economic Community followed suit as did individual countries including
France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany (NYT, August 3, 1990). On August 4,
the European Community imposed sanctions on Iraq which included a ban on oil imports
and the export of weapons, the suspension of all types of cooperation and the confiscation
of Iraqi assets (Genscher 1998, 472). UN Resolution 661 was adopted on August 6, 1990
in which Iraq was charged with “usurping the authority of the legitimate government of
Kuwait” and economic sanctions were imposed to force Iraq to comply with resolution
660.79 The UN would continue to uphold the principle of state sovereignty in no fewer
than twelve resolutions passed during the next months.
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Following President Bush’s memorable words “this will not stand, this aggression
against Kuwait”, uttered on the White House lawn, the United States quickly showed the
resolve to meet Iraqi aggression and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty (Baker 1995, 276). The
Bush Administration decided on a multilateral course of action and began to assemble an
international coalition designed to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait.80 Invoking the Carter
Doctrine81, the US also moved to protect Saudi Arabia from a potential Iraqi attack by
deploying troops as part of operation Desert Shield starting on August 7, 1990. Against
the backdrop of a number of diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and the continuing
military buildup that would eventually culminate in the deployment of over 500,000
soldiers in Saudi Arabia, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678 on November
29. The resolution established a final deadline of January 15, 1991 for Iraq to comply
with Resolution 660 and to withdraw from Kuwaiti territory. The resolution also
authorized member states to use all necessary means to enforce Iraqi compliance (Lantis
2002a, 28). By this time, the United States had been able to assemble an international
coalition that included thirty-four countries including the United Kingdom and France.
Both European powers chose to act resolutely. Together they would dispatch close to
50,000 troops.
On September 9, Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki and issued a joint
declaration calling for the unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. A number of
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diplomatic initiatives by the UN, the Arab League as well as the European Community
did not resolve the crisis. A six hour meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Iraqi
Foreign Minister Aziz in Geneva on January 9 also ended in failure.
Following a final congressional authorization on January 12, 1991, the United
States and its allies commenced an air campaign on January 17 named Operation Desert
Storm. Iraq escalated the conflict by targeting Israeli cities with Scud missiles. The fullfledged invasion of Kuwait and Iraq during the end of February followed the destruction
of Iraqi air defenses and command centers. The ground assault lasted just 100 hours and
on February, 27, 1991 the United States declared a cease-fire and the liberation of Kuwait
as complete.

The German Response to the Gulf Crisis
German elites and the general public strongly opposed the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait and on August 3, 1990, the Kohl government condemned the invasion of Kuwait
as act of unwarranted aggression that violated international law and human rights.82 The
Federal Republic also supported the various mediation efforts aimed at persuading Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait including the twelve resolutions issued by the UN Security
Council. Lastly, Germany participated in the economic sanctions imposed under UN
Resolution No. 661. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 26, 1990,
Foreign Minister Genscher indicated concerns about safeguarding principles of state
sovereignty and human rights. He condemned the annexation of Kuwait as illegal and
offered Germany’s unqualified support in demanding the complete and unconditional
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withdrawal from Kuwait, reinstitution of the country’s full sovereignty, and immediate
release of all hostages (Genscher 1998, 477).83
The Federal Republic addressed the Gulf Crisis diplomatically as indicated by its
condemnation of Iraqi aggression and the call for the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty.
Yet Germany did not join in the growing international consensus on a military solution to
the crisis and showed little concern about the possibility of further Iraqi aggression in the
region. In contrast, leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and France quickly
decided on the use of force and proceeded to deploy troops in Saudi Arabia to deter Iraq
from further aggressive moves. German policymakers also showed no inclination to force
Saddam Hussein to relinquish control over Kuwait. Neither parliamentary elites nor the
general public seemed to perceive Iraq as grave threat to international security (Berger
1998, 171). Public debates were characterized by the absence of discussions about
German interests in the region and how these interests should guide policy (Asmus 1992,
vi). The concern for domestic issues including reunification clearly preoccupied elites,
public and the media.84 The failure to partake and support a military solution pursued by
NATO allies and the United Nations would soon leave Germany diplomatically isolated
and susceptible to international criticism.
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Germany’s parliamentary elites were divided on the appropriate course of action
to address the escalating Gulf crisis. Cabinet elites were aware of the growing
international expectations of German military contributions. Members of the cabinet
including Chancellor Kohl and Defense Minister Stoltenberg were sympathetic to the
requests for military assistance issued by the United States and the United Nations and
initially recommended the deployment of logistical support troops to demonstrate
German solidarity with its allies (Berger 1998, 174; Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994,
68). They supported their argument with article 24, paragraph 2 of the constitution
according to which German membership in a collective security system could be
interpreted as establishing the special responsibility to support the coalition forces being
assembled in the Gulf (Stoltenberg 1991).85 This interpretation of the constitution
produced significant disagreements among parliamentary elites. Members of the
opposition parties dismissed the argument outright and even the coalition partners from
the FDP were unprepared to commit troops without judicial clarification. A political
controversy developed which indicated that the room for a consensus on the German
policy response was narrow and pre-determined by the role conceptions of the past.
Foreign Minister Genscher of the junior coalition partner FDP opposed changes in
German role behavior. He argued that the deployment of German troops in the Gulf
required a constitutional amendment (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 69). Addressing
the general question of military contributions to actions outside of NATO territory, the
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minister emphasized the requirement of an international mandate.86 Politicians from the
Social Democratic Party went even further in opposing Kohl’s initial position on
deploying logistical support troops in the Gulf region. Party members criticized American
actions as attempt aimed at preserving hegemony in the region and maintained that the
party was unwilling to support superpower interests at the cost of overturning Germany’s
pacifist traditions (Berger 1998, 173). These concerns were shared by the politicians from
the Alliance 90/Green Party who criticized past US policy in the region and contended
that it had contributed to the crisis. Green Party politicians also categorically opposed any
use of military force.
In the end, parliamentary elites settled their differences at a meeting on August 20
in which the leaders of the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD agreed to a compromise in which
military contributions of any sort were ruled out in return for an agreement on addressing
the issue through a constitutional amendment at a later date (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger
1994, 69). Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Stoltenberg conveyed the
Federal Republic’s position at a meeting of the WEU the next day and three days later, on
August 23, Genscher informed the Bundestag of the cabinet’s decision to deny military
assistance on the basis of limitations on the use of military force contained within the
federal constitution.87
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In the ensuing parliamentary debate, opposition politicians remained true to the
informal agreement forged at the inter-factional meeting three days prior. They also
reaffirmed their support for a constitutional amendment that would allow the Bundeswehr
to participate in UN peacekeeping missions. Backed by the elite consensus, Chancellor
Kohl turned down a personal appeal for military assistance made by President Bush
during the end of August by claiming that the constitution prohibited the of out-of-area
deployment of Bundeswehr troops (Hyde-Price 2003, 188; Lantis 2002, 82). On
September 13, the Chancellor declared that Germany would aid the coalition within
limitations and that he would introduce a constitutional amendment after the November
elections allowing for the use of the Bundeswehr in crisis spots within a multilateral
framework provided by the United Nations (Genscher 1998, 476).
Unwilling to render military assistance while being subject to increasing
international pressure to aid the coalition, Germany began to concentrate on financial and
diplomatic means to address the crisis. Kohl pledged about $2.1 billion in economic aid
to the coalition during a meeting with US Secretary of State Baker on September 15
(Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 66; Baker 1995, 299). Half of that amount was to go
to the United States with the other half to be divided between Egypt, Jordan and Turkey
(Ibid.). Baker, who personally believed “that Germany’s response to the crisis up to then
had been disappointing”, emphasized the importance of Germany living up to its
responsibilities (Baker 1995, 298-299).88 Germany made a second pledge in January
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1991 with the country promising an additional $5.5 billion to the United States and $550
million to the United Kingdom, followed by another pledge to support French efforts in
February 1991 (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 66; Kohl 2007, 308). In total,
German financial contributions would amount to $10.6 Billion (Berger 1998, 173).
Nonfinancial contributions were not insignificant. Germany sent seven support ships to
the Mediterranean in August to replace American vessels that had been reassigned to the
Gulf. It would later dispatch five minesweepers to the Gulf. Germany also agreed to the
use of its airspace, paid for the transportation of the bulk of US troops from Germany via
rail and river barges and dispatched eighteen Alpha jets to Turkey to protect it against a
potential Iraqi attack in response to a government request. Germany mobilized about
3100 troops in support of allied efforts.89 The air force deployment as part of the Allied
Mobile Force was largely a symbolic act of alliance solidarity. Public opinion remained
strongly opposed to military actions (Der Spiegel, March 11, 1991). Antimilitarism in
society and the armed forces turned the deployment decision into a minor governmental
crisis. The number of conscientious objectors surged with fifty alone among the troops
sent to Turkey.90
Germany continued to emphasize the need for non-violent means of resolving the
conflict although hopes for a negotiated end to the crisis quickly faded with Hussein’s
steadfast refusal to withdraw from Kuwait. Iraq’s position became increasingly more
isolated through September 1990, when Hussein began to detain foreign citizens as
its fair share. I know how important the U.S.-German relationship is to you, and you know how important it
is to me. But you can’t leave me hanging out there”.
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hostages and also ignored the appeals of the Soviet Union. At the United Nations,
Germany repeatedly underscored its support for principles of international law which
clearly defined Iraq’s actions as aggressive and illegal. Germany also helped facilitate the
Soviet Union’s continued political cooperation with the West which contributed to the
maintenance of cohesion among Gulf coalition members and indirectly supported alliance
objectives.91
A noticeable shift in the domestic debate about adequate responses to the crisis
occurred after the Scud missile attacks on Israel on January 17, 1991. German elites
agreed that the country had a special responsibility for Israeli security arising from the
historical burden of the Holocaust. The indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians made
German military reticence appear morally unacceptable and increased international
pressure to boost support for the multilateral coalition. The diplomatic damage worsened
when German firms began to be implicated in the design and construction of Iraq’s
chemical and biological laboratories (Lantis 2002a, 30). Germany, which had been
quicker to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait than some other states because it had
not engaged in major arms trading with Saddam Hussein’s government, now was
subjected to intense international criticism for having aided Iraqi capabilities (Ibid.).
Criticism, guilt and the missile attacks on Israeli civilians “triggered a complex
psychological and political reaction that helped produce a major shift in policy”… “[it]
created a political imperative for Germany to act” (Asmus 1994, 63). As such, the attacks
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on Israel led to a noticeable shift in both the elite and the public’s perception on the use
of force as a more effective means to address Iraqi aggression.92
The attacks on Israel and guilt over having aided Iraq shifted situational
parameters for German elites. The question of German responsibility elevated the Gulf
crisis to a high level of national importance. Parliamentary elites stepped up their support
for the coalition by increasing financial and material contributions significantly. In his
speech to the Bundestag on January 30, 1991, Chancellor Kohl justified an additional
$5.5 billion in aid by referring to the sacrifices other allies had made as well as US
contributions to the maintenance of German unity and freedom. He also argued that a
united Germany had greater responsibility that came with its increased freedom of action
(PB 12/05, January 30, 1991, 69).
Germany’s significant financial and logistical contributions did little to shake the
international perception that it had not contributed commensurate with capabilities.
International criticism of German policy conduct and military reticence heated up during
the peak of the coalition’s air attack in February. German policy elites responded with
baffled indignation. For instance, Foreign Minister Genscher stated that “nobody should
complain when Germans are thoughtful and not rash in questions of war and peace”.93
Voicing a civilian power conception of the German role in the world, President Richard
von Weizsäcker commented on international criticism of German inaction “that the world
would not want to rediscover how well German soldiers can fight”.94 The President saw
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Germany’s future role on the forefront of addressing the ‘real security problems’ of the
world which he considered to be overpopulation, hunger, social inequality and
environmental destruction.95
The country’s refusal to deploy troops on the grounds that the country’s
constitution ruled out the deployment of Bundeswehr troops in ‘out-of-area’ operations
can be contrasted with that of other middle powers such as the United Kingdom and
France which chose to act resolutely and between them, dispatched close to 50,000 troops
to the region. Both countries were cognizant of their leadership responsibilities in the
maintenance of the international order arising from their great power roles. French
military support against an Arab country, in particular, was strongly motivated by the
country’s desire to demonstrate great power status in the post-Cold War world (Wood
1992, 45-49). But emulating the role of the United Kingdom or France did not appeal to
most German politicians even though Germany was more dependent on oil from the Gulf
than France and many of the countries who militarily supported the coalition. Therefore,
preserving continued access to the region’s oil supply and preventing a dictator from
controlling them should have constituted a vital national interest. On the basis of the
principle of state sovereignty, as well, Germany should have militarily supported the
restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty which had been so blatantly violated by Iraq. There
also was the issue of the Iraqi human rights violations in Kuwait which should have been
a prime concern for a civilian power that had supported the strengthening of international
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human rights regimes for many years.96 The relatively swift reaction to the Scud missile
attacks on Israel did little to dispel the international image of German policy as being
callous and unconcerned. The debate over whether NATO ally Turkey should be
defended from a potential Iraqi attack was awkward and diplomatically damaging.
Perhaps most perplexing was the fact that the ongoing negotiations over the vital TwoPlus-Four Treaty required the goodwill of the allied powers which should have made
diplomatic and political concessions in response to Allied requests more likely.97 How
can the fact that Germany failed to exhibit the role behavior of a responsible and
calculable ally that it had shown throughout the Cold War be explained through the
interplay between role expectations and role conceptions?

Role Expectations and Role Perceptions
The diplomatic fallout over the German response to the Persian Gulf War was
dramatic. Foreign media and government officials criticized the Federal Republic for
failing to provide combat troops and for dragging its heels on offering financial
assistance. In the United States, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee singled
Germany out for special criticism (Baker 1995, 298-99). Along with Japan, Germany was
accused of being an ‘ostrich power’ that was strangely out of touch with international
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realities. Even more stinging criticism came in the form of accusations of cowardice98
and callously having traded lives of soldiers for checkbook diplomacy.99 The failure to
act decisively to protect Turkey exasperated many NATO officials and even raised
doubts about German reliability within the alliance (Stephen Kinzer, NYT, January 26,
1991, A8). Defense Minister Stoltenberg was forced to acknowledge that the Federal
Republic had been subjected to some very critical reactions (Ibid.). Chancellor Kohl and
Foreign Minister Genscher would spend months attempting to repair the diplomatic
damaged caused by the war. Clearly, Germany had not lived up to role expectations from
important allies. These expectations were based on the desire for Germany to act
responsibly by assuming a leadership role in international affairs after the end of the Cold
War.100 The intensity of the demands for a new German role during this period needs to
be viewed within the context of the evolution in NATO’s strategic doctrines and the
organization’s general purpose and self-perception which influenced the behavioral
expectations of important member states.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established by the North Atlantic
Treaty, signed in Washington in 1949. As a collective defense system, Article 5 of the
treaty treated peace as indivisible by considering an attack on one of the member states as
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President Bush expressed these expectations in his important speech in Mainz in May 1989 in which he
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Gorbachev’s initiatives (Bush 2009, 52-3).
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an attack on all. Article 5 was also referenced to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
which supports states’ rights to individual and collective self-defense (NATO, Art. 5).
Charged with defensive functions for European and North American territory, NATO
was not set up to conduct operations outside of its territory. So-called out-of-area or nonarticle 5 operations which were not directly related to the defense of alliance territory but
undertaken in the interest of maintaining international stability had always been the
source of disagreements between the member states (Baumann 2001, 160). However, the
rigid balance of power system of the Cold War generated few opportunities for out of
area mission and hence caused few issues of contention. This would change with the
emergence of a new security environment after the Cold War ended.
NATO’s Summit in Brussels in May 1989 acknowledged the far-reaching
changes that were beginning to envelop Europe as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy
revolution in the Soviet Union. The summit also began to address what would soon be
perceived as radical change in the international security environment. For instance,
articles 31-32 of the Brussels Declaration established the need to deal with regional
conflicts as well as comprehensive security problems including environmental
depredation, resource conflicts and economic disparities.101 However, the defensive
strategy of the alliance remained essentially unchanged with Article 12 stating that
defense depends on “a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate
and effective nuclear and conventional forces” (Ibid.). Subsequent role expectations were
conveyed in Article 13 which required that
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the Allies fulfil [sic] their essential commitments in support of the common
defence. Each of our countries will accordingly assume its fair share of the risks,
rôles and responsibilities of the Atlantic partnership (Ibid.).
Threat perceptions and strategies began to change in earnest at the London
Summit in July 1990 during which governmental leaders attempted to come to terms with
the fundamental transformations taking place in Europe. The creation of multinational
rapid reaction forces was a major issue at the summit (Berger 1998, 169).102 Article 14 of
the London Declaration addressed the need for crisis management through “smaller and
restructured active forces...which...will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied
leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis”.103 With the
increasing tendency of the UN to engage in peacekeeping missions in accordance with
Chapter VII of its charter, NATO would move even further towards the creation of crisis
reaction forces through the development of a new strategic concept in 1991.
In sum, NATO revised its strategic doctrines during the early 1990s in response to
changes in the international environment and the possibilities generated by the end of the
Cold War. The new doctrines effectively transformed normative parameters for state
action and participation in non-article 5 operations. Alliance responsibility was no longer
understood as state contributions to territorial defense. Instead, member states were
expected to develop the capability and willingness to address global stabilities through
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. During the period of the Persian Gulf
Crisis between August 1990 and February 1991, the new norms were not fully articulated
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and national force structures had not even been reorganized to allow for the capability for
rapid reaction missions. Changes in the physical environment were occurring faster than
institutions could respond to them. Given the uncertain and fluctuating nature of the
situation, the social impact of the developing intervention norms was muted which
increased the policy autonomy of German elites whose role conceptions still reflected
those of the Cold War.
The international criticism came as a surprise to elites whose civilian power
conceptions had largely survived the fundamental transitions that accompanied the end of
the Cold War. In fact, Germany’s response to the Gulf War suggested that the country
had not emerged from reunification as stronger actor, secure in its role as Europe’s
leading power, but a country “that really wanted to be a Greater Liechtenstein”
(Schoenbaum and Pond 1996, 67). Nevertheless, conservative elites quickly seized the
opportunity to attempt to change role behavior concurrent with international expectations.
Their interest lay in having Germany become a ‘normal’ state that would exhibit foreign
policy behavior similar to that of other great powers. The interest in normalization was
argumentatively presented as part of a concern with the country’s reputation as
dependable ally.
CDU party leaders quickly began to view Germany’s anti-military traditions and
institutions as obstacle to be overcome rather than as valuable post-war identity asset to
be preserved. Chancellor Kohl, his advisor Horst Teltschik, Defense Minister Stoltenberg
and Secretary General of the CDU, Volker Rühe, argued that the future reputation of the
Federal Republic would depend substantially on its willingness contribute militarily to
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the resolution of international crises.104 Karl-Heinz Hornhues, the foreign policy
spokesperson for the CDU/CSU coalition, maintained that the “unified Germany is a
normal state and should accept its responsibility in the international community” (quoted
in Lantis 2002a, 32). The desired role changes were also motivated by a desire for full
equality in social status as revealed by statements by Volker Rühe who voiced his
concern that “the quality and size of Germany’s contribution influences its political
capability and thus determines the weight that can be thrown behind its interests” (quoted
in Duffield 1998, 183). In line with their quest for behavioral normalization, Kohl and
Stoltenberg emphasized the need for the revision of the constitutional limitation on
deployment of troops outside of NATO area (Bach 1999, 122).
The role adaptation sought by the ruling party was pursued under the heading of
responsibility which had been the hallmark of elite role conceptions for many years.
Responsibility was the argumentative centerpiece of Chancellor Kohl’s inaugural policy
speech from January 30, 1991 in which he stressed that Germans could not exclude
themselves from world developments and that the country had a responsibility to
participate in the maintenance of international peace and stability. In that speech, the
chancellor also argued out that Germany’s allies expected such a role shift and that
Germany’s membership in the ‘community of free nations’ obligated it to contribute with
“all rights and with all the responsibilities”.105 Kohl also promoted the normalization of
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“Normale Rolle”, Der Spiegel, March 11, 1991, 22.
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Kohl conveyed the desired changes in role behavior in the following words: “There can be no safe little
corner in world politics for us Germans," and "we have to face up to our responsibility, whether we like it
or not. Until now, we have worked actively and successfully for the world's economic stability. This will no
longer be enough… The attainment of full sovereignty does not just increase behavioral latitude but also
comes with increased responsibilities. That is how our partners view this. They expect from the united
Germany that it becomes true to its new role. This is not a question of unilateral policy or ambitions of
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German policy and identity including Germany’s need “of finding its inner balance, its
center…which included what was considered normal in other countries, …[a] living
patriotism”.106
The statements of conservative politicians reveal that they desired a change in the
role behavior of the Federal Republic after the end of the Cold War. They promoted
policy normalization by cleverly linking allied expectations to values of responsibility
and reliability that had been central to the country’s traditional role conception since
World War II. Role entrepreneurs were unsuccessful in persuading other parliamentary
elites. Politicians from the coalition partner FDP and the opposition SPD advanced their
own positions of maintaining policy continuity on the use of force by invoking
Germany’s traditional civilian power role conception.
Politicians from the Free Democratic Party were concerned with preserving the
country’s traditional role conception including the institutionally anchored military
reticence. This foreign policy orientation was considered as a prudent state policy that
had proven itself in the past.107 For FDP politicians, the future reputation of the Federal
Republic was a function of maintaining the traditional role as an antimilitarist power that

power because for us there is only one place in the world and that is among the community of free nations”
(PB 12/5, January 30, 1991, 69).
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Chancellor Kohl concluded his speech with the statement that Germany was in need of finding its inner
balance, its center…which included what was considered normal in other countries, …[a]living patriotism
and…that the unified Germany takes its role in the circle of nations – with all rights and with all the
responsibilities. This is rightfully expected of us and we must meet this expectation…a vision of a new
order for Europe and the world which is based on national self-determination, the inviolability of human
dignity and the respect for human rights (Kohl, PB 12/5, January 30, 1991, 90).
107

FDP parliamentarian Feldmann conveyed this role conception in parliament by stating that “the Federal
Republic of Germany has achieved a good reputation and trust as a result of a forty-year record of a
commitment to a political and consistently nonmilitary foreign policy. Now, this condition of trust has to be
strengthened and transferred to the united Germany” (PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17478).
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addressed global security through holistic and institutionalized approaches.108 The
differences between CDU/CSU and FDP politicians over Germany’s future role took the
form of a disagreement over the nature of the mandate allowing for the participation of
German troops abroad. Emphasizing antimilitarism as part of the country’s role in world
politics and relying on Genscher’s holistic and institutionalized conception of global
security, party members preferred a UN over a NATO or European mandate. Thus, Otto
Graf Lambsdorff openly questioned the grounds on which the government could decide
to deploy German troops to the Persian Gulf.109 Genscher and others argued for the
resolution of the issue of the mandate through judicial clarification by Germany’s
Constitutional court.110
Politicians of the Free Democratic Party also worried about the precise nature of
the decision-making procedure leading to the deployment of troops. To prevent potential
abuse by the executive, they insisted on Bundestag majorities to allow out-of-area
deployments (Duffield 1998, 185). By linking out-of-area participation to Bundestag
majorities and hence, popular support and by emphasizing the importance of international
peacekeeping through the UN, the position of the FDP did not deviate substantially from
that of the traditional civilian power role. The disagreement between the coalition
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This benign, civilized vision of global politics relied on the premise that resolution of violence and
misunderstandings within international politics could be achieved through the support of institutions and
international law. Genscher was well-known for this vision (even referred to as Genscherism). The
underlying assumption behind this view of international politics was that international society could be
turned into something resembling domestic society – a concept German politicians referred to as worlddomestic politics (Weltinnenpolitik). See Longhurst (2004, 62).
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“Warum Sollen Wir nicht Dabei sein?”, Der Spiegel, February 11, 1991, 27-30.
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Germany’s Constitutional Court would not decisively rule on this issue until July 12, 1994 when it
allowed German participation in out-of-area missions on the basis of the country’s responsibilities as
member of a defensive alliance.
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partners undermined the ability of conservative politicians to promote a new role
conception of the Federal Republic as normal power. Politicians from the opposition
parties were even more vehemently opposed to a course change.
Politicians from the Social Democratic Party were among the strongest supporters
of Germany’s traditional role conception. SPD party chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel
opposed the cabinet’s original idea of deploying troops for logistical support missions
and criticized the economic support provided for the Gulf coalition. Party leader Oscar
Lafontaine went even further by questioning the use of military force to remove Iraqi
forces from Kuwait on the basis of principle.111 Instead of military force, party members
viewed sanctions as the only appropriate way of pressuring Iraq into restoring Kuwaiti
sovereignty. Humanitarian assistance operations were seen as the only acceptable form of
German participation.
The left-of-center rejection of the use of force and the view of war as
counterproductive and unacceptable means of diplomatic conduct closely corresponded
to the civilian power role conception. Opposition leaders fought hard to preserve that role
conception. They conjured up the specter of the potential militarization of German
foreign policy and the dangers inherent in abandoning the primacy of the established
policy tendency to seek political rather than military solutions to conflicts.112 They
recommended, instead, that the government pursue all opportunities leading to a speedy
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“Den Ernstfall nicht gewagt”, Der Spiegel, February 11, 1991, 25-27.
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Vogel cited concerns of US conflict expert Paul Nitze about the potential side effects of the of Gulf war
including the global rise of fundamentalism and environmental destruction. He went on to argue that the
logic of war needed to be disrupted at every possible moment so that the political process may be given the
chance to pursue justice by non-violent means (PB 12/6, January 31, 1991, 96).
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resumption of the political process.113 Left-of-center politicians also emphasized the
misuse of military force in the past and suggested, fully in line with the expectations
arising from the role conception of a civilian power, that the Federal Republic had a
special moral obligation arising from its history to disavow the use of military force to
resolve international disputes. Referring to the participation of German soldiers in the
Gulf as unacceptable, Vogel stated categorically: “We don’t want it and the constitution
does not allow it”.114
Responding to the idea of role normalization and explicitly rejecting its great
power ramifications, members of the SPD argued against such a national role if that
meant emulating France, the United Kingdom or Italy. Many party members had been
calling for the reduction of national force levels to under 250,000 troops. This figure was
significantly under the 370,000 troops agreed upon in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty
(Longhurst 2004, 55 and 62). Germany was to perform an international role comparable
to the one played by Sweden. The country’s foreign policy was to be characterized by the
central values of antimilitarism and humanitarianism (Kamp 1993, 167). SPD politicians
also rejected Kohl’s argument that Germany had an obligation to demonstrate solidarity
with the alliance.
Members of the more radical left wing within the Social Democratic Party also
were distrustful of American intentions in the region. US actions were viewed as
primarily hegemonic and self-serving in nature. The Gulf Crisis was perceived as a
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In German: “…jede Möglichkeit genutzt werden, damit erneut die Politik eine Chance erhält, das Recht
mit gewaltlosen Mitteln wiederherzustellen” (Ibid.).
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PB 12/6, January 31, 1991, 96. SPD parliamentarian Wischnewski had used similar words during the
debate from August 23, 1990: “We welcome that clarity has been achieved about the fact that there will be
no Bundeswehr in the Gulf. “Our constitution does not allow it” (PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17471).
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peripheral event given the party’s traditional policy focus on European events.
Europeanists had been advocating for the dismantlement of NATO in favor of an
expanded and strengthened European security policy after the end of the Cold War
(Berger 1998, 181).115 The questioning of US motives is revealed in the discourse on
Turkey’s request for military assistance under the auspices of NATO’s Allied Mobile
Force.
The Turkish president had publicly criticized Germany for its delayed response in
providing military aid against a potential attack from Iraq. SPD Party chairman Vogel
rejected the criticism and accused Turkey of trying to use the incident to boost the
country’s regional power in an effort to become a regional hegemon.116 Clearly rejecting
external role expectations that required Germany to act responsibly by rendering
assistance to an ally in need, Vogel maintained that “the Federal Republic gets to decide
if she wants to participate in military operations on the basis of UN decisions and not the
Turkish president or the NATO General Secretary”.117 He later reaffirmed his disapproval
of German military assistance to Turkey because he perceived the risk of having troops
be used in violation of constitutional parameters.
The positions of SPD leaders emphasized values of Germany’s traditional role
conception over those of foreign role expectations. Responsibility was understood as
adherence to the civilian power values of the past. Antimilitarism and humanitarianism
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The party decided to abandon this position during the December elections of 1990.
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The term used here was Ordnungsmacht which roughly translates into hegemon. The relevant sentence
in Vogel’s statement in German was: “Das Wort von der Ordnungsmacht in der Region läβt da aufhorchen”
(PB 12/6, January 31, 1991, 97).
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This statement was followed by strong supporting applause from politicians of the SPD and the Alliance
90/Green party.
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were viewed as guiding principles of German policy orientation in the post-Cold War era.
This stance would be affirmed through a series of party congresses during the early
1990s. The vast majority of party delegates would continue to reject German
participation in peacekeeping mission that carried the risk of weapons being used for
purposes other than self-defense. SPD leaders had initially agreed to compromise on the
necessity of a constitutional amendment on the use of military force. But support for that
position during the August 1990 meeting had been lukewarm and possibly guided by the
conviction that the necessary two-thirds majority for an amendment in the Bundestag was
out of reach.118
Members of Germany’s Alliance 90/Green Party maintained the most restrictive
position on the use of military force. Claiming that “military intervention by the United
States exacerbates the conflict and contributes to the escalation”, party member Beer
criticized the actions of the United States as “gunboat diplomacy”.119 Green Party
politicians emphasized the importance of political rather than military means of resolving
the conflict by voicing their support for continued UN sanctions and Iraq. They also
criticized the desire of the government to meet foreign expectations through military
involvement and “demanded strict military abstention” in this and all future conflicts
(Ibid.,17477). The categorical rejection of the use of force was based on a role conception
of Germany as an immature state.
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Some dissent did exist within the party. For instance, Hans-Ulrich Klose, Karsten Voigt and Rudolf
Scharping who would later take the position of Defense Minister in the first Schröder cabinet, supported a
more active stance for Bundeswehr participation in UN peacekeeping missions even if combat was
involved (Longhurst 2004, 63; Lantis 2002a, 32).
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Beer stated that “the US disregarded the UN resolution and that is proof of the fact that the old thinking
and foreign policy based on gunboat diplomacy is the determining element” (Beer, PB 11/221, August 23,
1990, 17476).
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According to the view of the radical left, Germany was a state not yet ready to
take on international responsibility. The country’s imperial past and its militantexpansionistic foreign policy orientation established the obligation for the Federal
Republic to rule out military involvement outside of state territory. Continued state
immaturity and irresponsibility in international affairs were confirmed by German actions
in the Gulf region. Germany was seen as guilty for having contributed to the region’s
militarization and insecurity through a defective arms export policy.120 In their
categorical rejection of the use of military force and their opposition to German
involvement abroad, Green Party elites strongly supported the traditional role conception
of the Federal Republic.121
The elite debate during and immediately following the Persian Gulf War shows
that conservative elites attempted to meet foreign expectations and wanted to combine
that goal with their desire for the normalization of German role behavior. As first major
crisis of the Post-Cold War order, the Gulf War initiated a debate on the normalization of
national identity and German foreign policy. The war helped define the discursive terrain
along with what would become the rhetorical positions and argumentative dividing lines
between elites for the next years.122 The battle would rage over what type of role behavior
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In German: “... daβ die BRD und die DDR erheblich zur Mitaufrüstung und Militarisierung dieses
Konfliktes im Nahen Osten beigetragen haben zeigt, daβ das vereinigte Deutschland erst noch unter Beweis
zu stellen hat, daβ es nicht zu Eskalationen von Konflikten auf der Welt oder gerade in der Dritten Welt
beitragen wird” (Beer, PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17477).
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In a striking turnabout, Fischer and the Green Party would later support and oversee the country’s first
military engagement since World War II during the Kosovo Crisis.
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The debate was not always strictly divided along ideological lines. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt
(SPD) and left-of-center opinion leader Magnus Enzensberger supported the use of force to liberate Kuwait
to the need to oppose aggression by authoritarian regimes in reference to Germany’s own past.
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most closely matched the central tenet of responsibility that had defined German role
conceptions since World War II.123 Conservative elites would argue for a change in role
behavior that included the pursuit of ‘normal’ national interests and the use of force.
They were joining forces with a small but influential group of scholars who argued
strongly for the acceptance of the country’s ‘natural’ great power role in Europe.124 The
opposing position was that of role continuity which entailed the preservation of the
civilian power role including its defining principle of the rejection of the use of force.
The decision to not comply with new international expectations of German behavior
during this role episode was also influenced by domestic elite interests.
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Even Social Democrats who vehemently opposed the participation of Bundeswehr troops in Gulf
operations accepted the need for greater responsibility. In the first major rhetorical exchange in parliament,
Wischnewski (1990, August 23, 1991, 17471) stated that Germany needs to be prepared to contribute to
international peace outside of NATO area. In German: “…weil wir bereit sein müssen, in aller
Behutsamkeit und in aller Bescheidenheit unseren Beitrag zu leisten, um den Frieden auch auβerhalb des
Bereichs unseres Bündnisses zu erhalten oder wiederherzustellen”.
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Examples of the arguments promoting normalization are found in the contributions by Stürmer,
Schöllgen and Gillessen. Schöllgen wrote that “half a century after World War II, Germany is again
united, again a nation-state and thus on the evolutionary path to again becoming a European Great Power”
(1993, 27). Stürmer argued that Germany, as “defined by the four Gs: Weight and size, history and
geography (Gewicht und Gröβe, Geschichte und Geographie)… is by its nature a Great Power. Germany is
thus both becoming normal and returning to normalcy” (Stürmer 1992 quoted in Schöllgen 1993, 140).
Finally and perhaps most telling, Gillessen wrote that “Germany will have to become a normal nation
among other nations…Identifiable interests are the basis of continuity, credibility and trust…a nation which
is not able to talk about its national interests openly and clearly will appear to pursue a hidden and perhaps
suspect agenda…A country that cannot define its interests properly and set its policies accordingly will be
regarded by others as unpredictable and if, in addition, that country is powerful, as dangerous (Gillessen
1994, 30-31). We see here the clear linguistic appropriation of concepts associated with the traditional role
conception including predictability and calculability (trust) to forge a new role conception and foreign
policy conduct.
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Table 2: The Persian Gulf War Role Episode: Important Events
1990
August 2
August 6
August 20
August 23
End of August
September 12
September 15
September 26
November 29

Iraq invades Kuwait
UN imposes trade sanctions
Request for German military support
Inter-Factional meeting between all major parties leads to agreement on
rejecting military involvement
Genscher informs Bundestag that Basic Law does not permit out-of-area
deployment of Bundeswehr
President Bush requests military assistance
UN requests military assistance
Two-Plus-Four Treaty signed in Moscow
Kohl pledges $2.1 Billion after meeting with Secretary Baker
Genscher condemns annexation of Kuwait in speech to UN Assembly
UN Security Council passes resolution 678 giving Iraq until January 15,
1991 to withdraw from Kuwait

1991
January 10
January 17
January 19
January 28
January 30
February 27
March 15

CDU/CSU looses election in Hessen
Operation Desert Storm begins
First SCUD missile attacks on Israel
President Bush requests additional financial support for the coalition
Kohl’s inaugural speech lays out new role for Germany as normal
power with international responsibility
Kuwait is declared liberated
Supreme Soviet ratifies Two-Plus-Four Treaty

Domestic Concerns of Parliamentary Elites during the Gulf War Crisis
The crisis in the Gulf could not have developed at a more momentous time in
Germany’s post-war history. The government of Helmut Kohl was preoccupied with the
range of political, socioeconomic and fiscal ramifications of reunification and the
preparations for the first all-German elections since World War II. The December
elections were widely perceived to create some type of watershed in German politics that
would influence politics for years to come. On the foreign policy side, the negotiation of
the crucially important Two-plus-Four Treaty trumped other issues.
Germany’s domestic agenda in the fall of 1990 was dominated by the need to
address the extraordinary range of political, economic and social issues pertaining to
reunification. These issues revolved around nothing short of the conjoining of two states
125

that, after five decades of leading a separate existence in opposing systems, had little in
common safe language and the will of the citizens to unite sooner rather than later.
Adding to the complexity of the domestic situation was the mind-boggling speed of the
reunification process which frequently rendered plans obsolete even as they were being
drawn up. In the face of these fast-moving events, the options available to policy-makers
changed continuously. Plans for a federation of the two German states and a currency
union were quickly superseded by the necessity of full national reunification. This, in
essence, took the shape of an annexation as most East German economic and political
models were deemed unacceptable to a majority of Germans. Parliamentary debates in
1990 were dominated by the extraordinary range of issues that needed to be addressed to
both facilitate reunification and address issues of social and economic integration.125
In early October, 1990, the Democratic Republic of Germany formally ceased to
exist when its parliament, the Volkskammer, voted for unification with the Federal
Republic. The country began to prepare for the first all-German elections since the last
Reichstag elections of 1933. Kohl and the CDU/CSU won the first post-unification
election of December 2, 1990 by a landslide. He had advocated a swift reunification
course, maintaining that Article 23 of the German constitution allowed for the extension
of West German institutions to the five Länder of East Germany. The euphoria
surrounding reunification in both East and West undoubtedly contributed to the party’s
election success. Meanwhile, the opposition parties incurred major losses. The SPD had
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In the end, Kohl’s government chose the easiest path to reunification. Invoking Article 23 of the German
constitution which allowed for the extension of the institutions to the new provinces, the 5 Eastern
provinces were simply incorporated in the existing territory of the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, major
problems were in need of resolution: These included in particular the rather complex laws governing
German federalism – meaning the relationship between the Länder and the federal government as well as
between the Länder themselves.
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to surrender about 3.5 percent of its seats in parliament. The Green Party suffered a major
defeat. It lost 4.5 percent of its votes and failed to preserve the right to parliamentary
representation.126 Both parties had advocated a more cautious and incremental
reunification process based on stages. Party leaders had warned of the high costs for the
West German population as well as inflated expectations in the East. Aware of the
euphoria surrounding reunification, Social Democratic politicians had relied on what they
believed was their party’s powerful reputation among East Germans.127 CDU/CSU
politicians since Chancellor Adenauer had pursued an unequivocally Western orientation
which should have negatively impacted their electoral prospects in East and West. SPD
politicians including Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr had built a strong and lasting
reputation for conciliatory politics towards East Germany. The party’s popular Ostpolitik
had linked populations in East and West Germany during the 1970s and had enabled the
two states to maintain cordial relations even during times of renewed tensions in the
1980s.
Germany’s Green Party was relatively unknown in the East. To overcome their
party’s name recognition deficit, party leaders had pursued an alliance with leading
intellectuals from the East who had been instrumental in bringing about the democratic
changes in the former GDR. These individuals, turned politicians, had banded together in
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Support for the Green Party dropped from 8.7 percent in 1987 to 4.8 in 1990. The party did not clear the
five percent hurdle and, subsequently, failed to win the right to parliamentary representation (Finkel and
Schrott 1995, 360).
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The reputation was build on the Ostpolitik policies pursued under the Brandt cabinet which had replaced
the confrontational course of previous cabinets with a series of conciliatory policies culminating in the
semi-official recognition of East Germany in return for increased contact between the two populations.
SPD politicians viewed increased contacts and communication as major factors in bringing about the
peaceful revolution in the German Democratic Republic and the desire of the population for reunification.
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the Alliance 90 Party. Neither Green nor Alliance 90 parties were able to produce a
strong showing during the election because the reunification issue trumped everything
else by a wide margin.
Eager to regain some of the public confidence lost during the election, politicians
from SPD and Alliance 90/Greens had an interest in continuing to embrace the country’s
civilian power role by opposing German contributions to the Gulf War alliance. The
nonconformist roots of the Greens as pacifist party opposing German NATO membership
made that stance credible and corresponded effectively to the public’s antimilitant
attitudes at the time. The antiwar position paid off during the election campaign in the
state of Hessen on January 20, 1991 during which the SPD and Green Party successfully
used the Gulf War to mobilize their respective bases (Kohl 2007, 307). The election took
place just three days after the start of the air campaign in the Gulf. The incumbent
CDU/FDP government lost power and was replaced by a Red-Green coalition.128
SPD politicians, in particular party chairman Vogel, would continue to pursue the
theme of antimilitarism as the ruling elites came under international pressure to increase
German contributions to the alliance. Chancellor Kohl was forced to commit 6 Billion to
the United States after a phone conversation with President Bush on January 28, 800
million to the United Kingdom after a meeting with British Foreign Minister Hurd in
early February and yet another 300 million to France after a phone call with President
Mitterrand on February 12, 1991 (Kohl 2007, 308). In his memoirs, Kohl complained
bitterly about the criticism coming from SPD politicians who had effectively been able to
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The state of Hessen was traditionally left-leaning and the Green Party had scored some of its first
successes in government here. Thus, the success of the SPD and the Greens may not solely have been due
to their anti-war campaign strategies.
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publicly label Germany’s financial contributions to the coalition as a ‘war tax’
(Kriegsschuld). This allowed SPD politicians to deny political responsibility for the
action and the party to distance itself from any potential tax increases (Ibid., 316).
A central campaign promise given during the federal elections had been
Chancellor Kohl’s insistence that reunification would not result in tax increases for West
Germans. But throughout 1990, reunification costs spiraled out of control. Payments to
the USSR, a currency swap that converted the significant savings held by East Germans
for a multiple of their true value, the rapid adjustment of East German wages to their
West German counterparts irrespective of comparatively low productivity as well as
massive public infrastructure spending in the East made Kohl’s campaign promise
unsustainable. The financial pledges to the Gulf War coalition provided a convenient
excuse that taxes would eventually have to be raised.129
In his January 30 speech to the Bundestag, Kohl justified the financial
contributions to the Gulf War coalition on the basis of German responsibilities. The
Chancellor invoked the sacrifices made by other allies and US contributions to the
maintenance of German unity and freedom. He expressed his view that a united Germany
had more responsibility as well as more freedom of action (Kohl, PB 12/05, January 30,
1991, 69). Kohl’s concern with responsibility after reunification is conveyed strongly in
his memoirs in which he viewed checkbook diplomacy during the crisis as a way of
‘buying off’ (freikaufen) responsibility and admitted that such a strategy would prove
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Protzman argues in similar fashion: Unification costs vastly exceeded expectations and probably would
have forced the government to raise taxes regardless of the unforeseen contributions to the coalition. The
Gulf War contributions may have served as excuse to justify breaking untenable campaign promises
(Ferdinand Protzman, “Kohl Says Gulf War May Bring Tax Rise”, NYT, January 24, 1991).
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untenable in the long run. Germany had to be prepared to participate in peace keeping
and peacemaking missions (Kohl 2007, 564). These statements clearly reflected the
influence of external role expectations on the mindset of Germany’s political elites. But
the invocation of external demands also conveniently dovetailed the moral argument of
responsibility towards allies and citizens in the East that would sustain unavoidable and
unpopular tax increases. An additional concern of policy elites during reunification was
the external diplomatic game being played to make reunification possible in the first
place.
The Treaty on the Final Settlement in Regards to Germany, more commonly
known as the Two-plus-Four Treaty, was one of the most significant treaties in German
history. The treaty finalized the agreement between the Allied Powers that had been
formulated at Potsdam in 1945. It restored German sovereignty by terminating all special
privileges and responsibilities of the Allies. Thus, it was designed to resolve all
remaining issues pertaining to end of World War II which had been precluded by the
division of Germany and Europe during the Cold War. In return for its full sovereignty,
the united Germany would accept the borders established by World War II and seek to
conclude a separate peace treaty with Poland.130 In addition, the country was expected to
reduce the size of its armed forces, agree to not station foreign troops in East Germany
and to renounce the possession of all types of weapons of mass destruction. Meetings
between the two Germanys and the quadripartite powers started in May 1990 and would
not be concluded until the signing ceremony in Moscow on September 12, 1990. When
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A German-Polish Border Treaty was concluded on November 14, 1990 in which Germany formally
recognized the Oder-Neisse border as final and renounced all further territorial claims.
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the Gulf Crisis erupted, parliamentary elites were concerned about the possibility that it
could lead to a falling out between the superpowers. Foreign minister Genscher’s later
commented that “my first thought after the Iraqi invasion was whether this event would
have any effect on relations between the West and the Soviet Union, which were vital for
the German agreement” (1998, 473). German elites clearly viewed the invasion of
Kuwait as an illegal act of unwarranted aggression and supported UN resolution against
Iraq. But politicians were also anxious to smooth over potential points of contention
between the US and the Soviet Union.131 They perceived two different sets of social
expectations.
Politicians perceived important NATO allies and the United Nations as expecting
more active German leadership and contributions to address international instability. Yet
too forceful a contribution including military force was seen as potentially harming the
relationship with the Soviet Union. Genscher wrote about this time that he “…opposed
the use of Bundeswehr troops in the Gulf for reasons of constitutionality but also of
foreign policy” (1998, 479). Even after the signing of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty in
September 1990, the German government remained concerned over the treaty’s possible
rejection by the Soviet Parliament which would have had “catastrophic consequences for
Germany and Europe” (Ibid., 478). Political elites wanted to act appropriately but
appropriate action was motivated by the national interest of ensuring reunification. This
required meeting perceived expectations from NATO alliance partners and the Soviet
Union without which the normalization of Germany’s status could not have been
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Major differences between the superpowers remained as Secretary of State Baker chronicles in his
account of Gulf War diplomacy (Baker 1995, 281-283 and 285-287).
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achieved. The continually changing situation within the disintegrating Soviet Union
complicated matters further.
President Gorbachev had ended the Cold War by initiating a series of profound
policy reforms within the Soviet Union and by changing the fundamental tenets of the
country’s foreign security policy. Domestically, Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika
reform initiatives represented fundamental efforts at modernizing and revitalizing the
Soviet system. In the area of foreign policy, Gorbachev ended the war in Afghanistan,
negotiated fundamental arms control agreements with the United States that effectively
reduced Soviet military power and perhaps, most importantly, substantially increased the
political leeway of forces seeking reforms within the Warsaw Pact societies in Eastern
Europe. Domestic reform measures and the Soviet Union’s new tendency towards
noninterference in the internal affairs of other Warsaw Pact states were politically
contentious. Gorbachev was making enemies among the party rank and file which
increasingly opposed his reform policies because they undermined Soviet power. At the
historic bilateral summit in July 1990, Chancellor Kohl had been able to extract
Gorbachev’s concession of a united Germany’s NATO membership. Repeated policy
changes and diplomatic concessions increased the frictions within Gorbachev’s
government and the Communist Party. Soviet foreign minister and Genscher’s main
negotiating partner Shevardnadze resigned on December 20, 1990, citing concerns about
an ‘impending dictatorship’ by forces intend on undermining political and economic
reform efforts. The prospect that the end of Perestroika would also jeopardize the
ratification of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty greatly concerned Genscher and Kohl. Only on
March 15, 1991, when the German Foreign Office received the ratification document by
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the Supreme Soviet, did Germany regain its full sovereignty (Genscher 1998, 479). On
the other side of the Atlantic, the Two-Plus-Four agreement was still awaiting ratification
by the US Congress. In sum, Germany’s response to the crisis in the Gulf is impossible to
understand without considering the impact of the ongoing Two-Plus-Four negotiations
with particular emphasis on relations between Germany and the Soviet Union (Lantis
2002a, 26). German politicians viewed the most effective foreign policy role for the
pursuit of the country’s vital interests as one based on the predictable and calculable
nature of the past. The concern with predictability was considered prudent policy even in
relations with Germany’s alliance partners.
The prospect of German reunification presented a dilemma for allies of the
Federal Republic. For many years, the governments of the United Kingdom and France
had supported West Germany in its quest for the exclusive mandate and had maintained
an official commitment to the need of national reunification. Faced with reunification in
1990, however, some allied governments quickly became concerned with the
reemergence of the ‘German problem’ and a potential return to the power-oriented
policies of the past. The fear that Germany “might break loose from its Cold War
moorings in NATO and the European Economic Community and adopt a more
independent, unilateral and nationalistic approach to foreign policy” had Prime Minister
Thatcher and President Mitterrand attempting to slow down the reunification process and
even exhibiting some inclination to stop it altogether (Berger 1998, 168). Traditional
balancing against Germany as way to contain a stronger German state was considered
and the reorganization of international organizations including NATO was conducted in
part with the goal of containing German power through institutional integration (Ibid.)
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German politicians were aware of the reemerging concerns about German power
in European capitals and addressed any potential impediments to reunification through
confidence building measures. They renewed the country’s commitment to
multilateralism in security issues by promoting the functions of the WEU and the OSCE.
Elites accelerated the process of European integration by supporting preparations for the
milestone summit in Maastricht and made crucial economic concessions that allowed for
progress on Economic and Monetary Union. Playing the traditional role of a civilian
power role enabled Germany to maintain European support for reunification. Adherence
to the behavioral parameters of the calculable and predictable role Germany had played
throughout the post-World War II era was also seen as supporting President Gorbachev
against the forces that opposed his domestic and foreign policy agenda from within the
Communist Party.132 Domestically, the country maintained its commitment to traditional
institutions including the commitment to the unique type of civil-military relations based
on ‘inner guidance’ and national service even though the latter was being considered an
outdated and inefficient institutional form of recruitment even at the time.
Given the primacy of the objective to achieve German reunification through the
successful negotiation of the Four-Plus-Two Treaty, the decision to exhibit foreign policy
behavior consistent with the normative expectations generated by the Cold War
environment appears as prudent course of action. But the decision to conform to
‘outdated’ rather than contemporary behavioral expectations came at a cost. The
appropriate behavior associated with values of predictability, calculability and
132

These forces particularly opposed the withdrawal of the Red Army from East Germany for reasons of
national pride, distrust and economic concerns about the living standards of the soldiers who generally
fared much better in East Germany than they would within the Soviet Union.
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responsibility was beginning to change. Exhibiting the old behavior without adapting it to
conditions of the post-Cold War environment increasingly carried the risk of it being
perceived as inappropriate policy conduct. Without the willingness to militarily
participate in peacekeeping operations when such actions were beginning to constitute
the norm rather than the exception, adherence to the role conception value of
responsibility was being compromised. As a consequence, Germany appeared as
unreliable and irresponsible ally. It was perceived as free rider who failed to contribute
commensurate with capabilities. Domestic elite interests were not the only factor
explaining noncompliance during the Persian Gulf War. The value of antimilitarism in
Germany’s strategic culture also inhibited security policy reorientation during this role
episode.

Strategic Culture: Antimilitarism as Constraint on Elite Action
Strategic culture with its dominant value of antimilitarism acted as major
constraint in delimiting the space for elite responses to the Persian Gulf War. Public
opinion polls indicated that Germans generally supported allied actions to evict Iraqi
troops from Kuwait but only a twenty percent minority supported the deployment of the
Bundeswehr.133 A majority of Germans explicitly rejected the use of force and preferred
a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Public opinion also supported the UN sanctions against
Iraq with a majority indicating the desire to allow more time for the sanctions to persuade
the Iraqi regime to comply with the international demands to withdraw from Kuwait.
Public opposition to German military involvement in the Persian Gulf grew steadily
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Der Spiegel, January 28 and March 11, 1991; Lantis 2002a, 26.
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between November 1990 and January 1991 as a military solution became more likely.
The number of public protests against the war increased as did dissent within the ranks of
the armed forces (Lantis 2002a, 34). The German public sympathized with Iraqi civilians
as victims of a potential bombing campaign with references being made to the 1945
firebombing of the city of Dresden (Berger 1998, 172). An opinion poll from January 18
found that 79 percent of Germans viewed the use of force against Iraq as wrong with
support for NATO declining to a historic low (Asmus 1994, 60-61). The respected,
influential weekly journal Der Spiegel ran a series of articles criticizing the use of
military force.134 The centrist and equally influential newspaper Die Zeit took issue with
any potentially emerging nationalism after reunification and criticized the small group of
conservative writers who had argued for the normalization of foreign policy.135 In
addition, a relatively small yet vocal and well-publicized anti-war movement organized
demonstrations in many cities under the heading of ‘no war over oil’.136 The subsequent
outbreak of war on January 17, 1991 was greeted by the German public with general
surprise, dismay and calls for sympathy for the victims of the conflict (Asmus 1992, 10).
SPD and Green Parties effectively exploited the public sentiment against the war during
the regional elections in Hessen on January 10 and forced the CDU into opposition (Kohl
2007, 307). However, public opinion was not as staunchly antiwar as it appeared from
media coverage of the vocal minority of protesters and the general value structure of the
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Some examples of this include Peter Glotz, “Der Ungerechte Krieg“, Der Spiegel, February 25, 1991.
Rudolf Augstein, “Sterben für Kuwait?”, Der Spiegel, November 12, 1990.
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The largest anti-war demonstrations took place in Bonn on January 26, 1991 with about 200,000 people
attending. For a detailed account, see Der Spiegel, January 28, 1991.
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antimilitant strategic culture. This was revealed by the missile attacks on Israel which
caused significant changes in public sentiment.
The missile attacks on Israel and the media images of gasmask-wearing civilians
huddling in bleak shelters influenced public opinion. Surveys taken at the end of January
and the beginning of February began to show the majority of German citizens now
supporting military actions against Iraq, financial support to the multilateral coalition and
military assistance to Turkey.137 Polls also indicated the beginning of a trend of a mildly
supportive public acceptance that Germany needed to take on greater responsibility with
59 percent of those asked indicating that “Germany should pursue a more active role in
world affairs” (Asmus 1994, 61).138 The list of prominent intellectuals from the left that
began to publicly support the use of force as necessary evil to assist Israel and liberate
Kuwait grew. It would eventually include Jürgen Habermas, Hans Magnus Enzensberger
and songwriter Wolf Biermann as well as leaders from the Green Party ‘realist’ (Realo)
Wing including Petra Kelly, Joschka Fischer and Micha Brumlik.139 Nevertheless,
antimilitarism continued to be a powerful value among the population with Bundeswehr
actions generally being rejected. Antimilitarism was shared by Germany’s political elite.
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Two polls are used here: The ZDF Politbarometer for February and March 1991, Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen, Mannheim and a survey from the Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 29, 1991, 10. Both polls are cited
by Lantis 2002a, 35.
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However, this development should not be overemphasized because a long-term RAND study of German
foreign policy goals between 1991 and 1993 found that strengthening the UN and defending the security of
allies consistently ranked last among the leading ten foreign policy goals which included goals such as
preventing proliferation, the global environment, arms control (Asmus 1994, 65). The RAND polls also
revealed that Eastern Europe was considered a key national interest which may or may not have had
anything to do with the German hesitancy in regards to the Persian Gulf Crisis.
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“Wir haben die Faust geballt”, Der Spiegel 36, 1990, 176-180. Wolf Biermann, “Damit wir uns
missverstehen: Ich bin für diesen Krieg am Golf”, Die Zeit, February 1, 1991, 6.
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Political elites occupied a Janus-headed position between external and internal
demands. On one hand, they were exposed to foreign expectations which, as indicated
above, consisted of confusing and contradictory social messages about the future role of
Germany. On the other hand, elites were attached to the main tenets of strategic culture
and carriers of principle state values. Genscher refused to support an amendment to the
constitution because of his concern with public opinion.140 The foreign minister
concluded early on in the crisis that “the government was in an accordingly weak position
both internally and externally given that the war fit neither the political needs nor the
mood of the people” (Lantis 2002a, 26). Key to understanding the elite debate about the
adequate response to the crisis was the controversy about the proper interpretation of
constitutional provisions on the use of the armed forces in areas outside of NATO
territory.
The debate about the proper role of the Bundeswehr in situations that went
beyond territorial defense had ignited on previous occasions during the Cold War.
German governments had reacted to foreign requests for military assistance by declining
participation in reference to limitations on the use of military force stipulated by the
Basic Law of 1949. The key sections of the Basic Law related to the question of the
potential deployment of troops for missions outside of Germany were article 24,
paragraph 2 and article 87. In article 24, paragraph 2, the Federal Republic agreed to
limitations on its sovereign decision-making prerogatives due to the country’s
membership in a collective security system.141 Article 87 declared that the role of the
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“Standing Up”, The Economist, August 18, 1990.
The precise wording of Article 24, paragraph 2 is: “For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may
enter a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its rights of
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armed forces be of an exclusively defensive and rule-based nature.142 By stating that
“apart from defense, the armed forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted
by this Basic Law”, the constitution substantially reduced the decision-making authority
of the chancellor democracy. The pursuit of national interests through the deployment of
the use of force constituted an important element in the foreign policy of other great
powers. In Germany, this governmental option was largely precluded. The institutional
limitation on the exercise of military force was an important aspect of the civilian power
role. However, the relevant paragraphs of the constitution could reasonably have been
interpreted to allow for German participation in peacekeeping missions outside of NATO
territory (non-article 5 operations) as long as these missions were undertaken to “secure a
peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world” (art. 24, par.
2).143 This was, in fact, the position of leading government officials including Kohl and
Stoltenberg who favored the deployment of German troops to demonstrate the country’s
solidarity with its allies (Berger 1998, 174). In mid-August, Kohl had suggested that
Germany could partake in coalition actions in the Gulf under the auspices of the WEU
(Lantis 2002a, 23). The use of force could also have been presented as necessary when
Turkey invoked Article V of the NATO Treaty, in which all parties agreed that “an armed

sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of
the world”.
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Article 87 of the constitution reads: “The Federation shall build up Armed Forces for defense purposes.
Their numerical strength and general organizational structure shall be shown in the budget … Apart from
defense, the Armed Forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law”.
143

This is, in fact, what the Constitutional Court would decide in 1994.
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attack against one or more of them…shall be considered “an attack against them all”.144
In spite of the interpretative possibilities allowed by the constitution and the NATO
treaty, the Basic Law had always been used to stave off Bundeswehr participation in
foreign missions. After a brief debate, Chancellor Kohl’s coalition cabinet would
continue in this tradition and present this position to Germany’s allies. As such, this
interpretation of the constitution could be said to constitute a key aspect in the elite
consensus on the issue of military deployment which was, in turn, deeply related to the
key value of antimilitarism so important in Germany’s post-World War II strategic
culture. Evidence for both presence and dominance of antimilitarism abounds. For
instance, prior to President Bush’s visit in November 1990, Kohl stated that “some
believe that the problem can be solved by military means…[but that] I strongly advise
trying everything possible to bring about a solution through negotiations”.145 Genscher,
as well, pleaded for a peaceful resolution of the crisis hinting that such resolution may
have positive consequences for other regional conflicts.146 SPD party members adamantly
rejected military measures to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Their concern with civilian
casualties and the potentially adverse effects of military actions indicated a deeply-held
belief in the counterproductive nature of the use of military force.
The prominence of antimilitarism among both the general public and
parliamentary elites explains in part the inability of the government to accede to the
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The North Atlantic Treaty, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
(accessed September 20, 2009).
145

Kohl, Interview by Guenter Muechler, Cologne Deutschlandfunk Broadcast from November 18, 1990,
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requests of the allies to actively participate in military operations to liberate Kuwait.
Conservative politicians were inclined to meet foreign expectations. Their lack of resolve
in pursuing their position indicated a lack of resolve in changing the cultural agreements
upon which Germany’s postwar institutions had been constructed. Doubts about the
efficacy of force prevented a stronger push for the use of force against a parliamentary
opposition that was able to use the elements of the traditional civilian role conception to
construct a more convincing argument and public opinion that remained overwhelmingly
antimilitaristic. A cultural and institutional web of constraint prevented the effective
reorientation of German foreign policy. Falling back on the understanding of the German
role of a civilian power, the country chose to engage in ‘checkbook diplomacy’ by
contributing financial and material assistance to the coalition effort. The antimilitant
dimension of strategic culture is, however, not sufficient in explaining policy behavior
during the Persian Gulf Crisis. The foreign policy objective of securing full sovereignty
weighted heavily on the minds of political elites. Playing the traditional civilian role
made it easier to secure the agreement of France, Britain and the Soviet Union.
In referring to the impact of socialization processes, Johnston saw the desire to
maximize status, honor and prestige within a group as outweighing concerns of material
rewards (2001, 499). German actions during the Gulf War corroborate that assertion
because the country’s financial and material contributions began to increase as
international criticism increased. Germany’s failure to conform to social expectations
regarding the use of force in the post-Cold War security environment led to public
consequences. It led, for instance, to criticism from other coalition countries that
Germany did not contribute its fair share to the effort which had a shaming effect and
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acted as effective means of persuasion. In the US congress, both Germany and Japan
were criticized for not living up to the responsibilities of reliable allies.147 Perhaps most
importantly, it led to a condition of cognitive dissonance from actions inconsistent with
role and identity (Johnston 2001, 499).
German identity reproduction requirements since World War II have relied to a
considerable degree on complying with allied expectations as member of a social
reference group of liberal states joined in a security community. The liberal identity of
the Federal Republic distinguishes this state from its previous incarnations, Imperial and
Nazi Germany. Previous German states are viewed as bad because they sought autonomy
through the maximizing of power. This course of action left them isolated and these
policies are viewed as having caused the national catastrophe of two world wars as well
as the rise of right and left-wing totalitarianism. In short, German history has created a
compelling reason to never again be isolated or to pursue a special path (Sonderweg) and
this is part of the generally accepted understanding shared by elites as well as the public.
The Federal Republic’s unique social identity reproduction requirements made its
elites particularly susceptible to influence of international expectations and hence,
socialization. Foreign expectations from important allies empowered those internal actors
or groups who were most likely to prevent a condition of diplomatic isolation. Thus, the
Persian Gulf War empowered cabinet elites as these individuals argued for compliance
with external expectations and the use of force regardless of longstanding cultural values
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In early January, members of Congress had criticized Germany for shirking its alliance burdens (Baker
1995, 298-91; Walter Mossberg, Urban Lehner, and Fredrick Kempe, ”Some in US ask why Germany,
Japan Bear so little of Gulf Cost”, WSJ, January 11, 1991). For an analysis of the burden sharing debate see
Pagliano (1991).
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of anti-militarism, the reliance on diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts and the tendency
to use economic means to pursue national interests. In the words of Chancellor Kohl, “It
is now time that the unified Germany takes its role in the circle of nations with all rights
and obligations (Kohl 2007, 316). This is rightfully expected of us – and we must meet
that expectation. There is no niche for us Germans in world politics, and there can be no
flight from responsibility for Germany. We want to make our contribution towards a
world of peace, freedom and justice” (Ibid., 316).
In opposing reorientation and supporting foreign policy actions in line with the
traditional role of a civilian power, SPD leaders had won a Pyrrhus victory and its own
political orientation could not be maintained in the face of the growing awareness of the
international security environment. Among some SPD leaders, and through the
international rejection of this role during the Persian Gulf War, the consensus was already
shifting towards supporting military participation in out-of-area missions even as the
rigid opposition to these actions remained popular among the party base (Duffield 1998,
185). The world was changing and with it, most of the assumptions about threats,
stability and peacekeeping were changing as well as the evolution of NATO’s strategic
doctrines during the next years would demonstrate. A succession of humanitarian crises
was about to make this clear to Germany’s foreign policy elite and it would pursue the
fundamental reorientation of foreign policy regardless of party ideology. Of these, the
unfolding crisis in Yugoslavia would be the one that had the greatest impact on the
reorientation of foreign policy since reunification.
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Conclusion: Explaining Partial Compliance
The Gulf Crisis finds Germany performing its traditional civilian power role as
had been expected and affirmed by the external environment for the duration of the postWar period. German elites continued to believe that the country’s constitution ruled out
the army’s deployment abroad and that the antimilitary tendency of public opinion would
make the military engagement of the country outside NATO territory impossible. In
interpreting existing institutions in a way that categorically ruled out the use of force,
elite behavior suggested the continuity of existing strategic culture. In part, this was due
to cultural and institutional path-dependence. The perceptions of elites were still
anchored in the Cold War understandings of security threats and viewed their country’s
obligations towards the alliance in terms of territorial defense. They could not reorient
themselves that quickly, particularly, since they were used to a consensual policy-making
style. They had their country perform the civilian power role out of habit and because it
become the quintessential German identity after World War II. Thus, they showed
genuine surprise at the pronounced international criticism of German military inaction
and obstinacy during the liberation of Kuwait. Statements by President von Weizsäcker
and other politicians that indicate surprise at the fact that anyone would want Germans to
fight again are revealing this respect.148 They indicate both a desire to comply with
international expectations and confusion about the nature of those expectations. Thus,
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President von Weizsäcker conveys the confusion political elites experienced as a result of contradictory
foreign expectations: “All our alliance partners always proceeded from the assumption that because of our
historical burden no new German military potential could ever again arise. In the year 1990 there were
many fears about what a Germany, strengthened in power by unification, would one day do with it
militarily–and now, at the beginning of the year 1991, Germans are faced with the accusation that they do
not want to participate in war” (von Weizsäcker, Die Zeit, February 1991, quoted in Ackermann and
McArdle Kelleher 1993, 418).

144

elites blamed their failure to act in concert on the country’s antimilitant strategic culture
and institutions which they claimed placed political constraints on further action and did
not allow for more commitments beyond the traditional checkbook diplomacy. The
international criticism had the effect of forcing a reinterpretation of antimilitant views
and institutions in a process that would continue for years to come.149 Clearly, value
conflicts within strategic culture and role ambiguity caused by a changing security
environment were important determinants of the unique mix of German foreign policy
responses during the episode. However, to fully understand German behavior, the
interests of particular policy-making elites have to be considered who were able to
effectively utilize the condition of role ambiguity to their advantage.
An overriding foreign policy interest of parliamentary elites during the Persian
Gulf War episode was the achievement of national reunification. The diplomatic process
of negotiating the Two-plus-Four Agreement that ended quadripartite powers in Germany
entailed the negotiation of a series of delicate bilateral agreements with allies that could
potentially be at odds with each other. Regional conflicts during the Cold War had
always carried the danger of superpower confrontation and subsequent proxy wars.
Considerable distrust and divergence of interests continued to characterize US-Soviet
relations during the Gulf War. In addition, fears about German power and the future
German role after reunification remained high in the United Kingdom, France and the
Soviet Union. Superpower differences and widespread fears about German intentions
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Longhurst (2004, 58-59) views the Gulf War as important watershed event in German foreign policy.
He writes: “Discord emerged between external demands and conditions within Germany. Policy-thinking
was caught between expectations and fears at home and abroad, and sought to do justice to both … what
transpired in the course of the conflict was a tension, even a dialectic, among certain foundational elements
of German strategic culture; namely, how a parochial stance of restraint was to be maintained if other core
values, such as solidarity with the alliance or responsibility towards Israel, could not be served this way”.
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could have derailed the immensely important reunification project. To facilitate a smooth
diplomatic process that ensured continued external support for reunification, German
elites had an interest in avoiding military actions because this made the country appear
more calculable and predictable.
The inclusion of elite interests in the ongoing process of socialization through
external role expectations helps explain the timing of the foreign policy changes. It is
only after reunification is achieved, that German elites allowed the changes leading to
Bundeswehr participation in military missions to take place. After the Gulf War,
conservative elites would promote a new type of role behavior through the use of the
concept of responsibility as understood within the framework of a new understanding of
international security after the Cold War. The consistent use of the values of
responsibility and alliance solidarity allowed them to tie the desired behavioral changes
to the country’s principal values established by its strategic culture. In addition, they
would be able to cast opponents to the changes in role behavior as unreasonable or even
immoral.
The desire to combine the need to comply with international demands to avoid
diplomatic isolation with the domestic interest of role normalization is revealed in
Chancellor Kohl 3rd inaugural address delivered on January 30, 1991. Here, the
chancellor argued that the “escape from the responsibility for maintaining peace and
freedom through global crisis management is not an option for Germany” (Kohl 2007,
315). Falling short of articulating a military role, the Chancellor nevertheless sought to
establish a more independent, active and authentic role for Germany after reunification.
The new role presented a middle ground between the extreme of antimilitarism on one
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hand and the feared militarism potentially associated with traditional roles on the other.
This role could be linked to the behavioral expectations generated by the new security
environment after the Cold War. It would establish full equality in status with other
alliance members while enabling Germany to remain unique in that the use of force
would be acceptable only for morally higher reasons rather than used for the pursuit of
national interests. Increasingly, conservative politicians would also present the new role
as the natural endpoint in a process of maturation since World War II.
The Persian Gulf War episode suggests that international socialization processes
via expectations from social reference groups of states can affect domestic policy debates
with the potential of leading to changes in state foreign policy behavior. The aftermath of
the Persian Gulf War saw conservative elites with traditionally strong ties to NATO and
Western allies initiate the process by which the deeper meaning of traditional elements of
Germany’s role conception–concepts like reliability, alliance solidarity, continuity,
stability and predictability–would be redefined. Social Democrats and Greens first argued
against the reinterpretation of the traditional civilian power role. Over the next decade,
these elites would reexamine their reservations about the efficacy of force to engage their
country in a kind of ‘moralistic Realpolitik’. As such, the Persian Gulf War marked the
beginning of the process of reorientation that would eventually culminate in the
deployment of troops in Bosnia.
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CHAPTER IV
UNILATERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA
Introduction: An Awkward Performance
The role episode produced by the Persian Gulf War was associated with a
firestorm of international criticism for Germany’s parliamentary elites.150 The decision to
play the civilian power role by hiding behind the country’s constitutional limitations on
the use of force outside of NATO territory tarnished Germany’s international image as
reliable ally. The hurtful and near universal foreign criticism constituted a clear social
message that German policy responses had been inappropriate given the existing
expectations based on the country’s global role and capabilities. The criticism threw
Germany into “a crisis of confidence and direction” (Stephen Kinzer, NYT, February 17,
1991). A major debate about Germany’s responsibilities ensued with conservative and
centrist newspapers alike questioning the cabinet’s decision to risk the country’s
reputation by not contributing commensurate with capabilities.151 Several newspapers
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Stephen Kinzer reported for the New York Times that “in Washington, London, Paris and other allied
capitals, there has been much grumbling in recent weeks over Germany's perceived reluctance to help the
anti-Iraq coalition. German leaders have been assailed as self-absorbed, niggardly, and ungrateful for four
decades of Western support”. The writer also quoted an unnamed diplomatic source in Bonn as saying that
“whatever you get out of them, you really have to squeeze it out” (Stephen Kinzer, NYT, February 17,
1991).
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The influential conservative newspaper Bild editorialized that “while the Americans, British, Canadians,
French and Italians are in the desert doing freedom's grueling work, the German Army sits aloof on the
sidelines”, and “In 10 days, the Bonn Government has ruined the reputation that took us three decades to
build“, Hans-Hermann Tiedje, Bild Zeitung, February 17, 1991, quoted by Stephen Kinzer, NYT, February
17, 1991. The Süddeutsche Zeitung added that the cabinet had been lucky because if coalition forces would
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also carried an appeal from the Atlantik-Brücke, an organization promoting GermanAmerican ties, which urged Germans to show solidarity with coalition forces.152
The Persian Gulf role episode had created an untenable situation of diplomatic
isolation from Germany’s social reference group of Western states. For the first time in
many years, Germany was not in compliance with the expectations from those states. A
powerful social message had been generated that Germany would risk further isolation
unless its elites took steps to adjust the country’s role in global politics. The episode had
also revealed the country’s continuing institutional and cultural limitations on meeting
external expectations.153 Role expectations would lead to the internal adjustment process
by which a central tenet of the civilian role conception of parliamentary elites–the use of
force–would be challenged and eventually overturned. Yet an additional, crucial element
in the process of reorientation would be elite perceptions that the security environment
had inexorably changed and that new military responses to address internal instabilities
would be required. With the Gulf War barely over, another international crisis was
quickly developing in Yugoslavia during the summer of 1991. This crisis brought postCold War instability to Germany’s backyard and its unimaginable cruelty and disregard
for human rights standards would quickly challenge everything policy makers had come
to believe in.

have sustained high casualties “the Germans would be in trouble in the United States for a long time” (As
quoted by Stephen Kinzer, “Genscher at Eye of Policy Debate”, NYT, March 22, 1991)
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The appeal was signed by many prominent Germans including former chancellor Willy Brandt, a social
democrat.
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In his memoirs, Kohl 2007 criticized the public’s antimilitant response and intransigence of the
opposition in failing to recognize the German responsibility to international peace through the participation
in peace keeping after the Cold War.
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The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia underscored policy makers’ perception
that the world had changed after the end of the Cold War. Old demons including ethnic
strife and genocide were reemerging as new threats to peace and security even in Europe.
Yugoslavia’s proximity to Germany and the growing refugee problems established an
urgent need for political action. The high levels of violence and the systematic violations
of human rights directly clashed with the central values of Germany’s antimilitarist
culture. UN and NATO involvement in the region intensified to manage the escalating
crisis. As the efficacy of international security institutions was repeatedly challenged by
determined regional adversaries, Germany was confronted with requests to play a larger
role in supporting the missions of these organizations. Eventually, the country would get
involved militarily for the first time since World War II. Thus, Yugoslavia’s descent into
unimaginable violence can be considered as the “catalyst for the development of a new
German security policy” (Hyde-Price 2003, 189).
More than any other foreign policy area or challenge, the recurring violence in
Yugoslavia would profoundly test the traditional role conception of a civilian power
developed during the post-war period which had allowed Germany to become readmitted
to the ranks of civilized states after World War II. Playing this role had enabled the
country to navigate the often unruly and unpredictable waters of international relations
through the deployment of its considerable economic and normative influence.
Specifically, violence in Yugoslavia would challenge the claim to moral superiority that
non-violent means of conflict resolution had enjoyed as part of German strategic culture
after World War II. Parliamentary elites would begin to view the widespread pacifism
among the general public as problematic and the country’s position on the use of force as
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unsustainable when correlated with international expectations and security perceptions of
the post-Cold War environment. In a series of role episodes, elites would move to enlarge
the foreign policy role of the Federal Republic by taking on greater responsibility. The
fact that the role adaptation process would not always be smooth was made evident by
the first major attempt at assertively engaging the crisis in Yugoslavia.
Like the Persian Gulf crisis, external and internal processes leading to the
unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia may be viewed as constituting another
example of Germany’s maladaptive response to the international pressure to develop a
role proportionate to the country’s economic, military and political significance. During
this role episode, the international environment was characterized by a high level of
normative ambiguity. Long-honored norms of state sovereignty clashed with those of
group self-determination as Eastern European states disintegrated quickly and the postWorld War II political map literally changed before policy makers’ eyes. The confusing
normative context allowed German elites to ignore role expectations and pursue
unilateral policy options which were based to a significant degree on domestic concerns
of maintaining levels of electoral support. Multilateralism was pursued to a point but
abandoned when the prospects for electoral gains generated by an assertive and unilateral
stance became apparent. Parliamentary elites would choose to instrumentally appropriate
external demands when it suited them and to reject or avoid them when these demands
conflicted with their political interests. The result was an awkward performance.
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The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the International Response
The breakup of Yugoslavia began after Marshall Tito’s death in 1980. The
socialist dictator had managed the country’s ethnic and religious differences through the
de-emphasis of regional identities, the centralization of power and his personal appeal as
hero of the guerilla war against the Nazi occupation. The power of the Serb majority in
particular had been reduced through an administrative trick by which the regions of
Kosovo and Vojvodina had been turned into independent provinces whose votes within
the state council were used to balance those of the Serb faction. The fairly rapid
estrangement between the national groups inhabiting the Yugoslav federation after Tito’s
death indicated that animosity and distrust between groups had not sufficiently been
reduced through socialization and propaganda efforts aimed at promoting socialist unity.
The death of Tito also coincided with mounting economic difficulties. These economic
stresses contributed to the process by which groups of people frequently tend to identify
with their own kind in times of trouble.
Modernization efforts and oil imports had led to the need for foreign loans which
Western governments had been eager to provide given the country’s non-aligned position
and the role it played as balancer of Soviet power in the region. The dual oil crises of
1973 and 1979 had drastically exacerbated the problem of exchange imbalances. By the
1980s, Yugoslavia was deeply in debt.154 In 1987, the IMF initiated structural adjustment
measures which had the effect of corroding “the social fabric and the rights and securities
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that individuals and families had come to rely on” (Woodward 1995, 15). Real incomes
fell dramatically between 1987 and 1991.155 In addition to straining social cohesion
amongst citizens, the economic crisis also created stresses between the ethnic provinces.
Wealthier regions such as Slovenia and Croatia began to question their membership in
the Yugoslav federation due to what they perceived to be the one-sided transfer of
resources to poorer regions. Comparatively poorer areas and groups, in turn, sought to
preserve the federation through the control and deployment of state power. The ongoing
process of democratization became another nail in Yugoslavia’s coffin.
The arrival of democratic institutions including legalized party pluralism in
Yugoslavia brought to power nationalist parties and their leaders (Cohen 1995, 104).156
After 40 years of multiethnic policy-making, the sobering reality revealed a divided
citizenry with a multinational Yugoslav identity being the property of all but a minority
of citizens.157 By appealing to primary ethnic identities within an economic environment
marked by intensifying resource competition, Tudjman, Kučan, Milošević and other
nationalist leaders fanned the flames of ethnic animosity and prepared the ground for
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Real wages in Yugoslavia fell by 41 percent during the first six months of 1990. That year, inflation was
above 70 percent but quickly accelerated to 140 percent in 1991. It soared to 937 percent and 1134 percent
respectively in 1992 and 1993 (Chossudovsky 2005, 246-247, quoted in Nick Beams, “IMF Shock Therapy
and the Recolonization of the Balkans”, World Socialist Web Site, April 17, 1999,
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/apr1999/imf-a17.shtml (accessed October 22, 2008).
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In examining newly registered parties, Cohen finds that the number of parties devoted to preserving
national unity and the attainment of liberal-democratic goals is relatively low (1995, 104-107).
Contemporary opinion polls also indicated that a Yugoslav identity remained relatively poorly developed
and that Yugoslavs were more likely to identify themselves along regional lines. This condition was fairly
well understood in academic and reconnaissance circles as indicated by a CIA report from November 1990
according to which the ‘Yugoslav experiment’ had failed and the country was predicted to violently fall
apart within eighteen months (NYT, November 28, 1990, 7).

157

Democratization as transitional phase has been considered as characterized by greater instability. During
democratization, countries have been viewed as more aggressive and war-prone. The likelihood of violence
is higher in multiethnic societies. See, for instance, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) and Cederman et al.
(2008).
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separatist aspirations. A final element in the escalating crisis was the systematic
appropriation of state power by Yugoslavia’s Serb faction led by Slobodan Milošević.
In an act of manipulation as brilliant as it was ominous, Milošević and his
nationalist supporters had subverted the federal institutions designed by Marshall Tito to
ensure unity through the balance between national groups. By stripping the provinces of
Kosovo and Vojvodina of their political autonomy and installing a pro-Serb leadership in
Montenegro, Milošević created a voting bloc that allowed him to seize control of the
Federal Presidency and with it, the ability to deploy the state’s armed forces (Maull 1995,
100).158 The raison d’être of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) as the guardian of the
territorial integrity of the (multiethnic) Yugoslav state would cleverly and effectively be
subverted to pursue the nationalist objectives of the Serb majority.159 National groups in
other provinces were left with little choice but to accept membership within a
Yugoslavian federation dominated by the Serbs under Milošević or to leave this
federation altogether.160 Eventually, all major groups would opt to leave.
On June 25, 1991, the year-long process of Croatian and Slovenian emancipation
culminated in their unilateral declarations of independence. Under the control of
nationalist parties, the new states quickly passed constitutions denying minority rights as
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In July 1991, the Dutch Ambassador to France, Henry Wynaendts, was sent to Yugoslavia on a factfinding mission for the European Community. He noted that the Federal Presidency resisted peacekeeping
efforts by the EEC which he attributed to Serb control of half of the eight votes in the Federal Presidency.
The voting power of the Serb block was a direct result of the removal of autonomy of the provinces of
Kosovo and Vojvodina and the usurpation of their votes (Libal 1997, 26). With the vote of Montenegro, the
Serb faction was able to control the presidency and deploy the JNA against seceding provinces.
159
True to the JNA’s declared mission of preserving Yugoslav integrity, US ambassador Zimmermann
found Ministry of Defense officials and generals of the JNA to be hostile towards Croatia’s intention to
secede (Zimmermann 1996, 100-102). However, by 1989, most of the army’s generals were Serb
(Stoessinger 2005, 122). Thus, the guardians of the Yugoslav state would allow themselves to become the
tool of Serb nationalism.
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The idea of a confederation was considered but did not find much traction among either side.
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defined by the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).161 Clashes
between the Yugoslav People’s Army and Croatian and Slovenian National Guard
elements had occurred before that–now they escalated. Armed hostilities peaked in
Slovenia but quickly ceased, ending hostilities in that part of the country when JNA
forces withdrew by July 19, 1991 (Cohen 1995, 227). The situation was more
complicated in Croatia because a significant number of Serbs lived in the Krajina region
located between the capital Zagreb and Bosnia. The new state’s nationalist constitution
had not adequately protected their cultural rights.162 Open warfare commenced between
the JNA which, through desertions, had become an almost entirely Serb-Montenegro
force, and the Croatian National Guard and volunteers.163 Conflict between the parties
intensified throughout the spring and summer of 1991. The first human rights violations
were committed and full-fledged civil war conditions had developed by October and
November, when JNA forces destroyed the Croat city of Vukovar and lay siege to
Dubrovnik. By December 1991, the conflict in Yugoslavia had cost over 10,000 lives and
over half a million people had been made homeless (Duffield 1998, 190). Europe was
witnessing its worst violence since World War II. Even so, few people would anticipate
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The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became the permanent Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995.
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About 12 percent of Croatian citizens were Serb (Zimmermann 1996, ix). That amounted to a number of
about 670,000 Serbs living in Croatia (Ibid., 94).
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The military action against Croatia, ordered by the government of Yugoslavia, violated Article 316 of
the Yugoslav constitution which stipulated that the use of the armed forces during peace time could only be
authorized by the Federal Presidency. However, the Presidency could be considered to have become
illegitimate due to the blocking of the routine rotation in its chairmanship by the Serb-led faction in the
government. Libal views this action as the first “act in an attempt to solve the Yugoslav crisis by means of
a joint JNA-Serbian dictatorship” (See Libal 1997, 13 and Genscher 1998, 496).
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that the series of civil wars fought in the Balkans would last four more years and
eventually reach a death toll of over 250,000 people.
The initial response by governments and international organizations to the
escalating crisis was characterized by the objective to maintain Yugoslav unity and
sovereignty.164 The emphasis of the principle of state sovereignty over that of national
self-determination was based on a number of normative reasons as well as national
interests. The UN charter protects the integrity of sovereign states in article 2 which
establishes that states, as principle actors in international relations are entitled to respect
for their territorial and political sovereignty and have the power to regulate internal
affairs without foreign dictation (Alexander 2000, 403 and 408). Directly derived from
sovereignty is the principle of non-intervention which requires that states refrain from
intervening in the domestic affairs of another (Ruggiero 2003, 7). The general acceptance
of this principle in customary law and international treaties actually predates the UN
charter (Alexander 2000, 408). The Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe of 1975 also enumerated several points protecting the integrity of
states (notably, principles III, IV and VI). This agreement on the inviolability of World
War II borders had always been crucial for the maintenance of cordial relations on a
continent divided along ideological lines. The reliance on principles of international law
at this time may also have been influenced by policy-makers’ increasing concern with
regional stability. After all, central political parameters in Europe were changing quickly
and both EU and NATO had already published important security analyses arguing for
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In a display of unity and out of the desire to build an independent foreign and security policy, members
of the EC came to an agreement that the status quo should be preserved (Crawford 1996, 492-3).
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the revision of long-standing perceptions and responses to a newly emerging security
environment.
In addition to the normative context, many states chose to support maintaining the
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as leading political objective due to the existence of
unresolved ethnic and national questions in Europe. Policy-makers in Spain, Belgium and
the United Kingdom had long been concerned with reemerging regional autonomy issues
within their own states and did not want to set a precedent by recognizing break-away
provinces of Yugoslavia which would have indicated the support of the principle of
national self-determination. The issue was also relevant given the national aspirations of
national groups within the convulsing Soviet Union. Policy makers were reluctant to
encourage secessionist tendencies by supporting claims to Croatian and Slovenian selfdetermination (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50).165
The United States, as well, had historically supported Yugoslav unity and was
particularly concerned about negative repercussions on the cohesion of the Soviet Union
(Cohen 1995, 218). US Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger was dispatched in
February 1990 to convey the position of support of Prime Minister’s Marković’s reform
policies. In the face of the escalating crisis, US Secretary of State Baker himself visited
Belgrade on June 21, 1991 to convey the US position in support of national unity and in
opposition to recognition (Cohen 1995, 218; Baker 1991, 478-483).166 At the prior CSCE
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For instance, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh considered the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia to
be “one of the essential preconditions for the stability of Europe” (Politika: The International Weekly 56,
April 13 – April 19, 1991, 2, cited in Cohen 1995, 218).
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Secretary of State Baker (1995, 481) would later recall his own words as “we regard your policies as the
main cause of Yugoslavia’s present crisis…you are propelling your people, your republic, and Yugoslavia
toward civil war and disintegration”.
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meeting in Berlin, a Croatian attempt to achieve support for a peaceful session was
defeated by the United States with the support of all major powers who had committed
themselves to a policy of supporting the federal Yugoslav government (Cohen 1995,
220). French and British positions tended to be especially supportive of Serb-controlled
Yugoslavia (Ramet and Coffin 1995). Given the normative consensus of the international
environment and the national interests of powerful actors such as the United States, the
Soviet Union France, the United Kingdom and France, multilateral institutions like the
EC and the UN initiated a number of mediation efforts designed to support the territorial
integrity of the Yugoslav state and to discourage the use of violence between the parties.
On May 30 and 31, 1991, Jacques Santer, Chairman of the European Council of
Ministers and Jacques Delors, the Chairman of the European Commission visited
Belgrade to meet with federal and republican leaders. The envoys offered a substantial
economic support package to convince Yugoslavs that they resolve their constitutional
differences peacefully and maintain the cohesion of the state.167 Under the impression of
the escalating violence throughout the later summer and fall of 1991, perceived Serb
intransigence and, no doubt, in part due to German diplomacy, the EEC would
increasingly move towards identifying the Serb-controlled Federal government as the
main aggressor in the conflict and target it with sanctions.168
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The policy makers offered financial support between $4 and $5 Billion, the immediate commencement
of association talks for Yugoslavia and the intercession with international financial institutions like the IMF
to help strengthen foreign currency reserves, the convertibility of the dinar and increasing foreign direct
investment levels (See Cohen 1995, 219).
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Trade sanctions against Yugoslavia were announced in November and the Peace Conference was
suspended. More important as indicator of the growing conviction that Serbia was to be blamed for the
conflict was the decision in December to drop sanctions against the republics except for Serbia and
Montenegro (Libal 1997, 187).

158

International mediation efforts continued through the Berlin meeting of the CSCE
in June, the meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE in Prague in July
and a peace conference convened in The Hague in September after open conflict had
broken out. Chaired by Lord Carrington, this peace conference would broker no fewer
than 14 ineffective ceasefires between Serb and Croat forces.169 The United Nations also
attempted to mediate in October with its efforts being led by Cyrus Vance but the
rationale for denying recognition was increasingly being undermined by the quick and
almost automatic recognition of the break-away republics of the USSR after the
attempted August coup in the Soviet Union and the JNA’s persistent refusal to withdraw
from Croatian territory. The Yugoslav government’s decision to exclude all the other
republics from the Federal Presidency undermined the credibility of its argument that the
Serb-controlled rump state constituted the legitimate successor to Yugoslavia and on
December 16, the EEC agreed to recognize all Yugoslav republics seeking independence
provided they met constitutional conditions protecting the rights of ethnic minorities
(Ramet and Coffin 2001, 51/Table 1). An arbitration commission led by Robert Badinter
was dispatched to assess the degree of compliance and make recommendations regarding
recognition.
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The 15th ceasefire held when the Serb-controlled federal government dropped its opposition to UN
peacekeepers on January 1, 1992 and hostilities in Croatia began to cease after President Milosevic
pronounced the war to be over. Whether the German decision to internationalize the conflict through the
unilateral recognition contributed to the success of the final ceasefire continues to be debated.

159

Table 3: The Recognition Role Episode 1991-1992: Important Events
1991
January 30
February
June 19
June 25
June 27
June 27
July 1
July 4
September 25
October 1
December 10
December 13
December 15
December 16
December 17
December 20
December 23

Chancellor Kohl argues for greater international responsibility
Alliance 90/Green Party proposes recognition
All-party resolution supporting Yugoslav unity in the Bundestag
Croatia and Slovenia proclaim independence
Hostilities erupt in Slovenia
CDU leaders call for recognition
Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee leads to agreement on recognition
Germany suggests recognition by the EU
UNSC Resolution 713 imposes arms embargo on Yugoslavia
Siege of Dubrovnik begins
UN Secretary General de Cuellar urges German compliance
UK and France introduce Security Council Resolution to forestall German
unilateral recognition
Kohl announces recognition at CDU party Congress in Dresden
EC yields to German pressure on recognition after a 10 hour meeting
Compromise based on commission findings with date set for January 15, 1992
Genscher announces German recognition of Croatia
Baker urges German compliance at NATO Summit in Rome
Germany recognizes Croatia and Slovenia, delays exchange of ambassadors

1992
January 14
January 15

Badinter commission recommends recognition of Slovenia but not Croatia
EC members recognize Croatia and Slovenia, UK delays exchange of ambassadors

The German Response to the Breakup of Yugoslavia
Germany’s foreign policy during this crisis was characterized by a number of
multilateral as well as unilateral foreign policy moves with the overall impression left by
the latter. In the beginning of the crisis, Germany clearly followed its multilateral policyorientation characterized by the use of consensus-seeking processes within international
organizations and based on a normative structure provided by international law. To that
effect, Germany supported a joint declaration of the foreign ministers of the European
Community in favor of the political integrity of Yugoslavia coupled with a pledge to not
accept unilateral declarations of independence by Yugoslav republics wishing to secede
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(Axt 1993, 359; Crawford 1996, 483).170 Germany’s commitment to Yugoslav unity grew
out of the special relationship that the two countries had maintained for many years and
which Genscher himself had been instrumental in cultivating. Referring to international
norms upholding state sovereignty, Foreign Minister Genscher called for the suspension
of the declarations of disassociation of the two republics (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49).
Throughout July, Genscher would promote the internationalization of the conflict by
involving European organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU) which Germany was chairing
at the time. Flexing its economic muscles, Germany also threatened the federal
government of Yugoslavia with the suspension of economic aid.171
An important debate in Bundestag on June 19, 1991 ended with an all-party
declaration supporting Yugoslav unity (Ramet and Coffin, 49; Crawford, 493).
Representing the government’s position, Minister of State Schäfer stated succinctly that
Germany, along with its allies supported the peaceful maintenance of Yugoslavia on the
basis of democracy and human rights.172 The debate revealed that the position of the
government was more pro-unity, in line with the international diplomatic consensus at the
time, than that of the parliament. Even though the Bundestag eventually chose to support
goal of preserving the unity of Yugoslavia, members of parliament had mostly been
concerned with issues of democratic and peaceful processes of conflict resolution within
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Agence Europe, June 24/25, 1991, 4.
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In 1990, German economic aid to Yugoslavia amounted to $550 million (Ramet 1993, 327).
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In German: “Gemeinsam mit den Partnern treten wir für den friedlichen Erhalt gesamtjugoslawischer
Strukturen auf der Grundlage von Demokratie und Menschenrechten ein” (Schäfer, PB 12/13, June 19,
1991, 2564).
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the country and they appealed to all parties in the conflict to refrain from the use of force
in the settlement of the relationship between provinces and central government (PB
12/33, June 19, 1991, 2558-2566).173 As such, parliamentary factions appeared more
concerned with the issue of national self-determination and the potential for violent
suppression by the central government.174 Members of parliament perceived the role of
Germany to be one of a careful mediator, cognizant of the country’s past role in the
region and intend on not repeating it.175 The concern with the principle of selfdetermination indicated by the chamber would soon have consequences for German
diplomacy.
In July 1991, the German position on recognition began to divert sharply from
that of its European and NATO allies–a fact that would generate considerable pressure on
the country’s ability to conform to traditional role expectations which emphasized
predictability and calculability. On July 1, Chancellor Kohl first publicly spoke out in
favor of the norm of self-determination for Croats and Slovenes (Maull 1995, 102).176
Volker Rühe, Secretary General of the CDU, supported him, arguing that Germany had
been reunited due to the principle of self-determination and that extending it to Croatia
and Slovenia was imperative to not loose moral and political credibility (Maull 1995,
173

The key principles discussed were renunciation of force (Gewaltverzicht), Democracy (Demokratie) and
human rights (Menschenrechte).
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In closing his speech, Minister of State (Staatsminister) Schäfer points out that “the Bundestag appears
to have focused more on the issue of national self-determination” (PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2565).
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In the words of one of the members, “Germany is neither the protective nor preeminent power of
Eastern Europe or Southeast Europe”. In German: “Deutschland ist weder die Schutzmacht noch die
Vormacht Osteuropas oder Südosteuropas“ (Glotz, PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2560).
176

Chancellor Kohl made a general statement regarding recognition. According to Axt (1993, 359,
footnotes) newspaper sources disagree on whether he specifically stated his intentions to diplomatically
pursue the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
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117; Libal 1997, 19). Other important party members within both CDU and SPD were
beginning to support recognition at about the same time.177 Among others, Karl-Heinz
Hornhues, the Deputy Chairperson of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, explicitly
criticized Foreign Minister Genscher’s hesitancy and called for immediate recognition.178
It appears that Genscher and his Free Democratic Party were the last group within the
policy establishment to embrace recognition; even at the cost alienating important allies
of the Federal Republic (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49).
Officially, Germany advocated EC recognition of the break-away republics a few
days later at the EC Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in The Hague–a move that was
vetoed by France (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49; Maull 1995, 103). France and the United
Kingdom would continue to obstruct German recognition efforts until the end of the year,
particularly within the UN Security Council.179 The position on recognition began to
crystallize throughout the summer with Genscher expressing the government’s
willingness to recognize unilateral declarations of independence if negotiations were to
fail on September 4 (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50). The government’s increasing
divergence from the international consensus on recognition has to be considered against
the backdrop of a number of important domestic and international developments at this
time.
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This included Karl Lamers, the CDU foreign policy spokesperson and Volker Rühe, the Party SecretaryGeneral although Lamers would later reverse his position and become one of the few CDU politicians to
question the recognition course (“Brennend nach Aktion”, Der Spiegel 26/1995, 38-41). Important partymembers of the SPD had moved towards recognition as early as May (Maull 1995, 102).
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SZ, July 6/7, 1991, 7, quoted in Ramet 1993, 327.
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NYT, December 16, 1991.
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Domestically, a public groundswell was developing in support of more resolute
diplomacy towards the crisis in Yugoslavia. The German media presented the escalating
violence in Croatia in rather concrete and vivid imagery (Libal 1997, 15; Woodward
1995, 184). Croatia had been a popular travel destination for German tourists.180 Erb,
comparing domestic debates about the situation in Yugoslavia in Germany and the United
States, reports that while the debate appeared detached in the United States, concerned
with abstract political issues such as setting precedents for recognition or the inviolability
of territorial boundaries, media reports in Germany were almost entirely characterized by
the concern for human rights and the suffering of the Croat people (2003, 159).
Chancellor Kohl would later call the news and media images coming from the Yugoslav
civil war as unbearable.181 Influential conservative dailies including the Frankfurter
Allgemeine and Die Welt had launched effective press campaigns in support of
recognition (Maull 1995, 102; Heidenheimer 1995, 51; Woodward 1995, 149). In press
reports and editorials, the rump-state of Yugoslavia as controlled by the Serbs was
frequently painted as the aggressor.182 Public sentiment, as yet, was not fully supporting
recognition but public opinion was beginning to exert pressure on politicians to act in
some meaningful way to stop aggression and violence in Yugoslavia. Leaders of the
Catholic Church had been adamant supporters of recognition (Jakobsen 1995, 405). As
180

Yugoslavia’s and, specifically Croatia’s close ties with Germany are exemplified by a joke according to
which Yugoslavia had not six but seven provinces – the seventh one being Germany – in reference to the
many cars with German license plates on the road (Woodward 1995, 469, notes).
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Kohl used the terminology of “kaum auszuhalten” to describe the intolerable images (Kohl 2007, 564).
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The Serb-controlled state media ran orchestrated campaigns to denounce German diplomacy by
associating the Federal Republic with Nazi Germany (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49-50). Kohl and Genscher,
who grew up resisting Nazi totalitarianism, were greatly offended and saw the campaign as evidence for
intransient totalitarianism of the Serb-run Yugoslav regime that needed to be resisted.
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additional indicator of public sentiment moving policy-makers, representatives of all
German state governments (Länder) requested EEC recognition of the two republics if
the Yugoslav army continued to attack with the state government of Hessen even offering
material aid to Croatia.183
The public’s empathy for the suffering of the Croat people influenced German
political elites. Within the main parties, the principle of self-determination began to
trump other issues and concerns–often to the surprise of party leaders (Axt 1993, 355).
The Alliance 90/Green party had supported recognition as early as February 1991
(Crawford 1996, 508).184 Leading politicians of the Social Democratic Party, noticing
that recognition seemed to strike a chord with the electorate, had called for diplomatic
recognition within days after the declaration of independence of the two break-away
republics (Heidenheimer 1995, 51). The FDP had decided on a policy in support
recognition by July 9th (Crawford 1996, 493-94) and at the annual Party conference of the
CDU in Dresden on December 15, 1991, Chancellor Kohl declared to thunderous
applause that Germans had won the valuable prize of national self-determination at the
time of unification and wanted others to share in the same good fortune (Horsley 1992,
239).
Internationally, the failed coup in the Soviet Union, followed by the rapid
dissolution of the Soviet Union had changed strategic realities that had existed for a
generation. The successor states of the Soviet Union were recognized fairly swiftly. The
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Both the Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green parties were trying to recover from rather
embarrassing electoral defeats at the time.
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international community’s relative lack of concern for minority rights in the new states
underscored the inconsistent and interest-driven application of international norms
governing recognition at the time–a fact that may have contributed to the German
decision to extend recognition unilaterally.185 The deterioration of the situation in
Yugoslavia and the escalation of force was another important concern that increased the
urgency of the need for some kind of diplomatic action.
Genscher had visited Yugoslavia in July. The fact that he had been unable to meet
with Croat and Slovenian leaders in their own capitals due to Serb attacks had apparently
left quite an impression on him (Maull 1995, 102; Libal 1997, 16). The German foreign
minister identified Serb aggression as leading cause of the conflict during the July
meeting of the CSCE (Crawford 1996, 493). The violence unleashed during the brutal
battle for Vukovar which started in August, followed by the Serb siege of the city of
Dubrovnik in October clearly helped push Germany towards accepting the dissolution of
Yugoslavia as irreversible at a time when other governments still clung to the possibility
of maintaining Yugoslav unity. In fact, Ramet and Coffin claim that it was “Yugoslavia’s
continued use of force in Croatia that changed the nature of the conflict for Germans and
reoriented German foreign policy” (2001, 50).
Policy divergence did not mean abandoning multilateralism and Germany became
a leading force behind the pro-unity EEC initiatives that were generated during the

185

Crawford (1996, 501) writes that “…underdeveloped regimes and conflicting international norms
provided permissive conditions for defection”.
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summer and fall of 1991 (Duffield 1998, 188).186 When Chancellor Kohl first suggested
recognition in July, he also warned that unilateral German policy actions would
jeopardize European integration (Maull 1995, 102). As late as September 20, 1991,
Genscher rejected unilateral steps in a declaration to the German Bundestag.187 Despite
the official insistence on multilateralism, however, Germany had begun to ignore the
wishes of its allies by beginning to establish increasingly closer ties with Croatia and
Slovenia. Between July, when Croatian President Tudjman was received for official talks,
and recognition in December 1991, Croatia was perceived by many international
observers to have assumed the role of a rather unpredictable German protégée. A German
consulate was established in Ljubljana in November and unofficial assurances were given
after President Kučan’s visit to Bonn in October that recognition was “only a matter of
choosing the right moment and right circumstances”.188 These developments raised the
specter of a reunited Germany resuming traditional power politics in the Balkans.189 The
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In early July, Genscher tentatively proposed that the EEC consider a joint recognition in the event that
the Yugoslav Army continued to violate cease-fires. He quickly dropped the idea when he encountered
opposition from other community members.
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Emphasizing joint action with France, Genscher said that “the widest possible support will make every
step we take more efficient. The same holds true for the issue of whether Croatia and Slovenia should be
recognized…We consider it crucial to take a stand with France.” Indicating the government’s desire to
move towards recognition within a multilateral setting was a joint statement by Kohl and Mitterrand from
September 19, 1991 which confirmed respect for the right to self-determination as long as it was exercised
peacefully, democratically and safeguarded the rights of minorities (Genscher 1998, 505).
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The line is taken from a statement of a spokesman for the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs after
President Kučan’s visit to Germany in early October (FBIS-EEU, October 10, 1991, 35, as cited by Cohen
1995, 238). The close link between Croatia and Germany was indicated by the levels of arms exports.
Between April 1992 and April 1994, the Federal Republic exported $ 320 Million worth of arms to Croatia
despite the existing arms embargo on Yugoslavia (Der Spiegel 32/94, Prügel vom Ziehvater, 121). That
was roughly 25 percent of the total arms exports to Serbs, Croats and Muslims.
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A number of international observers viewed Germany’s unilateral pro-recognition initiatives as
indication of the intention to reestablish German hegemony in Eastern Europe and to force the EC to
legitimize these hegemonic aspirations. For examples of these critiques see, Misha Glenny, "Germany Fans
the Flames of War," New Statesman and Society, December 20 and 27, 1991, 145; Daniel Singer,

167

negative perception was not helped by the fact that Germany had begun to put together a
pro-recognition group of states that, not counting Denmark and Belgium, looked
embarrassingly like the World War II coalition that had backed fascist Croatia (Crawford
1996, 496). However, any association with power politics was vehemently denied
officially and in parliamentary speeches.
In a speech to the Bundestag on November 6, 1991, Chancellor Kohl said that his
government would continue to pursue the recognition of all Yugoslav republics that
sought recognition (Kohl, PB 12/53, November 6, 1991, 4367). By early December, Kohl
promised Tudjman that Germany would recognize Croatia before Christmas. In a letter
sent to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, Genscher clearly broke with the tradition
of multilateralism when he argued that the EEC’s founding treaty of Paris allowed for
unilateral action when a member state’s overriding national interest was involved (Owen
1995, 343). In an uncharacteristically stern reply, the General Secretary rejected the
German position.190 France and the United Kingdom, recognizing that Germany was
clearly heading towards unilateral recognition, introduced a UN Security Council
resolution on Yugoslavia on December 13 designed to forestall any unilateral state action
that could change the political balance between the parties engaged in the civil war
(Crawford 1996, 496). The resolution had the backing of the United States which had
earlier issued an official statement that recognition should be part of only a larger peace

"Germany Muscles In," The Nation, February 3, 1992; Quentin Peel, "Damned If It Does--and If It
Doesn't," Financial Times, January 18-19, 1992, 6.
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Making his preference for non-recognition very clear, the Secretary General sternly reminded Genscher
of the EC declaration in Rome from November 8, 1991 in which the recognition of independence had been
viewed as acceptable only within the context of a comprehensive settlement (Owen 1995, 343-344).
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settlement.191 At the margins of the NATO summit in Rome in November, the US
strongly pressed Germany not to break the non-recognition consensus (Baker 1995, 638,
footnote *). Germany remained undeterred with Foreign Minister Genscher confirming
the government’s decision of official recognition on December 16 (Maull 1995, 104)
against the objectives of Britain’s foreign secretary who cautioned of an escalation in the
Balkans (Cohen 1995, 238). Germany’s official recognition of Croatia and Slovenia
followed on December 23, 1991.192
In extending unilateral recognition, Germany was preempting the decision of the
EEC’s Badinter Commission sent to the region on December 16 as well as joint EC
recognition agreed on for January 15, 1992 pending the results of the arbitration
commission. More importantly, Genscher had promised German recognition regardless
of the Badinter Commission’s findings (Maull 1995, 104) and on December 19 pledged
economic, legal and cultural assistance to Croatia.193 A diplomatic ‘firestorm’ during
which Genscher had tried to convince other states to join the German position had done
little to alleviate what Maull has called ‘a bad aftertaste’ of German diplomatic tactics
(Maull 1995, 105). The ‘premature’ act of recognition stunned the international
community. Germany had disregarded the wishes of the United States, ignored the
warnings of the United Nations and risked diplomatic repercussions within the European
Community.
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Stephen Kinzer, "Germans Follow Own Line on Yugoslav Republics," NYT, December 8, 1991, 18.
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The unilateral act was cushioned diplomatically by the qualification, lost on most international
observers, that recognition was ‘awaiting implementation’ until January 15, 1991 at which point the act was
formally concluded together with the multilateral recognition by the member-states of the European Union.
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The impression left of unilateral and bullying conduct was strikingly out of line
with the role of the reliable, calculable and consensus-focused actor that the country had
played in the past. Where did the reticence, patience and caution go that had
characterized German foreign policy conduct since World War II? Germany failed to
comply with the expectations of its French, English and American allies as well as the
United Nations. But the country acted unilaterally while supporting multilateralism in
European institutions with its bureaucratic elite busy preparing for the important
Maastricht summit.

Role Expectations and Role Conceptions
Expectations of German behavior during the role episode were generally based on
German support for the consensus on maintaining Yugoslav sovereignty that prevailed
within the international community. Expectations were based on having Germany play
the role of a mediator pursuing a non-assertive foreign policy with a low diplomatic
profile that would lend its weight to the establishment and maintenance of a multilateral
consensus. When German elites showed inclinations to deviate from that international
consensus, social pressure was applied to make the country’s policy conform. UN
Secretary Perez de Cuellar’s exchange with Foreign Minister Genscher and the efforts by
the United States, France and the United Kingdom to prevent Germany from unilateral
recognition represent but a few important actions in a sequence by which external
pressure was applied to change German behavior.
Scathing criticism of German actions, mixed with apprehensions about its future
role and intentions, further confirms the nature of external expectations. US Secretary of
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State Warren Christopher later claimed that “Germans bore a particular responsibility for
the failure of the international community to stop the bloodshed”194 and Lord Carrington,
the chief negotiator between Croatia and Serb-controlled Yugoslavia alleged that the
peace conference “had been torpedoed by Germany’s premature recognition…”.195 More
importantly, observers saw in this “first action taken by Germany against the expressed
preferences of its allies since 1949” a sort of reawakening of the German giant (Jakobsen
1995, 401). French President Mitterrand warned that the days of the “good German are
almost over and that the world must brace itself for the worst.196 Daniel Vernet expressed
the concern of many around the world when he wrote in Le Monde that the “lesson drawn
from the Yugoslavia affair is that Germany no longer will accept European integration to
bind its potential power”.197 Foreign criticism of German actions was not confined to
political decision-makers and journalists but extended to the academic community in
which power-based positions predicted the reestablishment of German influence in the
Balkans on the basis of the ethnic alliances forged during World War II and made
possible by the waning of Soviet power (Jakobsen 1995, 401-402).198
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Woodward (1995, 146-147), for instance, criticizes Germany for pushing the EU towards recognition
ahead of the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement involving all provinces in spite of warnings of
future violence. Horsley (1992) is equally critical. Academic concerns included the arguments made by
Waltz (1990; 1993) and Mearsheimer (1990) that foresaw Germany’s return to power-based unilateralism
within the emerging multipolar order after the Cold War. The time period immediately before and after
reunification was characterized by widespread fears that Germany would resume a traditional role
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The scathing criticisms of German foreign policy conduct coming from its close
allies disaffirmed German role behavior in Yugoslavia. The international community
rejected Germany’s role as trailblazing policy leader that acted commensurate with
capabilities in this case. Contrary to the Persian Gulf War where German actions were
viewed as inappropriate because they were too reticent, German behavior in Yugoslavia
was viewed as inappropriate and labeled as unilateral because it too brazen. What was the
role conception held by policy elites?
Germany’s initial response to the crisis in Yugoslavia corresponded closely to its
traditional civilian power role conception with its role performance characterized by a
strong emphasis on multilateralism, consensus-seeking and compliance with the norm of
state sovereignty. Core elements of the role conception including reliability and
calculability were maintained and the country was eager to meet the role expectations of
its closest allies, France, United States and United Kingdom. When German elites first
encountered French resistance to their desire to pursue EEC recognition of Croatia and
Slovenia, they backed down, deferring to the French position (Ramet and Coffin 2001,
50). German elites appeared united in supporting a multilateral course of action even
though they had clearly developed a preference for the norm of self-determination by late
summer of 1991. At the European level, Germany had been firmly committed to the
integration process of the EEC and substantial bureaucratic and diplomatic efforts had
been expended on preparing the upcoming Summit of Maastricht with the intention of
making it one of the most important integrative milestones in the history of the European
involving power politics. Woodward (1995, 470, note 121), for instance, quotes an unnamed Western
ambassador as telling her that “Grossdeutschland is second nature to them [the Germans], it is part of their
makeup; they can’t do anything about it, but it is a problem for others”.
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Community.199 In support of the long-term project of European Monetary Union,
Germany had signaled its willingness to make substantial concessions including the
surrender of a key symbol of its post-war economic identity, the Deutsche Mark. German
elites had also been on the forefront of the development of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy for the EEC which represented a significantly improved set of
multilateral procedures over the more loosely coordinated foreign policy adjustment
through the European Political Cooperation mechanism of the past. Overall, German
actions during this time were characterized by a desire to manage the rapid changes in
Europe through the reorganization and empowerment of multilateral institutions
including the EEC and its military arm, the Western European Union (WEU), the CSCE
and NATO (Maull 1995, 101). Given Germany’s diplomatic support for strengthening
international organizations through a policy emphasis on multilateralism, it is not
surprising that some of the strongest opposition to unilateral recognition came from the
Foreign Ministry.
Leading bureaucrats in Germany’s Foreign Ministry had a key interest in not
wanting to risk Germany’s reputation as a good team player in Europe and a reliable ally
of the United States (Horsley 1992, 239). Horst Grabert, the former ambassador to
Belgrade aptly captured the prevailing attitude within the foreign service when he voiced
legal concerns about recognition, stating it would set a bad precedent since it entailed the
waiver of established rules on diplomatic recognition based on the control of
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governments over their territory and populations.200 In internal memos, the embassy in
Belgrade also warned of the possibility of a diplomatic failure and even accused policy
makers in Bonn to have promised too much.201 President Tudjman’s ‘official’ visit to
Bonn in mid-July was met with considerable criticism (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50).
When Secretary of State Dieter Kastrup, the highest ranking permanent official of the
German Foreign Ministry, briefed leading parliamentarians on the Yugoslav situation on
July 31, 1991, he did not even touch upon the question of recognition (Libal 1997, 26).
Ministry bureaucrats also appeared to be concerned about the effects of recognition on
multiethnic Bosnia.202 Outside of the government as well, there were prominent voices in
society warning of unilateral policies while criticizing the merits of the recognition
course overall.203 Rhetorical exchanges between elites in parliament had politicians
distance themselves from any hint of wanting to reassert a hegemonial role in the
Balkans.204 Thus, official announcements in support of maintaining role behavior based
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Ambassador to Belgrade, Hansjörg Eiff later pointed out that ethnic violence in Croatia started only
after Tudjman’s intolerant course towards the Serb minority. Eiff had briefed Bosnian President
Izetbegovic for a meeting with Genscher during which the president inexplicably failed to point out the
possibility of civil war arising from a general recognition policy of all former Yugoslav republics
(“Brennend nach Aktion”, Der Spiegel, June 26, 1995, 38-41).
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Debating responses to the crisis, CDU/CSU parliamentarian Lummer rejected both unilateralism and
regional hegemony as German motives by stating: “We also passed on unilateral recognition because we
wanted to say: What happened in 1941 is over once and for all; we will have nothing to do with it. We are
not concerned with influence or supporting one or the other republic but we are supporting freedom,
democracy, self-determination, rights of minorities and peaceful conflict resolution”. In German: “Wenn
wir auf eine einseitige Anerkennung verzichtet haben, dann auch deshalb, weil wir sagen wollen: Was 1941
war, ist endgültig vorbei; damit haben wir nichts zu tun. Uns geht es nicht um Einflüsse oder das
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on consensus-seeking were not empty statements. Germany continued to be a ‘team
player’ seeking the multilateral resolution of the conflict.205 Germany sought to comply
with international norms and behavioral expectations based on the support of the
principle of sovereignty but then attempted to change that international consensus on
recognition through diplomatic persuasion within multilateral settings. Even after having
achieved that goal, parliamentary elites still found it necessary to break with the
European consensus unilaterally.

Domestic Concerns of Parliamentary Elites
Parliamentary elites of Germany’s dominant catch-all parties were dealing with a
number of challenges during the early 1990s. Party membership had declined
substantially during the previous decade as the Germany constituency had grown weary
of the tendency of the entrenched party system to maintain a stable consensus on major
foreign policy issues since the 1950s (Crawford 1996, 509). More radical parties emerged
and grew their membership numbers at the expense of the traditional ones (Ibid.).206 The
rapid socio-political transformations in Eastern Europe created additional challenges for
German parties. The disappearance of the Communist threat and the controversies
surrounding the German reunification process transformed the political landscape and
presented the leadership elite of the main parties with the challenge to maintain party
Parteiergreifen für die eine oder andere Republik… sondern…wir ergreifen Partei für Freiheit, Demokratie,
Selbstbestimmung, Minderheitenschutz und friedliche Konfliktlösung” (Lummer, PB 12/58, 4855).
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cohesion and appeal through the incorporation of popular issues. The reformulation of
traditional ideology and incorporation of more popular and even radical positions offered
the prospect of acquiring support from hitherto inaccessible voting groups as well as
arresting the defection of traditional constituencies to smaller parties. In this
environment, foreign policy issues became politicized to a degree previously unknown.
The appeal to national self-determination represented a logical move.
Along with anti-communism, self-determination had been part of the conservative
agenda since World War II (Crawford 1996, 506). The emphasis on the principle through
the promotion of a speedy reunification course during the general elections of 1990 had
provided the CDU/CSU with an election landslide.207 In West Germany, the
conservatives had been able to overcome their legacy of being a party of primarily
Western rather than Eastern policy orientation. In the Eastern Länder, the CDU cleaned
up its tarnished reputation as former Block Party affiliated with the Socialist Unity Party
(SED) that had controlled the German Democratic Republic. Thus, the public appeal of
the self-determination principle had proven so effective that it had overcome the
conservative party’s ideological and historical deficiencies and established it as the
dominant force in reunification Germany. Chancellor Kohl closed his first inaugural
speech in January 1991 with his vision of the future that involved a new order for Europe
and the world based on the self-determination of nations, the protection of human dignity
and respect for human rights” (Kohl 2007, 316).
After the successful reunification election, the party’s position among the
electorate quickly came under attack: As public enthusiasm over reunification gave way
207
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to the realization that the project was immense, costly and associated with long-term
sacrifices, the CDU-FDP coalition lost the successive Länder elections in Hessen
(January 1991), Rhineland-Palatinate (April 1991) and Hamburg (June 1991). The loss in
the Rhineland was particularly disconcerting because this was Chancellor Kohl’s home
state in which he had actively campaigned. It was the first CDU defeat since 1946
(Jakobsen 1995, 415; footnote 36; Kohl 2007, 322). The electoral victories allowed the
opposition to take control of the upper house and effectively become a co-governing
force. The decrease of electoral support in the West was somewhat expected given that its
population stood to pay for the modernization of the East. Massive tax increases to pay
for reunification costs and Gulf War contributions had been decided on in February and
went into effect in July.208 But the party’s popularity in the Eastern provinces was also
waning (Jakobsen 1995, 415). Here, the primary reasons were popular dissatisfaction and
disappointment over the fact that reunification was resulting in massive job losses due to
privatization and the closings of hundreds of companies. In his memoirs, Kohl wrote
about the impact of the elections in 1991 that “…the five elections in 1991 brought
soberness and created new challenges…the acceptance of the CDU had to be reconquered in manifest ways” and that the party had a need to differentiate itself morally
from the more economic orientation of the FDP (Kohl 2007, 324). Retracing the party’s
success through the public display of support for the principle of self-determination in
Yugoslavia became a logical line of action. Woodward writes that “Chancellor Kohl
seized the opportunity of the vote in the Bundestag demanding recognition of Croatia and
Slovenia, which was initiated by the opposition SPD, to divert attention abroad to a
208
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diplomatic gain and capture the issue for his party” (Woodward 1995, 185). The support
of oppressed people offered strong moral appeal and was immensely popular. In
conjunction with Kohl’s stated goal of taking on greater responsibility after the Gulf War
debacle, the foreign policy action also offered the possibility of moral action and the
display of international responsibility without having to face military responsibilities as
these were precluded by the present institutions. In fact, German policy demonstrates a
very clever and flexible appropriation of existing values and institutions by Germany’s
leading party at the time.
On July 3, Volker Rühe asked the European Community to open the prospect of
recognition to Slovenia and Croatia (Libal 1997, 19). The purported reference to reasons
of demonstrating political and moral support for the two peoples based on the German
people’s recent ability to reunify is in line with the emphasis on human rights that is a
central component of German strategic culture. But the action also represented a shrewd
political choice by this seasoned politician and ambitious ally of Chancellor Kohl. His
position was quickly supported by the Deputy Chairperson of the CDU/CSU
parliamentary party Karl-Heinz Hornhues, who went on to criticize Genscher’s hesitancy
on the issue and called for immediate recognition.209 More important because of its
proximity to actual recognition in December is the fact that Kohl and Genscher gave the
promise of recognition to Croatia on December 15, one day before the party’s important
summit in Dresden. This provided the Chancellor with the political powder that
unleashed the thunderous applause from the CDU delegates. The consideration of elite
interests in conjunction with cultural variables is crucial to understanding this policy
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episode. It explains the conundrum of why Germany would push for multilateral
recognition throughout the fall of 1991 and basically achieve that diplomatic victory by
moving the EEC through strong arm tactics and promises of diplomatic concessions at
Maastricht only to still defect on its promise. Self-determination and human rights were
used instrumentally to shore up party support and win electoral support. The reason this
could be done was because they appeared as morally superior actions within the German
cultural context.
The leadership of the CDU’s sister-party CSU also was quick to embrace the proindependence position. The fact that both Croatia and Slovenia were predominantly
Catholic and the existence of a sizable Croat community in Germany may have
contributed to the urgency of the decision for a party with traditionally strong ties to
catholic voters (Paterson, 1996, 142).210 The desire to aid the Croatians may also have
been influenced by the Vatican’s early support for catholic Croatia which it exerted
through Episcopal conferences in Bavaria.211 CSU politicians were among the earliest
critics of Foreign Minister Genscher’s initial course of action in which he attempted to
maintain Yugoslavian unity (Axt 1993, 353).212 In all likelihood, the CSU leadership was
also worried about the party’s diminished importance in the united Germany as the role
of Bavaria as pivotal player in the Bundesrat was being diluted through the addition of
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the new Eastern provinces. The electoral benefits generated by the popularity of the
principle of self-determination were too good to pass up. Thus, in the fall of 1991,
conservative elites increasingly began to embrace the self-determination for instrumental
reasons.213
Support for the principle of self-determination was steadily increasing within the
Social Democratic Party. During the German general elections of 1990, the SPD had
opposed the rapid reunification platform of the CDU with a slower, incremental
integration course. The CDU’s resounding success in all of the five new provinces of
Germany convinced the SPD leadership that the will of the people expressed in the
movement for self-determination had not been adequately accommodated by the party
line. The SPD had been unable to reap the benefits from the political opening to the East
that had been initiated by Willi Brandt’s Ostpolitik during the 1970s and the party’s
linkage to the East German intellectual opposition. It had viewed itself as instrumental in
contributing to the fall of the Socialist regime yet was facing with the prospect of being
consigned to the political sidelines during this critical juncture in the nation’s history. The
SPD had also experienced the erosion of its traditional voter base during the late 1980s
(Crawford 1996, 509). Struggling to regain its former political role and recognizing the
popular appeal of the recognition course, leading figures in the SPD called for diplomatic
recognition within days after declaration of independence of the two break-away
republics in spite of the party’s traditional aversion to ultra-nationalist movements
213
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(Heidenheimer 1995, 51). At the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Bundestag on July 1, 1991, SPD leaders joined the CDU in demanding from Genscher
that he commit the European Community to the speedy recognition course sought by the
German public.214 Indicative of the party’s position, SPD leader Björn Engholm later
remarked that the recognition was arriving too late for Croatia and Slovenia and Norbert
Gansel stated that “if the EU sticks to this schedule [of recognition on January 15, 1992],
she might be able to only recognize corpses and ruins”.215 The second parliamentary
resolution for recognition on November 14, 1991 received widespread support from both
the SPD rank and file. The threat of further party fragmentation became more pressing
when considering the position and the influence of the SPD’s junior partner in
opposition–the Alliance 90/Green party.
Germany’s Green Party had been founded in 1980. With a platform centered on
environmental and gender equality issues, the party had steadily gained strength and
credibility with the electorate through the 1980s. During the parliamentary elections of
1987, the Greens had received a stunning 8.3 percent of the vote.216 The party’s success
steadily eroded the central role that the Liberal Democrats had played as ‘kingmaker’ in
Germany’s multi-party system. The successful run came to an abrupt halt when the
Greens experienced a catastrophic defeat during the 1990 federal elections. The emphasis
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on environmental issues had not appealed to an electorate concerned with reunification
and nationalism. In addition to campaign-related mistakes, the party had always struggled
with profound internal problems. Fierce personality clashes, ideological conflict between
the left wing (the Fundis) and the more mainstream (the Realos) side as well as an
unorthodox style in organization, decision-making and debating had always characterized
the anti-establishment party whose leaders had been active in the civil rights movements
of the 1960s. In 1990, the electorate punished the party severely. Receiving just 4.8
percent of the vote, the Green Party support fell beneath the critical five percent threshold
necessary to retain the right to parliamentary representation (Ibid.). The special nature of
election law during reunification offered the last way out. 217 In East Germany, the
Greens had survived because they had campaigned as part of a coalition with the Alliance
’90 Party formed by notable civil rights activists. Thus, in December 1990, 41 West
German Green parliamentarians were given notice by the Bundestag administration to
vacate their seats while two East German Greens along with six members of the Alliance
90 moved in. The existential threat posed by the West German Greens’ poor showing at
the polls thus necessitated a merger with the East German civil rights activists. The defeat
and the nature of the newly combined party would profoundly influence the emergence of
the German foreign policy preference for recognition.
Forged for pragmatic reasons, the union between East German activists and West
German Greens created a marriage of convenience characterized by an uneasy and
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conflict-prone relationship from the start. The East German activists from the Alliance
90, who had been instrumental in bringing about the peaceful changes leading to
reunification, harbored strong resentments against the West German Greens whom they
accused of having viewed the former regime in the Democratic Republic through rosetinted glasses. They claimed that Greens had emphasized peace and détente while turning
a blind eye to human rights violations committed under the East German regime (Der
Spiegel 7/1992, 30). The two parties shared a tradition of grass-roots activism but greatly
differed on the goals that should be pursued. Alliance 90 members were more
conventionally oriented and considered the ideological squabbles within the Green party
as childish enterprise of a generation of privileged Westerners who, unlike the Alliance
90 activists had never managed to fundamentally transform society (Der Spiegel 16/1991,
26). The former East German activists were particularly at odds with the left wing of the
Green party and its anti-capitalist polemics. As a result of having achieved a grass-roots
revolution against a totalitarian and communist regime through the will of the people,
Alliance 90 activists brought with them a loathing of undemocratic regimes combined
with a principled emphasis on human rights standards. Thus, the prominence of the
Alliance 90 activists within the parliamentary faction of the Greens and their moral
authority derived from their activism in support of civil rights translated into a powerful
endorsement of self-determination and human rights in former Yugoslavia. But that is not
the whole story. Within the Green Party, important changes were taking place as well.
The Green party’s devastating defeat prompted a process of inner soul searching
and programmatic reorientation. Joschka Fischer, one of the Greens most popular and
charismatic politicians, strongly supported the long-range goal of participating in
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government through the pursuit of a more pragmatic orientation. Stating after the election
that “we will be different in four years or disappear” (Der Spiegel, December 10, 1990,
90), Fischer worked hard on achieving a more pragmatic consensus build on
environmental and human rights issues.218 This emphasis on core issues was intended to
forestall further losses to the SPD which had increasingly appropriated some of the
traditional policy suggestions of the Greens. Rather than the party’s anti-unification
stance during the election, Fischer saw issue convergence as main reason for the massive
voter losses during the parliamentary elections (Ibid.). Against the backdrop of a
generally accepted need for reform within the party, his pleas for a streamlined and more
pragmatic position took hold. At the Green Party’s congress in April 1991, Fischer and
his Realos were able to isolate the most adamant of the radical Fundis under Jutta
Ditfurth who chose to leave the party.
While ensuring that the Greens continued to differentiate themselves from the
catch-all parties through the adherence to a set of core issues, Fischer also was crucial in
laying the groundwork for future cooperation with the Social Democrats as stepping
stone to governmental power. As first Green politician to join government as
environmental minister in a Social-Democratic/Green coalition ruling the state of Hessen
between 1985 and 1987, he would serve in that position again after the defeat of the
conservatives in January 1991. Greens and Social Democrats had shrewdly exploited the
German public’s antimilitant attitudes during the Persian Gulf War (Kohl 2007, 307).
The process, by which the two left-of-center parties would move towards one another
culminating in their eventual coalition and victory during the 1998 parliamentary
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elections, was among the crucial developments in German politics of the 1990s. The
incrementally occurring normalization of their policy stance on the use of force and
German participation in international peacekeeping efforts would play a critical role as
convergence point which increased both the prospects for a workable coalition as well as
electoral viability.
The move from radicalism towards the center, the renewed focus on core issues
with the strong emphasis on human rights as well as the prominence of the Alliance 90
activists after the demise of the West German Greens in parliament all explain the joint
party’s concern with minority rights in Yugoslavia. Consequently, Alliance 90/Greens
were calling for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on the basis of the principle of
self-determination as early as February 1991 when the other parties were still concerned
with the negative consequences of the Yugoslav breakup (Crawford 1996, 508). By June,
when Green parliamentarian Poppe advocated peaceful self-determination as only viable
option because “the current basis for coexistence no longer enjoyed the consensus of all
Yugoslav nations”, he also noted that the other parties’ desire to maintain Yugoslav unity
had finally given way to a more realistic assessment of the situation.219 The fact that the
other parties had moved over to the Alliance 90/Green position on self-determination
indicates that the small party was somehow crucial in the process.220 The groundswell
supporting self-determination and national independence as a solution to the conflict in
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Crawford (2006) also sees the Alliance 90/Greens as crucial in explaining the emergence of an all-party
consensus on recognition. She views the Alliance 90/Green Party promotion of self-determination as
example of small parties’ attempts to distinguish themselves on foreign policy issues. Concern over loss of
votes then prompted the catch-all parties to embrace the new position in a process she calls ‘elite
bandwagoning’. The temptation of larger parties to embrace the new position is likely to be stronger with
increasing salience of the issue and perceived popularity of the proposed policy decision.
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Yugoslavia also enveloped the liberal FDP with its strong legacy of promoting
multilateralism in foreign policy.
The outcome of the election in 1990 had generally been positive for the
Germany’s small but influential liberal FDP. The traditional king-maker party had fared
well in the new provinces with its relative gains outpacing even those of the CDU. But
given its small constituency, FDP politicians always had to be concerned with correctly
maneuvering politically among the fluctuating policy interfaces produced by the catchall
parties. Foreign Minister Genscher personified and became famous for this ability to
survive by reconciling contradictory foreign policy positions and decisions.221
The convergence of interests between politicians of the CDU/CSU and SPD in the
fall of 1991 created a dilemma for the FDP. Controlling the Foreign Ministry,
parliamentary elites like Genscher were most concerned with not alienating the allies of
the Federal Republic by straying from the traditional path of reliability and calculability.
This had left FDP elites in a position of wait-and-see on recognition while focusing on
the upcoming Summit of Maastricht. The sudden alignment of CDU/CSU and SPD
politicians caught leaders of the FDP off-guard and created the possibility of leaving the
party isolated–an untenable political position given its minor popular basis of support
(Axt 1993, 354). The convergence of the main parties’ positions on recognition became
evident during the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee in early July. This meeting
had a profound effect on Foreign Minister Genscher. According to an eye-witness,
Genscher went into the meeting a cautious diplomat opposing recognition and left it
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singing the recognition tune (Horsley 1992, 240). By July 9, Genscher had succeeded in
revising the FDP’s position to accommodate the pro-recognition course (Paterson 1996,
142; Crawford 1996, 494).
The investigation of the interests of party elites at the time of recognition
indicates the instrumental appropriation of the norm of self-determination. In essence,
elites were falling over each other in trying to be the first to embrace the new position
because it offered electoral benefits for the ruling coalition parties CDU/CSU as well as
the opposition Social Democrats and the struggling Alliance 90/Greens. In the case of the
FDP, perceived electoral advantages may have taken second place to the desire to avoid
political isolation. Given the popularity of the recognition decision, parliamentary elites
were tempted to pursue career and party interests over those of the country as a whole.
The fact that the parties that lost the previous election seemed to be the first to embrace
the recognition course while Genscher’s FDP and Kohl’s CDU were the last, supports
that view that domestic considerations were important and eventually trumped role
expectations of multilateral calculability.

Strategic Culture: Antimilitarism and Self-Determination
Elite policy actions in support of national self-determination in Yugoslavia were
generally in line with constituent elements of German strategic culture. Two important
values of strategic culture after World War II include human rights on one hand and
antimilitarism and a negative perception of force on the other. The official commitment
to the protection of human rights differentiates the identity of the Federal Republic from
that of its predecessors. The protection of minority rights is viewed as part of the
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country’s special responsibility and historical burden and enjoys a general national
consensus (Crawford 1996, 504). Statements about the preservation of human rights and
dignity regularly find their expression in official documents and statements of
government principles as well as state policies.222 Debating the escalating crisis in
Yugoslavia just days before the declarations of independence, all parties in the Bundestag
applauded the statement, “where the process of state disintegration is taken as
opportunity to mistreat and deprive minorities of their rights, we, the German Bundestag
are on the side of the minority”.223 Later, the Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU
parliamentary party, Rupert Scholz, would justify Germany’s support for selfdetermination by invoking United Nations’ principles and stating that misperceptions of
German foreign policy during the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia may have to be the
price for “doing the right thing” (Scholz 1995, 51). Support for self-determination is also
found among the public which showed a majority of those polled indicating a preference
for self-determination and possible independence for Yugoslav republics in September
1991.224 Support for human rights also can be linked to Germany’s post-war history as a
divided nation existing in two separate states which necessitated the support for peaceful
self-determination to allow for reunification. After achieving this goal, German elites
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For instance, in the preamble to the Constitution and Germany’s asylum policy, which until amended in
1992, was considered one of the most tolerant in the Western world. As strong supporter of strengthening
international human rights regimes, Germany has traditionally been very sensitive to arguments related to
human rights and prone to take diplomatic action when such rights were demonstrably violated. On
German human rights policy, see Boekle (2001).
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A September 1991 poll shows 63 percent in favor of self-determination and independence (“The
Yugoslav Crisis”, Eurobarometer 36, December 1991, A41).
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thought that the country’s moral and political credibility depended on recognizing the
right to self-determination in Croatia and Slovenia.225
A final issue in regards to the central human rights value was the nature of the
regime in Yugoslavia. Discourse and government statements indicate that German elites
viewed rump Yugoslavia as totalitarian. Totalitarian regimes violate human rights and
employ violence as part of state policy to control their populations through fear. As such,
Belgrade and the JNA enjoyed very little legitimacy from parliamentary elites in
Germany many of whom had experienced Nazism in their youth and who had helped
develop a political culture in which force and intimidation were frowned upon. The
prevalence of the human rights value in Germany’s strategic culture explains the urgency
of German elite actions although the preference for protecting minority rights through
reliance on the principle of self-determination also raises a number of questions.
For one, the cultural emphasis on the protection of human and minority rights
does not have to be automatically linked to a policy in support of self-determination,
much less the immediate recognition of the independence for oppressed minorities.
Institutional and cultural forms guaranteeing minority rights have been developed in
many states. In addition, serious doubts exist whether the cultural preference for the
support of human rights translated into actual German policy. Woodward, for instance,
claims that within the CSCE, German policy was more focused on stability concerns and
the inviolability of post-1945 borders (Woodward 1995, 153). Lastly, if protecting the
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General Secretary of the CDU, Volker Rühe, argued in July 1991 that “we won unification through the
right to self-determination…if we may pursue a policy of the status quo without recognizing the right to
self-determination of Croatia and Slovenia, we lose our moral and political credibility” (quoted in Maull
1995, 117).
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rights of minorities in Yugoslavia was such important concern, why were the German
government, parliament and the public so keen on supporting the rights of Slovene and
Croatian minorities in Yugoslavia while all but ignoring the rights of Serb minorities in
the breakaway provinces? More likely, self-determination served as surrogate for some
other motivating force.
The most important of the values constituting German strategic culture since
World War II was that of antimilitarism. Elite aversion to the use of force characterized
the parliamentary discourse at the time of recognition. The debate on June 19, 1991, for
instance was characterized by the frequent use of expressions of such as “preventing the
use of violence” (Gewaltanwendung verhindern), “seeking an mutually agreeable
solution without force” (einvernehmliche Lösung ohne Gewalt), “peaceful resolution of
the conflict”, (friedliche Beilegung des Konfliktes), and the “renunciation of force”
(Gewaltverzicht).226 The value of antimilitarism naturally predisposed German politicians
to take sides against actors in the civil war who engaged in violence. The Serb-controlled
rump state and the JNA were quickly perceived to be the prime culprits. In a radio
interview from July 3, 1991, Genscher blamed military force by the JNA in support of
totalitarian state objectives for the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Libal 1997, 17).
Contrary to the position held by the United States, United Nations and chief negotiators
who viewed recognition as a trump card that could be used to force the civil war parties
to settle their differences, Genscher argued in his letter to the UN General Secretary that
“delaying recognition would lead to further escalation of violence by the Yugoslav
People’s Army, since the troops would necessarily regard our refusal to recognize the
226
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republics as encouragement for their policy of conquest toward Croatia” (Genscher 1998,
513). The escalating of violence in Yugoslavia made vivid by the German media and the
identification of the main aggressor created a moral imperative for politicians to act.
Thus, at the important Foreign Affairs Committee meeting of the Bundestag on July 1,
Genscher had to defend himself against accusations of German inaction in the face of
Serb violence by emphasizing that the government’s chief aim in Yugoslavia’s crisis had
been the prevention of violence (Libal 1997, 15). The trouble for elites was that the
country’s antimilitant culture and traditions disallowed anything but diplomatic action.
Public opinion imposed significant and clear constraints on elite actions towards
Yugoslavia. Military involvement was widely rejected with public opinion polls
indicating a clear preference for humanitarian missions (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Public Attitudes toward Military and Non-Military Missions

Source: Asmus/Rand 1994, 63.

The Rand data shows that the public generally rejected the participation in peace
enforcement missions even if sanctioned by an international organization. Furthermore,
the declining support for such missions within the population between 1991 and 1993
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suggests that, if anything, the escalating violence in Yugoslavia only strengthened the
public’s generally negative perception on the efficacy of force in addressing domestic
instabilities.

Conclusion: Explaining Non-Compliance
The crisis in Yugoslavia leading to the fragmentation of the state, ethnic warfare
and the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1992 found German parliamentary elites
initially performing role behavior corresponding to that of a civilian power which
international society had affirmed for many years. This explains the emphasis on
multilateralism which was very strong in the beginning of the crisis and never completely
disappeared until Germany clearly broke with the consensus by recognizing the two
breakaway republics in December 1991, roughly three weeks ahead of the scheduled
recognition by the European Union and the presentation of the Badinter Commission
findings. Thus, the actions of parliamentary elites also showed a clear desire to play a
more prominent role based on leadership conduct instead of the traditional reticence.
Germany had been encouraged to play that leadership role by the United States
(Woodward 1995, 153). Foreign expectations in the form of shaming criticism conveyed
during and after the Persian Gulf War amplified the power of the social message to
change role behavior. Conservative politicians had begun to promote external
expectations, trying to find a middle ground between the role of hegemonial power and
normal expression of natural capabilities. They encouraged a redefinition of the behavior
associated with reliability and calculability in German foreign policy. The key argument
they used was one of solidarity with Western allies and the avoidance of foreign policy
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singularity. Foreign expectations should have produced compliance with international
norms upholding sovereignty and Germany should have exhibited its new leadership role
in the form of foreign policy initiatives designed to coordinate a general consensus on
withholding recognition until orderly and peaceful secession processes could be
negotiated. A number of factors made this impossible and help explain German noncompliance in this episode.
The first factor is the context provided by Germany’s unique strategic culture.
Antimilitarism created a compelling urgency for German politicians to address the levels
of violence unseen in Europe since World War II. The value of human rights put
Germany at odds with a regime that used its massive army against its own people and that
deployed its state-run media in classic totalitarian fashion to demonize its political
opponents. Antimilitarism in both culture and institutions also constrained elite actions.
Arms transfers to regions of instability were prohibited and military involvement even in
the form of multilateral responses was unacceptable both for elites as well as the general
public. It was not until February 1992, that the Bundeswehr even received authorization
to participate in operations outside Germany but within NATO treaty area (Asmus 1994,
62). This left a diplomatic response to the crisis as the only option and the vehement push
for recognition can in part be understood as an attempt at crisis resolution through the
internationalization of the conflict (Genscher 1998, 510).227 As such, recognition may be
understood both as a response to violence that was viewed as particularly appalling due to
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Former Foreign Minister Genscher gives this as the main reason for the German policy drive towards
recognition when he writes: “What, I asked myself over and over, can end the bloodshed? More and more it
seemed as if recognizing Slovenia and Croatia and thus turning the conflict into an international matter was
the only remaining political means” (1998, 510).
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the antimilitarism of Germany’s post-war culture as well as an attempt to address a
foreign policy issue with as yet underdeveloped means. Antimilitarism may also have
influenced the key element of multilateralism that is so prominent in the traditional role
conception.
While the German public was not any more in favor of self-determination than
that of other countries, an important element of the civilian power role, mainly the
widespread support for multilateralism was experiencing a significant decline as violence
escalated in Yugoslavia. Initial public support for the multilateral conflict resolution
efforts undertaken by the EEC during the summer of 1991 was high but criticism of the
EC mediation efforts soon began to increase (Libal 1997, 15). In fall, at the time of the
fighting in Vokovar and Dubrovnik, a Eurobarometer poll found the German public
rapidly losing faith in the ability of the ongoing mediation efforts to restore peace to the
region.228 The growing disenchantment with multilateral conflict resolution initiatives
through EEC and UN was shared by the parliamentary elites with even the opposition
pushing for early recognition lest the government wanted “to recognize only corpses and
ruins”.229
A second important factor explaining noncompliance was the ambiguous
normative context provided by conflicting standards of state sovereignty and selfdetermination which provided a permissive condition allowing for national
interpretations and, hence, unilateral diplomacy. Both the Helsinki Final Act and the UN
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Charter provide equally for the inviolability of borders and the right to selfdetermination, as Germany was quick to point out (Crawford 1996, 500). The legitimacy
of multilateral standards regarding state recognition was also undermined by the EEC’s
selective enforcement of the principles of conditional sovereignty based on human rights
considerations. For instance, while the four nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union
were recognized on the basis of their promise to ensure human rights, Croatia was
expected to implement these rights before recognition was even considered. Macedonia,
which met all conditions established by the EEC, was not recognized at all due to
vehement Greek objections. Thus, the normative environment governing role
expectations provided mixed messages. During his diplomatic initiative, Genscher was
able to persuade a number of states to support the German pro-recognition group–no
doubt in part due to the widespread conviction that self-determination represented an
important principle worth honoring.230 The fact that the position of the EEC shifted
increasingly to accommodate that of Germany indicates the ambiguity of the normative
context. Germany was able to ‘bend’ the rules because the rules governing the
recognition of state sovereignty were ambiguous and allowed themselves to be
interpreted. This allowed German elites to deploy self-determination norms in
instrumental fashion as dictated by their electoral interests at the time. Thus, Chancellor
Kohl was proud to present German actions as “great success for us [the CDU] and
German politics” at the CDU Party Congress in Dresden.231 Foreign policy elites did
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engage in an effort of international persuasion of their own through forceful leadership
within the EEC and communication with the UN and US but ultimately failed to receive
international affirmation for the country’s assertive leadership style.
Taken together, the various factors impacting this role episode allow the
following conclusions to be drawn about German foreign policy behavior. Germany,
which had been encouraged to play a more prominent role in world politics after the
Persian Gulf War, encountered an extremely violent situation in its backyard which
required immediate attention. Violence projected from the totalitarian regime in Belgrade
predisposed German elites to take sides for the besieged breakaway states. Initial German
support of multilateralism was reflexive and immediate. But as EEC and UN efforts at
mediation failed to stop violence in the region, German elites and the public lost faith in
the ability of these efforts to stop the violence. They then began to support recognition as
means of deterring further Serb aggression because it was the only proactive means in the
diplomatic toolbox. The final break with multilateralism can be explained through the
developing spiral of distrust towards multilateral processes. The compromise on January
recognition achieved at Brussels on December 16, 1991 was hard-fought and remained
subject to the findings of the Badinter Commission. The outcome was not guaranteed and
elites preempted recognition to force the community to comply. This also allowed elites
to reap the domestic benefit of scoring points with the electorate.
Overall, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia constituted a role episode in the
evolution of German role conceptions that was to be followed by the challenges created
by the unfolding tragedy in Bosnia. Each time Germany was forced to address the
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situation in Yugoslavia, it faced the pressure of complying with international
expectations. The recognition case suggests that German elites and the public were
getting ready for a larger role within the international system but strategic culture and
institutions were hampering the effort. Germany led the world without the cultural or
institutional ability to back up its diplomacy. The result was inconsistent diplomacy that
emphasized the civilian power preference for multilateralism on one hand and the desire
for the policy autonomy of a great power addressing its national interests on the other.
The change in the security environment after the Cold War was also reaffirmed. Contrary
to the claim made by President von Weizsäcker that the Persian Gulf War had been an
exception, the war would prove to be an indicator of changes in the international security
environment which was further confirmed by the unfolding events in Yugoslavia. The
central message emerging for elites struggling with role adaptation after reunification was
that the new security environment required the strengthening of international institutions
through full German participation as an equal partner and that diplomatic singularity was
to be avoided.
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CHAPTER V
THE BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR
Introduction: Script Change
Parliamentary elites drew important social lessons from the international response
to unilateral behavior over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. For the most part, the
response to Germany’s more assertive stance in international politics had been negative
and marked by a “growing disquiet”.232 A fundamental break with consensus-oriented
policy behavior and normalization towards a more nationalistic policy stance had clearly
been rejected by the international community. Self-critique of the unilateral ‘adventure’
also erupted in Germany as fears of political isolation emerged and the possibility of
having contributed to violence in Yugoslavia was considered.233 German elites quickly
tried to minimize the significance of the policy behavior by claiming that worries about
aggressive behavior after reunification were exaggerated.234
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John Tagliabue, “Kohl Seeks to Fend Off Criticism Of His Assertive German Politics”, NYT, January
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European unity through its vigorous support of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (Ibid.). American
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Claiming that the united Germany’s energies would be spent rebuilding the East, Chancellor Kohl
dismissed suggestions that Germany had any intention of seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council, content with the fact, that the United Kingdom and France adequately represented
European interests. At the same time, Kohl indicated that a newly expanded role stemmed from reunited
Germany’s size and its position as “No. 1 in Europe in economic might” (Ibid.).
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The behavior associated with a ‘natural’ role for Germany after the Cold War
remained highly contested within the country. The need to show greater responsibility for
global stability after reunification and to act commensurate with capabilities was widely
acknowledged among elites and the public but what type of behavior this ‘normalization’
entailed was less clear. Against the backdrop of the domestic debate about future German
responsibilities within international society, Europe’s worst violence since World War II
began to unfold in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Bosnian Civil War would dramatically illustrate and confirm the new threat
perceptions held by policy-making elites. It was a prime example of the new security
problems characterizing the more complex security environment arising after the end of
the Cold War. The conflict would repeatedly test the network of European and global
institutions addressing international conflict and play a substantial role in prompting the
redefinition of strategies and missions of international institutions. As UN, NATO,
OSCE and EU moved irrevocably towards the adoption of out-of-area missions, the
obligations of member states including Germany, which was at the heart of this
institutional structure, took on concrete form and the process of role socialization became
much more intense. Increasingly, Germany would be called upon to contribute to
multilateral peacekeeping missions in line with its economic and military wherewithal.
The international community began to decisively reject the cultural or institutional
argument that limited Germany’s contributions to the use of force. This would provide
domestic role entrepreneurs with ample opportunities to promote the adaptation of role
behavior.
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The escalating horrors in Bosnia also shook the remaining support for a position
of radical pacifism, particularly after the large scale violations of human rights committed
in Žepa and Srebrenica. These atrocities empowered role entrepreneurs further by
undermining the credibility of radical antimilitarism on the left and reducing the moral
credibility of positions promoting the purely civilian role of the Federal Republic. Role
entrepreneurs would effectively turn the accepted interpretation of Germany’s historical
burden on its head by promoting the efficacy of force to help victims of genocide and by
casting neutrality and antimilitarism as accessory to crime. This was both tricky yet
ultimately effective within the Balkan context with its strong historical association with
previous German aggression.235
The effect of the Bosnia civil war on German views on the efficacy of force and
subsequent possibilities for security policy reorientation was significant. The policy
challenge represented the final stage in policy reorientation towards the renewed adoption
of the use of force. Other actions would follow by which troops would eventually
conduct combat and even secret missions in faraway places such as Afghanistan. The
beginning of the Bosnian civil war found German elites generally adhering to the
traditional civilian power role in which a military role for Germany besides territorial
defense was generally rejected as unthinkable for reasons of history and strategic culture.
By the time of the Dayton Accords in 1995, Germany had provided soldiers for
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monitoring missions, contributed Luftwaffe Tornado fighter jets that had engaged in
bombing missions over Bosnia and through its support of NATO’s implementation force
(IFOR), deployed ground troops outside of German territory for the first time since
World War II. During the IFOR vote on December 6, 1995, 543 out of 656
parliamentarians voted in favor of German participation to enforce the Dayton Peace
Accords.236 This was widely perceived to be a historical turning point in Germany’s
foreign policy. It signaled the completion of post-war Germany’s rehabilitation into the
community of nations (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 55). Germany left behind its non-military
identity as an international actor (Zehfuss 2001, 32).237
The following chapter will present the context of the Bosnian civil war and the
international response, the concretization of strategic doctrines and the behavioral
expectations this generated. Social pressure on German elites and the reactions of
domestic role entrepreneurs are investigated next with particular emphasis on the way in
which role entrepreneurs used foreign expectations to persuade others that maintaining
the country’s role as predictable and reliable partner required role adaptation. The
domestic concerns of parliamentary elites and coalesce of these concerns on the basis of
external expectations are addressed. As in previous chapters, German strategic culture is
investigated for any notable changes.
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The journal Focus used the headline ‘At the Rubicon’ to underscore the significance of the vote for the
Bosnia Deployment: The journal wrote that “step by step, the population and the army are being led to the
threshold of combat missions” (“Am Rubikon”, Focus, December 22, 1995).
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The Bosnian Civil War and the International Response
Hostilities in Croatia ended in spring 1992 when Serbs and Croatians honored a
ceasefire negotiated in The Hague in November 1991. Cyrus Vance was able to expand
the agreement into a comprehensive truce monitored by the United Nations. The ethnic
atrocities committed and the hitherto unthinkable levels of violence of the conflict had
ruptured the sense of continuity of the old Yugoslavia. Nowhere had this been felt more
severely than in the heart of Yugoslavia, the multiethnic province of BosniaHerzegovina.
In 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted an ethnic mosaic made up of 43.7
percent Moslem, 31.4 Serb, 17.3 percent Croat and 5.5 percent Yugoslav (Cohen 1995,
241). Ethnic concentrations existed with Serb enclaves surrounding a generally Muslim
center. Frequently, however, the different ethnic and religious groups lived side-by-side
with Sarajevo being a multiethnic city characterized by fairly advanced levels of
integration. However, anxiety and distrust between the groups had increased steadily with
the intensification of interethnic hostilities in Croatia. During the six months following
Croat and Slovenian secession and the states’ subsequent recognition, the leader of
Bosnia, Alija Izetbegović had warned repeatedly that the fragmentation of Yugoslavia
and the international recognition of its individual parts would spell disaster for
multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. That it would, should have been clear to all parties
observing the drift into the abyss of total ethnic war: The international community had
followed Germany’s leadership in recognizing Croatia without establishing adequate
protections for the sizable Serb minority located in the republic’s Krajina region.
Nationalists in Croatia and Serbia had openly declared their territorial ambitions in
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Bosnia with Croatia issuing an economic blockade and supporting the formation of an
army among autonomous Croats in Western Herzegovina (Woodward 1995, 276).238
Autonomous Serbs had declared regional governments in at least four areas (Ibid.).
Lastly, interethnic hostilities including barricading and sporadic assassinations had been
occurring throughout the summer and fall of 1991.239
Map 1: Ethnic Composition of Bosnia Herzegovina Prior to the Civil War (Source: Wikipedia Commons)

Repeatedly failing to secure support for a plan based on the continued existence
of Yugoslavia as a loose federation of independent states and faced with the realities of
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US ambassador Zimmermann (1996, 181-184) learned in his meetings with Tudjman that the Croatian
leader’s territorial claims to Bosnia were based on the rejection of Bosnia’s legal right to exist since it had
been formed under communist rule. In addition, he justified the partition of the state between Croatia and
Bosnia by conjuring up the paranoid claim of the rise an Islamic fundamentalist state threatening the
region.
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Woodward (1995, 277) claims that in October, 1991, both the Yugoslav leadership which was now
dominated by Serbia, as well as the government in Sarajevo repeatedly appealed to the UN for monitors in
Bosnia to stop ethnic violence from terrorist gangs in the villages of eastern Bosnia.
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Croat and Slovenian independence, Alija Izetbegović began to embrace the idea of
independence of an undivided Bosnia by the autumn of 1991.240 This objective clashed
with that of the Serb minority which feared being reduced to minority status in what they
considered to be their own state. Serbs in Bosnia considered their link with Serbia as
guarantee of their ethnic survival and political freedom.
In October 1991, Muslim and Croat legislators, over Serb protests, decided to
initiate the process leading to Bosnian independence by approving documents allowing
for secession (Cohen 1995, 241). In December, Bosnia under President Izetbegović
formally sought EEC recognition as independent state. An important consideration in the
hurry towards independence had been the establishment of a one-week window during
which the European Community would consider requests for recognition (Woodward
1995, 276).241 In compliance with EEC rules governing recognition of break-away
provinces of Yugoslavia, a referendum was held in February 1992 in which Muslims and
Croats overwhelmingly supported independence. The vote was boycotted by Bosnia’s
Serbs. Interethnic violence flared up in March following an attack on a Serb wedding in
Sarajevo and quickly spread throughout the province (Cohen 1995, 242). On March 3,
1992, the Bosnian parliament declared independence without the support of the Serb
party and its leader, Radovan Karadžić. On April 7, 1992, Serb party representatives on
the Bosnian collective presidency resigned and an assembly composed of Serb SDS and
SPO parliamentarians proclaimed the independence of a Serb republic in Bosnia
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Woodward (1995, 278) considers this to have been a major mistake. One week was too little time to
make such a momentous decision for a deeply divided political entity.
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(Woodward 1995, 284). In July of that year, a separate Croatian entity in Bosnia, aided
by Croatia was also proclaimed. In spite of the escalating violence and the questions that
should have been raised about the viability of the Bosnian state, the European
Community recognized Bosnia on April 6, 1992 with the US following suit the following
day.242
Preoccupied with the situation in Croatia, the European Community had largely
ignored events in Bosnia until January and February 1992. The Badinter Arbitration
commission had been mostly concerned with questions of human rights and democratic
standards in the new republics that were beginning to replace Yugoslavia. Among the
provisions governing recognition established by the commission were requirements of
constitutional guarantees for human rights and referendums on independence.243
Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and the wave of recognitions
the action prompted set a dangerous precedent for the international recognition of
national sovereignty even in the absence of a resolution of fundamental questions of
national identity. Viewing sovereignty in terms of national identity which, in turn was
linked to territory, the European Union brokered a peace agreement between Muslim,
Serb and Croat groups in Lisbon in March 1992 that divided Bosnia into three separate
territorial units and provided for power sharing between the groups (Cohen 1995, 243).
However, the agreement fell apart within weeks when Izetbegović reneged, suddenly
concerned about the issue of territorial division. Croat leader Mate Boban also rejected
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‘respectable numbers’ from all three major ethnic groups within the province (Woodward 1995, 280).

205

the accord because he saw a possibility for his group to gain additional territory in new
talks (Woodward 1995, 281).244
Violence between the groups erupted into full-fledged civil war as the April 6
recognition date drew near. The Bosnian government had ordered a general mobilization
of National Guard troops and reserves in preparation for a Serb attack on Sarajevo which
took place on April 5 when Serb forces began shelling the city from the surrounding hills.
A number of Bosnian and international observers had called for the UN to make Bosnia a
protectorate in order to stop the escalation. However, the new Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali had concluded that conditions were not appropriate for UN involvement
(Woodward 1995, 285). In June, Boutros-Ghali further expressed his view that the
position of the UN as conflict management after the Cold War being foremost the
responsibility of regional organizations. The UN did establish a presence in Sarajevo–
UNPROFOR, which was actually the headquarters for the mission in Croatia, the
implementation of which had been delayed due to wrangling by state governments over
the financing of the operation. This mission was soon forced to address the situation in
Bosnia but its size was dramatically reduced as fighting intensified. Overall, the
international community had begun to view the violence in Bosnia as a civil war in which
inviolably borders were given priority and only humanitarian aid should be provided. In
any case, the United States, the United Kingdom and France were not inclined to commit
troops to pacify the situation.
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International diplomatic pressure mounted on the warring groups as a
humanitarian catastrophe of a scale not seen since World War II rapidly unfolded. As
heavy fighting ensured, even the International Red Cross was forced to pull out of the
province and a stream of refugees began to leave the province for safer countries in
Europe. Even though the UN deployed a small force of about 1100 troops from Croatia in
June to open the airport of Sarajevo for humanitarian purposes, overall the number of
international monitors in Bosnia dramatically declined.
Yugoslavia, now composed of just Serbia and Montenegro, was increasingly seen
by many countries as the villain in the escalating Bosnian civil war. Serbia was directly
and indirectly aiding the Bosnian Serbs who had begun to conduct an utterly repugnant
campaign of ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnia. The United States took the lead in
seeking harsh international measures against Serbia. Severe economic sanctions were
imposed on the country in the end of May 1992 and in November, the UN Security
Council imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia designed to keep the Serb air force from
aiding Bosnian Serb forces. The first serious enforcement of the no-fly zone by NATO
planes began in March 1993 with Operation Deny Flight. The monitoring mission
required the use of NATO AWACS planes and naval forces. Later that year, the United
Nations provided protection under Chapter 7 of its charter to so-called safe havens
starting with Srebrenica.
During the escalating civil war, a number of peace talks were sponsored by
multilateral institutions.245 The most notable of the early efforts to achieve peace was the
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30 and 31, in Sarajevo on April 12 and in Lisbon at the end of April 1992.
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Vance-Owen Plan from spring 1993 which proposed a division of the Bosnia into ten
semi-autonomous cantons with an ethnic power-sharing type of government. This plan
was soon rejected by the Bosnian Serbs who favored a firm territorial and administrative
division, thereby rejected the membership in any potential multiethnic entity. A key issue
explaining the failure of the many attempts at conflict resolution was confusion over
leadership. Individual actors including the United States, France and even Germany and
the UN, OSCE and the EU would repeatedly initiate some kind of action involving
mediation or the coordination of relief efforts aimed at addressing the humanitarian
disaster but leadership from the international community would prove to be sporadic
without conviction or follow-through. Woodward blames this on a general absence of a
major powers’ strategic interests in the region as well as the as-yet underdeveloped nature
of conflict resolution institutions and mechanisms after the Cold War.246 Another issue
was the ever-changing power constellation between the fighting groups. The constant
fluctuation in relative group power must have influenced the pay-off matrixes of ethnic
negotiators, determining their preferences for compliance with or defection from
agreements.247
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Bosnia was fully contained within former Yugoslavia. The fact that the state did not share borders with
outside states like Greece reduced the destabilizing impact of the refugee crisis and the fighting. This was a
very different situation from the one that would develop in Kosovo in 1999 where there were significant
security implications for neighboring countries (Woodward 1995, 316-25).
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And so Europe worst violence since World War II continued on. The year 1993
saw major territorial gains by Izetbegović’s Bosnian Army against the Croat forces.
These losses would soon compel the Bosnian Croats to question the tutelage of their
supporter Tudjman in Croatia and open the door for an alliance with the government in
Sarajevo. The bloody civil war would grab the international headlines again in the spring
of 1994 when a mortar shot fired into a market square in Sarajevo killed 68 people and
wounded many more. The incident prompted NATO to force the Bosnian Serbs to end
the siege of Sarajevo. In May of 1994, fresh mediation efforts led to the establishment of
a contact group comprised of representatives from the United States, Britain, France,
Germany, Italy and Russia. Under the leadership of the United States, the group was to
work out a general peace agreement between the newly formed Bosnian-Croat federation
and the Bosnian Serbs but it failed its first major test when the Serbs rejected the plan
(Burg and Shoup 2000, 322). The rejection of the plan accelerated a growing rift between
the Bosnian Serbs and their protector in Serbia, President Milošević, who decided to
break off relations on August 4, 1994 (Ibid., 309).
In July 1995, the hitherto unrivaled levels of brutality in post World War II
Europe reached yet new stages in abject human depravity when Bosnian Serb forces
overran the UN declared safe areas of Srebrenica and Žepa, two of four remaining
Muslim enclaves in the ethnically cleansed eastern Bosnian Serb corridor. In Srebrenica,
thousands were murdered in what became the largest mass murder in Europe since World
War II. With that, the international community finally had had enough and in August and
September 1995, NATO conducted a major bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb
positions called Operation Deliberate Force. That summer, the Serbs were also
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experiencing major military and territorial losses against the Bosnian-Croat Federation
and in Croatia, where a newly trained and equipped Croat army emerged as an effective
fighting force. Serb resistance in Croatia’s Krajina was quickly crushed and the majority
of the Serb population expelled from the region. The various military and alliance
developments in the crisis set the state for the final diplomatic effort to end the hostilities.
In November 1995, President Clinton invited all parties to the conflict to Dayton, Ohio in
November 1995 where they negotiated a lasting peace agreement. After the peace
accords were formally signed in Paris in December 1995, the three and a half year long
civil war finally came to an end.

The German Response to the Civil War in Bosnia
Germany initially remained relatively reticent during the escalation of the war in
Bosnia, ceding the diplomatic initiative to other powers like the United States, France and
the United Kingdom. International criticism of the prominent role the country had played
during the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia had had a stinging effect (Duffield 1998,
212; Maull 1995, 105; Ramet and Coffin 2001, 53). A number of international observers
and negotiators were quick to blame German pro-recognition diplomacy for the
international rush to recognize Bosnia which, in their opinion, caused the ethnic powder
keg to ignite (for instance, Horsley 1992; Zimmermann 1996). When the issue of lifting
the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina caused controversies between European states
in 1992, German Foreign Minister Kinkel declared: “No matter what, there will be no
unilateral German decision …”.248
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But major issues developed that forced the hand of the government. The first one
was the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding at an alarming rate which dramatically
increased the number of refugees arriving in Germany. By July 1992, Foreign Minister
Kinkel249 reported to parliament that the country had taken in about 200,000 refugees
from the former Yugoslavia with 140,000 requesting asylum (Kinkel, PB 12/101, July 22,
1992, 8610). The Federal Republic began to contribute aid to address the situation,
promised to take in specific numbers of refugees from Bosnia and the Luftwaffe
contributed two of the transport planes for the humanitarian air lift operation to
Sarajevo.250 The government also advanced a quota system for the European distribution
of refugees at an EC summit of foreign ministers although it received little support for
this position (Woodward 1995, 295).
The second major foreign policy issue arose from the growing conviction among
the international community that Serbia and Montenegro were chiefly to blame for the
escalating violence. On May 30, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted
resolutions 713 and 757 which established harsh military and economic sanctions against
Serbia and Montenegro. The Federal Republic strongly supported the sanctions251
because parliamentary elites shared the view that Milošević’s Serb government was
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Germany’s longest-serving Foreign Minister Genscher departed from the scene in mid-May 1992. He
was succeeded by Klaus Kinkel from the FDP. Kinkel had been Minister of Justice for a year prior to his
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primarily to blame for the violence.252 When NATO and WEU began to enforce the
sanctions through air and sea patrols in the Adriatic Sea, Germany faced allied pressure
to contribute militarily (Duffield 1998, 195). The Kohl government dispatched a
destroyer and three marine patrol aircraft.253 The action sparked a major debate in the
Bundestag indicating that parliamentary elites were as yet divided about the future
military role of the country. However, the Bundestag did pass a resolution supporting
government actions with the limitation that further actions in this regard would require
the consultation of parliament. When the United Nations Security Council approved the
interception and searches of ships violating the sanctions in November 1992, neither
Defense Minister Rühe nor Foreign Minister Kinkel thought it politically feasible to push
the parliament beyond monitoring missions. Even though they were willing to comply
with foreign expectations and also saw major diplomatic and political advantages of such
compliance, they chose to not pursue the normative agenda given political realities. This
indicates that interests constantly influence the use and subsequent evolution of
normative standards. However, the country’s failure to comply with NATO expectation
prompted a new round of international criticism (Duffield 1998, 196).
When the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia in October
1992 with the possibility of NATO AWACS planes being called upon to monitor the
airspace above former Yugoslavia, Germany was again confronted with international
252
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expectations of contributing to the military mission. In this case, participation was
considered vital to the success of the monitoring operation because more than a quarter of
the highly trained flight crews were German.254 The UN Security Council decision to
enforce the ban in March 1993 caused a major controversy in parliament and more
importantly, among the cabinet elites themselves. Even though AWACS planes perform
non-combat surveillance missions, their information is relayed to command centers or
fighter pilots and could lead to decisions involving the use of force against aircraft
violating the no-fly zone. In addition, the planes themselves could be attacked, placing
their German crews in danger.
The resulting parliamentary controversy over whether to leave German flight
crews on the AWACS planes created major strains within the government coalition. CDU
politicians supported the move while FDP politicians continued Genscher’s tradition of
rejecting any use of force. Members of the opposition parties as well, opposed any
change in Germany’s long-standing policy of not participating in international actions,
including multilateral ones that could involve the use of military force. Squeezed
simultaneously by international expectations to contribute to the enforcement of the flight
ban and domestic pressures for continuity in policy, cabinet elites devised a rather clever
if politically embarrassing solution: The cabinet voted to support the mission by leaving
German flight crews on the AWACs planes while the FDP Bundestag faction filed for an
injunction with the Constitutional Court to stop participation. In effect, the government
was filing suit against itself. The court was quick to render its verdict which it pointed out
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addressed this particular government decision only. It let the cabinet action stand,
rejecting the request for an injunction. As a powerful indication of the importance of
external expectations for German domestic processes and controversies, the court found
that “a loss of confidence by the allies and all European neighbors would be unavoidable,
and the resulting damage irreparable”.255 Thus, the court considered alliance solidarity to
be more important than a potential violation of constitutional principles. The court also
found that future missions required parliamentary approval (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 53).
When the UNSC decided to enforce the flight ban with resolution 816 on March 31,
1993, German AWAC crews participated in the monitoring missions.
The next important challenge on the path to German security policy reorientation
occurred in December 1994, when the German government was confronted with a
request by the NATO commander in Europe, General George Joulwan, for aerial support
(Ibid., 54). The request constituted a significant escalation in the demands for an
increased German military role because of the possibility of German pilots getting
involving in air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. In addition, the deployment of
sophisticated fighter jets like the Tornado would require the accompaniment of logistical
as well as combat-ready support units.
Amid parliamentary disagreements, the government announced that it had agreed
to the deployment of six to eight jets by the end of the year (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54).
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The court did not rule on the constitutionality of the missions but rather on the political consequences of
upholding or denying the request for an injunction by the FDP Bundestag faction. Indicative of the moral
and value-based struggle going on between the elites, the court considered the negative consequences of
allowing German flight crews to remain on board the AWAC planes to be smaller than the potential for
violating the constitution. The court’s willingness to risk violating the constitution demonstrates the power
of external role expectations in the elite debate about foreign policy reorientation (Der Spiegel, April 4,
1993).
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The move was strongly opposed by the SPD with vice chairman Oskar Lafontaine
rejecting NATO’s role as the world’s policemen as incommensurable with German
foreign policy (Interview in Spiegel/Reuters, January 2, 1995) and federal manager
Verheugen categorically ruling out the use of the Bundeswehr (Reuters, February 22,
1995). The deployment was eventually approved by parliament on June 30, 1995 by a
narrow majority.256
In the fall of 1995, a lasting peace agreement for Bosnia finally became a distinct
possibility. The peace would have to be enforced by UN and NATO forces. In September
1995, Foreign Minister Kinkel indicated that Germany might be part of such a
peacekeeping mission and that the United Nations had asked Germany to contribute to
such an operation.257 Military contributions to the force protecting the Dayton Peace
Accords represented the final link in the chain of escalating German participation in
extraterritorial missions. When parliament voted with a vast majority supporting the
action in December 1995, German security policy had effectively been reoriented from
its non-military character to the support of out-of-area mission with the possibility of
both inflicting and taking casualties. The parliamentary and extra-parliamentary discourse
surrounding German contributions to the 50,000 strong NATO peacekeeping force
(IFOR) enforcing the Dayton Accords would prove decisive in establishing a new policy
context enabling the use of military force for future governments.
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During the Bundestag vote on June 30, 1995, 258 of the parliamentarians opposed the action (Focus,
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In Welt am Sonntag, September 24, 1995, quoted in Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54. The government tried
to delay the decision to deploy troops but foreign pressure was strong, particularly from France. The French
foreign minister Herve de Charette had in effect preempted the German decision by announcing that France
was going to send the German-French Eurocorps to the Balkans (Der Spiegel, October 10, 1995, 36b-37a).

215

Table 4: The Role Episode of the Bosnian Civil War 1992-1995: Important Events
1992
January 15
February
March 3
May 30
July 3
October 9

EC recognizes Croatia and Slovenia
Referendum in Bosnia in support of independence, Serbs abstain
Bosnian parliament declares independence over Serb objections
Economic sanctions enforced against Serbia; Germany deploys Navy
Sarajevo airlift begins; German planes participate
UN imposes no-fly zone over Bosnia; German AWACs crews participate

1993
March 16
April 12
March 31

Bundestag debates German responsibilities to global society and alliance
Constitutional Court rules that AWAC deployment is constitutional
Operation Deny Flight commences

1994
April 26
July 12
December

Formation of the Contact Group
Constitutional Court rules ‘out-of-area’ missions as constitutional
NATO formally requests German aerial support, Kohl cabinet consents

1995
June 30
Summer
November
December 2-3
December 6
December 14

Bundestag approves Tornado deployment, SPD objects but party discipline
breaks down with many members voting for the action
Fischer writes open letter to Green Party advocating use of force
Dayton Conference
Green Party congress rejects potential military role in Bosnia
Bundestag debates and approves German military contribution for IFOR
Dayton Peace Accord signed, IFOR deployment commences

Role Expectations and Social Pressure
The period between 1992 and 1995 would prove decisive in altering international
conceptions of security that had existed during the Cold War. It was during this time that
the debate about the future of NATO was settled in favor of maintaining the organization,
expanding its reach by incorporating former members of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern
Europe and to redirect the emphasis of its missions from territorial defense to rapid
reaction and out-of-area missions designed to address instabilities arising from the less
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structured security environment of the Post-Cold War era. NATO’s important London
summit of July 1990 had already characterized the new security threats as
multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional… hard to predict and assess…less
likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but
rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the
serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and
territorial disputes.258
The new Strategic Concept articulated the goal of creating multinational rapid
reaction forces to support the increasing scope of United Nations peacekeeping missions
pursued in accordance with Chapter VII of its charter.259 The Rome Summit of November
1991 was also very significant in the process of “the Alliance's transformation and …
[the redefinition] … of its role and missions in the new Europe” (Wörner 1991). This was
followed by a declaration to contribute to peacekeeping operations under the auspices of
the CSCE at the May 1992 Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and
the Nuclear Planning Group (Baumann 2001, 165). The Brussels summit of January 1994
again affirmed NATO’s willingness to conduct out-of-area missions within the limits of
mandates established UN or CSCE.260 The European Union pursued a similar course of
action as indicated by the members’ concerted efforts at elevating the European Political
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Cooperation procedure which had existed since the 1970s to the level of Common
Foreign and Security Policy and by revitalizing the Brussels Pact organization Western
European Union.
The Maastricht Declaration on the Western European Union from February 7,
1992 noted that “WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European
security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence
matters”.261 These new responsibilities were defined more thoroughly at the important
Petersberg meeting on June 19, 1992 which took place at roughly the same time as the
dramatic escalation of the Civil War in Bosnia. The meeting led to the establishment and
declaration of the so-called Petersberg Tasks which involved developing the capabilities
to rapidly deploy–mobile forces for peacekeeping missions in response to the “significant
changes that had taken place in the security situation in Europe since [the] last regular
meeting in November 1991” (Petersberg Declaration, art. 1).262 WEU Secretary-General
Jose Cutileiro later considered this time period to be crucial for the formation of a real
operational role for the organization in defining new missions, such as crisis management
and peacekeeping, that “matched the specific challenges of the Post-Cold War world”
(Cutileiro 1995). A draft recommendation of the EU’s Political Committee on European
Security Policy from 1993 also emphasized the range of domestic instabilities now being
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perceived to be the primary security threats after the Cold War.263 Thus, threat
perceptions established a decisive and permanent basis for the need of new roles for
international institutions and their missions that would address the regional insecurities
emerging after the Cold War. The new missions required new capabilities and member
contributions leading to the definition of new actor responsibilities or behavioral scripts.
The meaning of alliance responsibility now shifted towards actors’ embrace and
contributions to NATO non-article V missions. The old meaning of responsibility that
had been associated with contributions to territorial defense was no longer applicable.
For Germany, the new emphasis on extraterritorial deployment of combat-ready
troops produced significant tensions not only because of the antimilitarism associated
with the civilian power role but, perhaps more importantly, because German elites were
critically involved in the process of redefining the raison d’être and mission objectives of
NATO, the OSCE, and the European Union. Elites supported this process both because
they shared the prevailing threat conceptions and because they wanted for Germany to
remain a predictable and calculable actor. The concretization of standards and state
obligations in conjunction with the escalating Bosnian crisis dramatically increased the
social pressure on German elites to comply with the expectations to play a more
prominent role which included the acceptance of the use of force.
The Bosnian civil war caused the steady trickle of pleas for greater German
involvement to turn into a torrent of requests which increased the foreign pressure on
elites to adapt German role behavior. Foreign leaders attempting to resolve the Bosnian
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http://www.cec.lu/pub/history/military/a-weu/document (accessed on April 22, 1996).

219

crisis became increasingly less tolerant of Germany’s antimilitary culture and traditions
which they viewed as anachronistic or as an excuse for inaction. During a visit to Bonn in
January 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali repeatedly and publicly called for
full German participation in the entire range of United Nations missions, arguing that
without an unrestricted German contribution the UN would be unable to fulfill its
tasks.264 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher also called on Germany to increase its
support of NATO initiatives (Lantis 2002a, 93). In a closed meeting with SPD leaders in
January 1995, fellow social democrat from Norway and chief Bosnia negotiator Thorvald
Stoltenberg could hardly conceal his impatience and frustrations with German attitudes
regarding the use of force when he argued that nobody abroad understood the internal
discussion about the deployment of Tornado fighter jets. Since Germany had the military
means, it should use them.265 NATO commanders, including General George Joulwan,
repeatedly requested German aerial support in the fall of 1994 (Ramet and Coffin 2001,
54; Zehfuss 2002, 30). Pressure to conform to expectations came from President Clinton
who, during a state visit to Germany in July 1994 said: “I do not see how Germany, the
third-biggest economic nation in the world, can escape a leadership role…[it] has no
other choice but to assume a leadership role. Germany cannot withdraw from its
responsibility”.266 Foreign leaders also used peer pressure in an attempt to convince
German elites to get more involved. For instance, when Chancellor Kohl tried to delay
the decision to deploy German troops in the fall of 1995, France’s foreign minister Herve
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de Charette asked his counterpart during a short visit “are you ready?” after which he
officially announced that France was going to send the ‘German-French’ Eurocorps to the
Balkans.267
Effective social pressure to change Germany’s stance on the use of force also
came from members of the parliamentary elite who, through the country’s enmeshment in
international institutions, were actively involved in the process of restructuring
international security organizations after the Cold War. Foremost among them was
NATO’s influential Secretary General, Manfred Wörner268 who became one of the chief
advocates of the organization’s regional stabilization role and the development of rapid
reaction forces deployable for out-of-area missions.269 Advocating a forceful and militant
stance in Bosnia, Wörner repeatedly criticized non-interventionist attitudes in the United
States and Europe.270 Concerned about the effectiveness of NATO’s new mission
objectives he himself had advocated, the CDU politician applied public and personal
pressure to increase German participation in an effort to bolster NATO capabilities.271
SPD politician Hartmut Soell, who held the post of Secretary General of the assembly of
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the WEU during the time of the Petersberg Declaration, also promoted greater
international engagement of the Federal Republic within his own party.272 Hans
Koschnick from the SPD who served as EU Administrator in Mostar implored fellow
party members to not remain passive as troops from allied countries incurred
casualties.273
The requests coming from national leaders, heads of important security
organizations and chief negotiators in Bosnia as well as from Germans involved in
international security organizations created significant social pressure on German elites to
support military operations in Bosnia unless they risked being seen as unreliable partners.
As such, the requests coming from important actors and over a significant period of time
constituted a kind of socialization process aimed at changing German foreign policy
behavior. Allied leaders reminded Germany of its responsibilities on the basis of the
country’s extraordinary capabilities within the system. To further increase social
pressure, they treated Germany as if it had already embraced the desired role.274

Role Conceptions and Contestation
The foreign policy challenges of the Bosnian Civil War strongly underscored the
conflict between external role expectations and the domestic debate about what that role
and its conduct should be given the strong desire to remain true to the civilian power role
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conceptions that had characterized the country since World War II. Conservative elites
promoted the adaptation of role behavior towards that of a ‘normal’ great power. A
normal state was perceived as one that accepted its “natural role in the great distribution
of capabilities dutifully and rationally” (Bach 1999, 78). Normal states had the right to
autonomously develop their national interests which they were free to pursue and
maintain through a variety of means including the use of force.275 Normal states were
characterized by national pride and ‘healthy’ patriotism (Kohl, PB 12/5, January 30,
1991, 90). Conservative and liberal role promoters presented Germany as a great power
in a new context where power was freed from its traditional association with brutality and
arbitrariness (Willkür) and instead was seen as logically associated with actor
responsibility (Bach 1999, 79). The normalization of Germany’s role behavior was
promoted as necessary for the country to remain a predictable and reliable ally. In
Kinkel’s words: “by contributing to the international peace force, Germany has gained a
degree of normality…Germany is practicing responsibility and joint responsibility” (PB
13/76, December 6, 1995, 6650). CDU foreign policy spokesperson Lamers wrote in
April 1991 that if Germany “were to act obliviously to her power this would be
irresponsible and raise mistrust, and that Germany, without forgetting history, must move
to being as normal as possible”.276 In 1996, Defense Minister Rühe would express his
personal satisfaction over the fact that the country had given up
Germany’s political and military special role which Germany had played for half
a century due to its history; the later also serving as pretext for a policy after
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unification which neither matched the realities of world politics, nor Germany’s
new position and increased weight.277
In addition to invoking position and ‘weight’ within the system, conservatives also
supported the argument of role adaptation through the notion of demonstrating solidarity
with the “Euro-Atlantic community of shared values with a common fate”278 Membership
in that community was seen as coming with obligations. During the first IFOR debate in
November 1995, CSU politician Theo Waigel reminded politicians that “for more than
four decades, the freedom and peace of our country has been protected by our NATO
friends”.279 Adopting the use of force as expected by friends and allies was presented as a
way to preserve the traditional role based on the values of reliability, predictability and
calculability. Not showing responsibility would risk diplomatic isolation through the
divergence from expected role behavior. In effect, Germany would again be playing a
‘special’ role which had to be prevented at all costs (Kohl 2007, 569).280
Along with solidarity, status considerations within the alliance also were
important for conservatives with Defense Minister Rühe presenting German participation
as a necessity lest the country risk compromising its position within the alliance or cause
the alliance itself to fail281 and the chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group
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Schäuble arguing that Germany “would jeopardize its future and opportunities… if it was
unable to show itself to be a reliable friend, partner and ally”.282 Newly elected President
Roman Herzog, former chief justice of the constitutional court, presented a similar
argument for increasing German responsibilities in a more insecure world in March
1995.283
In his widely quoted and discussed speech on ‘the basic outlines of German
Foreign Policy’, President Herzog rejected Fukuyama’s optimistic statement about the
end of history and the rise of a liberal world order and instead, viewed the changes in the
international environment as having brought about greater uncertainty. Enumerating
security concerns such as “population explosion, climate change, poverty-induced
migration, atomic smuggling, drug trafficking, fundamentalism of all shades, genocide,
[and] the disintegration of domestic order”, the President viewed the evolving system as
entailing greater security risks than that of the era of deterrence (Herzog 1998, 26). In
response to greater uncertainty, the President advocated an active, involved and global
role for Germany. Invoking traditional key values such as responsibility and solidarity he
stated:
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In German: “Deswegen würden wir unsere eigene Zukunft, unsere Möglichkeiten angesichts aller
Umstände and aller denkbaren Entwicklungen und Gefährdungen…gefährden, wenn wir uns nicht in der
Lage sehen wurden, auch verläβliche Freunde, Partner, Verbündete zu sein” (Schäuble 1995, PB 13/48,
June 30, 1995, 3970).
283

Speeches and statements by German Presidents constitute strong indicators of German role conceptions.
The institution of the Federal Presidency is one of primarily symbolic importance. Presidents act above the
fray of party politics – seeking to promote unity by seeking to develop a national consensus on important
issues. In foreign policy, Presidents are free to engage abstract ideas about the course of foreign policy. In
setting the national agenda, they are able to directly influence the range of foreign policy options and,
among other courses of action, suggest reorientations. This speech is from March 13, 1995, given to the
German Society for Foreign Affairs.
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We have finished being a free rider284; Germany is now a part of the concert of
the great democracies, whether it wants to be or not, and if any one of these
democracies stands back, it inevitably not only damages the others, but ultimately
itself, as well (Herzog 1998, 27).
Further acknowledging special role-related responsibilities arising from the
changed nature of the structure of the international system, Herzog stated that “the quality
of our commitment must accord with our greater weight, for otherwise we will no longer
be taken seriously in the world in the long run (Ibid. 29). The statement’s reference to the
national interest as being taken seriously also indicates a strong desire to for equal status
and prestige.285 Further pursuing this point, Herzog stated that “German interests and
Germany’s share of responsibility for the world community thus largely coincide. And if
we do not wish to be at the mercy of developments in world politics, we will have to play
an active role in global domestic policy” (Ibid., 33).
An important element in Herzog’s speech was the implicit challenge to the
civilian power role when Herzog stated that “the checkbook does not always suffice and
that service at the risk of one’s life may one day be called for” (Ibid.). The President is
clear that the appreciation of the efficacy of force is to be seen in the context of
multilateral institutions such as NATO and in the interest of international peace and only
as last resort after moral and economic means of influence had been exhausted (Ibid. 29).
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The President used the terminology of ‘the end of riding on the car step’ (Ende des Trittbrettfahrens)
which roughly translates into free riding but also indicates the desire to be in the car with all responsibilities
including the right to steer the car.
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Interestingly enough, Herzog (1998, 29) states that “neither the deployment of the Bundeswehr, nor a
seat in the Security Council, should be status issues for Germany. We must focus on the substance of the
problems alone”. Here, Herzog is making instrumental use of a normative argument. Not status-seeking is
the goal but contributing to the resolution of problems arising from the new structure of international
politics. It is reasonable to assume that status and prestige do represent important objectives in addition to
contributing to the resolution of problems.
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Elsewhere, he had insisted that the central foreign policy parameters of the Bonn
Republic, defined as “moderation in style, predictability, preparedness for dialogue, and
readiness for compromise, would not change under the Berlin Republic” (Ibid. 33). In
conjunction with other passages however, in which the benefits of hard power are
acknowledged we can infer him to have indicated a preference for the normalization of
foreign policy.286 Conservative positions on normalization were shared to a considerable
extent by their liberal-democratic coalition partners.
FDP politicians continued to cling to the rejection of force that was part of the
traditional civilian power role and therefore insisted on legal clarification of the issue of
Bundeswehr participation. However, party leaders including Foreign Minister Kinkel
fully accepted the conservative argument of increasing responsibility as part of the
Germany’s new role obligations. During the summer of 1992, Kinkel criticized the
traditional German role, stating that the country could no longer behave like “an impotent
dwarf”.287 In the minister’s situational brief on Yugoslavia presented to parliament on
July 22, Kinkel argued that “in a world with an urgent need for international action, a
constructive and active German contribution is required as well…the international
political responsibility of the Federal Republic has grown since reunification”.288 Liberals
also shared the conservative concern with status and reputation. For instance, Kinkel
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We need a foreign policy that lacks snarling and bluster, but also one that is not tensely self-conscious
either (Herzog 1998, 33).
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Kinkel interview in Die Zeit, July 17, 1992.
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In German: “In dieser Lage, da alle Welt einen dringenden internationalen Handlungsbedarf sieht, ist
auch ein konstruktiver und aktiver deutscher Beitrag gefordert...Die internationale politische
Verantwortung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland is seit der Wiedervereinigung gewachsen...Dies gilt
namentlich...die in der UN-Charta angelegten Instrumente kollektiver Friedenssicherung nach Kräften zu
unterstützen” (Kinkel, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8609).
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linked reliability to equality in status by stating that “we must and want to be a reliable
and equal (vollwärtiger) European and transatlantic partner in the area of maintaining
peace” (PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6426). A frequently-used argumentative concept
employed by both conservatives and liberals alike was teleological. In their view,
German was ready to play a new role because the country had “matured enough to be
able to take on her natural responsibilities in upholding international law” (Gerhardt, PB
13/74, November 30, 1995, 6441).
Acceptance of the need for role adaptation as promoted by the conservatives
while adhering to the party’s long-standing support for antimilitarism produced
considerable role conflict within the party and tensions with the conservatives. The
AWACS controversy in April 1993 is a good case in point. Here, the FDP was not
prepared to allow German crews to remain on NATO planes even though Kinkel had
promised UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in January that Germany would start to
play a greater role in peacekeeping missions (Lantis 2002a, 93). The inconsistency of the
position made it difficult to maintain, particularly when the CDU/CSU began to win the
judicial battle at the Constitutional Court which first allowed German participation in
AWACs missions and in July 1994, rendered a defining ruling that allowed for ‘out-ofarea’ missions of the NATO, WEU as well as peacekeeping missions of the UN.
Argumentative inconsistency also exposed the FDP to criticism from their conservative
coalition partners. For instance, CSU chairperson Waigel publicly blasted the liberal
democrats over their AWACs stance, calling them ‘whiners’ and that “the FDP is always
like that”.289 In short, FDP cabinet members who opposed the use of force were
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“AWACS-Streit: FDP Politiker für Koalitionsausstieg”, Bild, April 5, 1993, 1.
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nonetheless susceptible to the argument of role normalization made by conservative elites
because of their willingness to accept the need for a more active role after the end of the
Cold War.290 Not consenting to one while promoting the other undermined the party’s
public credibility and reliability within the coalition.
SPD politicians generally opposed the modification of the country’s stance on the
use of force. Humanitarian mission were seen as only acceptable option. Rejecting the
use of force as adequate means to address conflict, party whip Klose argued during the
debate on German naval and aerial participation in the Adriatic Sea in July 1992 that
“military deployment…will most likely lead to even more bloodshed than that that we
have to witness daily on television”.291 The Tornado deployment debate in July 1995 saw
Rudolph Scharping arguing that “a military solution to the conflict in Bosnia cannot be
achieved” (PB 13/46, June 28, 1995, 3950). Invoking elements of the civilian power role
conception, he goes on to argue that the ongoing German humanitarian efforts in Bosnia
create a “more preferable image of Germany as a country that is peaceful and concerned,
characterized by assistance-rendering and human compassion” (Ibid). In essence, Social
Democrats viewed Germany as being fundamentally unable to contribute to armed
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Former Foreign Minister Genscher (1998, 521) reflects on Yugoslavia by stating that “from the very
beginning German policy set the prohibition of the use of armed force to solve political issues as an
important criterion….One of the essential lessons to be learned from the course of events in Yugoslavia
must be the continued renunciation of force…Because the debate on justifiable and unjustifiable aggression
results in old patterns of behavior, renunciation of force must remain the unalterable basis for peaceful
coexistence in Europe.” Written at the time that the Bosnian Civil war should have made apparent the
drawbacks of antimilitarism in deterring actors committed to policies of massive human rights violations,
the statement indicates the strength of the cultural commitment to non-violence.
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In German: “Ein Kampfeinsatz im ehemaligen Jugoslawien würde mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit zu
einem noch gröβeren Blutbad führen als jenem, das wir Tag für Tag im Fernsehen mit ansehen müssen”
(Klose, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8614).
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peacekeeping missions because of its militant past.292 Both Klose and Scharping were
attempting to counter the government’s argumentative scheme based on the country’s
increased international responsibility by proposing the need to remain true to the
traditional civilian role and emphasizing that anything else would damage the reputation
of the Federal Republic.293 Thus, they resisted the government’s intention to adapt role
behavior through the inclusion of the use of force by trying to rhetorically link
antimilitarism to reliability and predictability and by denying the nature of external
expectations. For instance, Günter Verheugen, reacting to Karl Lamers’ (CDU) argument
that AWACS participation was required to maintain Germany’s reputation as reliable
NATO alliance partner in the charged debate on German responsibilities in March 1993,
argued that NATO as defensive alliance should have no business conducting out-of-area
interventions and that the organization’s objectives should not trump the constitution.294
Almost stubbornly, the SPD politician went on to question the importance and validity of
foreign role expectations by claiming that the government had ulterior motives:
You … continue to tell us that the whole world is just waiting for the time that
the Germans finally send soldiers to military confrontations ... why don’t you
finally provide us with an example of a government that demands that the
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The government’s desire to deploy the Bundeswehr for peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia was seen
as tarnishing the international reputation of the country and further, states that the majority of Germans are
against a new role for Germany out of a sense of responsibility for the recent past. Sozialdemokratischer
Pressedienst, November 30, 1991 (http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/digibert.pl?id=022984&dok=44/022984,
accessed on January 24, 2009).
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For instance, Klose quoted the comments of the Milano newspaper Il Giorno that viewed Germany’s
participation in the Adriatic Sea as an indication of the country’s return as military power (Klose, PB
12/101, July 22, 1992, 8617).
294

In German: “Und kommen Sie uns bitte nicht mit Bündnisverpflichtungen! Erstens steht auch das
Bündnis nicht über der Verfassung, und zweitens ist die NATO ein kollektives Verteidigungsbündnis. Sie
is kein Interventionsinstrument, nicht aus eigenen Recht und auch nicht im Auftrag der UNO. Ob die
NATO bei der Erfüllung von Mandaten der Vereinigten Nationen eine Rolle spielen kann oder soll, ist eine
ganz schwierige Frage” (Verheugen, PB 12/150, March 26, 1993, 12872).

230

Bundeswehr be send to military missions. I really would like to get to know
this pressure.295
The rhetorical differences between parliamentary elites masked a central point of
agreement that made Social Democrats vulnerable to persuasion by role promoters. They,
like members of the FDP, shared the perception that the international security
environment had changed with the end of the Cold War and that some kind of a
redefinition of role behavior was required. In Klose’s words:
It is your prerogative … to want a new foreign and security policy. The world has
changed, and the security situation today is different from the one three years
ago…We are certainly prepared to help develop a new orientation through
discourse.296
Social Democrats also accepted another central aspect of the cabinet elite’s
argumentative scheme–the “increased importance of the role of Germany and the special
responsibility that arises from it” after reunification.297 Thus, Scharping, as leader of the
opposition who opposed the deployment of German troops in Bosnia and who would
hold on to the nonmilitary role of the country, nevertheless accepted the need for a
greater role based on responsibility and that this responsibility was based on solidarity
with NATO allies.298 Social democrats also shared the view that the country was ready
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In German: “Sie und alle möglichen Leute erzählen uns immer, in der ganzen Welt warte man nur
darauf, daβ die Deutschen endlich Soldaten zu Kampfeinsatzen schicken. Nun, wir haben ja auch Kontakte
in der Welt. Ich möchte, daβ Sie uns endlich einmal eine Regierung nennen, die verlangt, daβ die
Bundeswehr an Kampfeinsätzen irgendwo in der Welt beteiligt wird. Ich möchte diesen Druck endlich
einmal kennenlernen” (Verheugen, PB 12/150, March 26, 1993, 12873).
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In German: “Es ist Ihr gutes Recht...eine neue Auβen- und Sicherheitspolitik zu wollen. Die Welt hat
sich verändert, und die Sicherheitslage ist heute anders als vor drei Jahren...Wir sind durchaus bereit…um
im Diskurs eine neue Orientierung zu gewinnen” (PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8618).
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In German: “Die gewachsene Bedeutung der Rolle Deutschlands und die damit verbundene besondere
Verantwortung...” (Scharping 1995, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6637).
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“Mach kein’ Scheiβ”, Der Spiegel, August 14, 1995, 35.
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take on a new role because it had matured and it had learned from history.299 Again, this
undermined the position of elites who opposing role adaptation. Actors’ responsibilities
towards the collective are primarily defined by the collective–not the actors themselves.
In effect, the social democrats were trying to link their behavioral preferences to past role
expectations which conservatives elites exploited gleefully. During the AWACS debate,
for instance, Verheugen’s critique of the government position encountered the telling
outcry “you are standing still” from the conservatives who presented the need for change
as a necessary response to current conditions while casting social democrats as being out
of tune with the political realities that developed after the end of the Cold War.300 This
argument generated substantial pressure on social democrats to change their position
because the main elements in Germany’s role conception – reliability, calculability and
predictability–are subject to externally generated social expectations as is the appropriate
behavior associated with these values. By not allowing role adaptation, social democrats
were risking the country’s reputation and status within international society. Green party
politicians, who had an even more restrictive view on the use of force, also encountered
this dilemma.
Germany’s Green Party had traditionally maintained a pacifist stance which ruled
out foreign military deployments for any reason. Party leader Joschka Fischer strongly
supported Germany’s traditional emphasis on antimilitarism by repeatedly emphasizing
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Verheugen (PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6666) and Schulte (PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6653).
The metaphor of growing up had become an important element of the foreign policy discourse (Hellmann
2004).
300

In German: “Sie sind stehengeblieben” (PB 12/150, March 16, 1993, 12872).
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his conviction that only political solutions can lead to peace.301 Fischer was clearly
uncomfortable with the Tornado deployment in June 1995, critiquing it as a dangerous
water-shed in German foreign policy in that German troops stood to be deployed outside
of NATO areas with orders to shot.302 A few days before the Bundestag would decide on
full participation in IFOR, the Green party congress would continue to reject German
participation in missions that involved the use of force. Green party members also did not
share the pro-Western orientation maintained by conservatives and, to a lesser extent, the
social democrats. NATO membership had been questioned by more radical members and
international organizations were generally not viewed in solely positive ways because
Greens considered the impact of superpower influence on organizational decision-making
procedures and formulation of objectives. The party’s stance on pacifism and its cautious
stance towards international organizations placed it outside the mainstream of elite
thinking. But the party was diverse and the realist wing constantly quarreled with the
more radical elements. The escalation of violence and the turn to systematic genocide in
Bosnia produced a major dilemma for the party in that the initially plausible ethical
position on the rejection of force began to be viewed as morally unsustainable. The fall
and international inaction over the fall of UN Safe Heavens Žepa and Srebrenica, in
particular, severely damaged the credibility of the German peace movement. This
allowed role promoters to challenge the position of the Green politician by maintaining
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Fischer, PB 13/48, June 30, 1995, 3972.
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In German: “Es geht um eine historische Zäsur in der deutschen Auβenpolitik. Die Zäsur besteht darin,
daβ zum erstenmal seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs heute mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit eine
Mehrheit des Deutschen Bundestags beschlieβt, daβ deutsche Kampfverbände jenseits der NATOBündnisgrenzen eingesetzt werden und den Auftrag haben, notfalls – ich muβ hier aus meiner Sicht
hinzufügen: hoffentlich kommt es dazu nicht – auch zu schieβen. Das ist eine Zäsur, die wir fürchten...”
(Fischer, PB 13/48, June 30, 1995, 3971).
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that he, [Fischer], “lacks the ethical dimension of international responsibility and thereby
a part of the capacity to fundamentally [re]orient German foreign policy, which is what
this country needs”.303
On the extreme left, Germany’s reformed communist party also rejected the
deployment of armed forces outside of German borders. Party leader Gysi argued that
Article 87, paragraph 87 of the Basic Law clearly limited the use of force to selfdefense.304 Recognizing that the growing international engagement of the Bundeswehr
through humanitarian missions was part of the government’s strategy to promote a new
role for the country, Gysi added his conviction that
we are witnessing a process by which we are getting used little by little (slice-by
slice) to the international deployment of the Bundeswehr and the militarization of
foreign policy. We are supposed to get used to the fact … that the great power
role of Germany requires support through military missions.305
Other parliamentarians on the left added that “we have said after the war: Never, never do
we want to carry weapons, never, never do we want war, let those at the top fight it out
along, we simply will not participate”.306 The rejection of military forces was also
revealed in statements like “history teaches us that the attempt to defend peace with
violent means is accompanied by streams of blood…It is historically prudent to promote
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In German: “…Ihnen im Kern die ethische Dimension internationaler Verantwortung and damit ein
Stück Fähigkeit zur Grundorientierung der deutschen Auβenpolitik fehlt, die diese Land braucht”
(Gerhardt, PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6441).
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In German: “Auβer zur Verteidigung dürfen die Streitkräfte nur eingesetzt werden, soweit dieses
Grundgesetz es ausdrücklich zuläβt“ (Gysi, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8628).
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Gysi, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6647.
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In German: “Wir haben damals nach dem Krieg gesagt: Nie, nie wollen wir Waffen tragen, nie, nie
wollen wir wieder Krieg, laβt doch die oben sich alleine schlagen, wir machen einfach nicht mehr mit”
(Heuer, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6672).
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non-violent options…”.307 The communist opposition also tried to present the argument
of ulterior motives behind the reorientation effort by the government: “I fear that we will
find new justifications for such actions … it has already been mentioned today
that…[security] policy is about access to global markets and resources”.308 The rhetorical
support for antimilitarism notwithstanding, the party’s political isolation within the
Bundestag as well as the electoral precluded it from having any significant influence on
the process of role adaptation.
The rhetorical exchanges during the Bosnian Civil show parliamentary elites
engaged in persuasive attempts to adapt role behavior. In essence, both role promoters
and those resisting adaptation attempted to express their preferences for foreign policy
behavior on the basis of a socially acceptable logic of appropriateness linked to different
elements of the country’s role conception. Conservatives and Liberal-Democrats
presented the use of force as being within the existing framework of the role conception
by emphasizing reliability and solidarity as defined by external expectations. SPD and
Alliance 90/Green politicians viewed antimilitarism as integral part of role behavior that
could not be changed.
The presence of external expectations serving as guidelines for appropriate
foreign policy behavior strongly supported the agents intend on role adaptation.
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In German: “Die Geschichte uns lehrt, das der Versuch, Frieden mit gewaltsamen Mitteln zu
verteidigen, davon begleitet ist, daβ Ströme von Blut geflossen sind...Diese gewaltsamen Mittel, im
Übermaβ angehauft, haben zu Unterdrückung, zu entsetzlich Völkermorden und Kriegen geführt...Es ist
historisch angesagt, gewaltfreie Optionen zu fördern und als Mittel der Politik einzusetzen” (Nickels, PB
13/76, December 6, 1995, 6642-43).
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In German: “Ich fürchte, daβ wir immer neue und immer andere Begründungen fur solche Aktionen
finden werden...Es ist heute schon darauf hingewiesen worden, daβ...[security policy] gehe um den Zugang
zu Märkten und Rohstoffen in der Welt” (Nachtwei, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6672-3).
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Opponents of adaptation congruent with external standards could be shamed because they
risked central elements of the role conception including reliability and calculability. They
could be accused of risking the all-important relationship with other NATO members
within the alliance as part of the membership within a community that shared the
democratic values of Western civilization (Breuer, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6659).
Worse, opponents of adaptation could be cast as advocating a special role that risked
policy singularity. This cast the position of the opposition as lying outside of the socially
acceptable elite consensus intend on avoiding the country’s isolation for fear of its own
past identity. The intensification of violence in Bosnia allowed for the moral arguments
supporting the strong antimilitarism of the traditional role to be turned on their head.
Inaction was portrayed as morally inferior and tantamount to aiding the objectives of the
perpetrators of human rights violations. To sum up, the debates show that elites
promoting role adaptation leading to security policy reorientation produced a more
effective argument for their desire to embrace the use of force because this position could
be externally validated by foreign role expectations based on a shared understanding of
appropriate behavior among NATO members responding to the new security
environment. Thus, a ‘persuasive argument’ was one that involved adapting role behavior
to role conceptions after the Cold War even if that meant violating antimilitarism as core
element of German strategic culture since 1945.

The Domestic Concerns of Parliamentary Elites
The debate about adjusting the country’s role behavior taking place among
parliamentary elites interlinked with important concerns at the time. Role adaptation
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towards normal great power conduct helped parliamentary elites address a number of
critically important issues. For conservative elites, the primary issue had been federal
expenses and the dramatic influx of political and economic refugees which roughly
coincided with reunification. Requests for asylum reached a preliminary peak in 1992 at
which point the number of refugees from Yugoslavia reached an estimated 500,000.
Social democrats and Alliance 90/Greens were concerned with regaining control over the
government. The SPD had been out of power since Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in
1982. The Alliance 90/Greens, after experiencing a promising run between 1982 and
1987, incurred a devastating defeat at the polls in 1990. In search of a formula for
regaining power, both opposition parties were struggling with the public image of being
unfit to govern. Their stance on the use of force would turn out to be an important
element in their quest to be seen as trustworthy by the electorate.
An important domestic issue occupying parliamentary elites during the Bosnian
Civil war was that of asylum reform. Since the end of World War II, Germany had
maintained one of the most liberal asylum laws among Western democratic states. The
willingness to take in people who were escaping persecution was due to a concern with
human rights born from the barbarism of the Nazi regime. The openness served to
differentiate the Federal Republic from its inhumane predecessors. It was also unusual
when compared with asylum policies of other states which tended to be far more
restrictive. As such, the liberal asylum provision was part of the traditional role
conception that had emerged after World War II. Support for openness and the
willingness to absorb asylum seekers dropped dramatically after the end of the Cold War
when the rise of global instability coupled with the openness of borders created a refugee
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problem of hitherto unseen proportions. At its peak in 1992, Germany received 430,000
applications for asylum. The severity of the problem was exacerbated by Germany’s
generous welfare provisions, reunification costs and an outdated citizenship law based on
the principle of jus sanguinis or right of blood which made the assimilation of foreign
citizens difficult and prolonged their existence in the unproductive and socially
demeaning status of an asylum seeker.309 The civil war in Yugoslavia significantly added
to the severity of the refugee problem with Germany taking in the majority of displaced
persons (see Map 2). The influx of foreigners created considerable costs for Germany. It
also fuelled right-wing violence against foreigners which reached an all time high
between 1992 and 1993 (Marshall 2001, 160).
Map 2: Refugees and displaced people from the former Yugoslavia

(Source: United Nations Environment Programme)
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The principle of jus sanguinis (Right of Blood) establishes membership in the national group on the
basis of cultural or genetic affiliation with the nation while Jus Soli (Right of Territory) creates such
membership through affiliation with the state, its territory and adherence to its laws. The Citizen Act of
1913 would continue to inform immigration issues until the reforms passed by the Schröder cabinet in the
late 1990s.

238

To conservatives, immigration and asylum issues were of paramount importance.
Party members had for many years supported conceptions of citizenship based on the
principle of jus sanguinis. This resonated with the population of a country that had
traditionally not viewed itself as an immigrant nation. Party leaders had concluded that a
firm stance on the “foreigner issue would stave off electoral gains by the extreme right”
(Marshall 2001, 145). With its opposing stance emphasizing the open nature of the nation
in line with the unlimited constitutional status of asylum, the SPD had repeatedly paid an
electoral price. Under the impact of the growing resonance of the issue with the electorate
during the early 1990s, conservatives began to vehemently push for changes
constitution’s asylum provisions. Role normalization supported the resolution of the
problem of immigration through constitutional changes limiting asylum. As a ‘normal’
state Germany would be allowed to assert its national interests more prominently and the
‘unique’ asylum provisions could be amended. Institutional normalization offered the
additional benefit of closing a chapter in German history. In effect, the historical burden
of the country’s past could finally be left behind.
Conservatives promoted the change on the basis of responsibility and prudence.
For instance, CDU/CSU chairperson Schäuble argued that Germany was in fact aiding
and abetting perpetrators of ethnic cleansing by continuing to take in asylum seekers
instead of precluding such population movements by making emigration to Germany
more difficult.310 Conservatives also offered tangible solutions to the refugee crisis with
Finance Minister Waigel pointing out that the country’s military contributions to the
IFOR deployment and the peace thus created would allow some of the approximately
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PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8620.
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400,000 Balkan refugees to return home (PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6655). Thus, the
conservative effort to promote role adjustment to include the use of force complemented
the interest of asylum reform because it allowed a break with past traditions. SPD
politicians would eventually give in and a compromise was produced by the end of 1992.
This involved the tightening of asylum laws by rejecting applicants who had passed
through adjoining ‘safe’ countries, by establishing tougher standards in the definition of
safe and unsafe countries and by introducing a fast-track return procedure. While the
issue of asylum reform was on the minds of conservatives to address the refugee problem
while shoring up support amongst some voting groups, members of the opposition were
struggling to increase prospects for gaining government control. Increasingly, the stance
on role obligations in the new security environment would become intertwined with
electoral prospects because it influenced both public views of being fit to govern
(Regierungsfähigkeit) and the viability of parties as coalition partners.
Social Democrats had been out of power since 1982. The losses during the
reunification election of 1990 had been substantial and unexpected. The election of 1994
again ended in defeat. The early 1990s were important years for reorientation as the
party sought new leadership and redefined its stance on important issues. The SPD’s
position on the use of force would turn out to be of crucial importance. A major problem
for the party was its contradictory stance on the future role of Germany which expressed
itself both in a desire to take on greater responsibility through a permanent seat on the
UN Security Council while trying to maintain the special role of a civilizing influence in
world politics. This ideational conflict was taken up by traditionalist and pragmatist
groups who competed over control within the party.
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Leaders of the left wing including Oskar Lafontaine and Heidemarie WieczorekZeul lay claim to the party’s pacifist traditions in support of the pure civilian power role
conceptions. Only the deployment of humanitarian and logistical troops was viewed as
appropriate and as late as June 1995, Lafontaine claimed that he would rigorously enforce
the party’s official position against non-compliant party members. 311 Initially, support
for the antimilitarist position within the party was very strong. The Bremen Program of
1991, while accepting a greater role for Germany, proposed strict limitations on
Bundeswehr use for blue helmet missions. The use of force through the acceptance of
combat missions continued to be ruled out categorically and participation in the rapid
intervention tasks as outlined by the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 was
rejected. A special meeting of party leaders convened by moderate Björn Engholm in
August of 1992 ended on an agreement on Bundeswehr participation under UN auspices
that was again highly restrictive in nature (Duffield 1998, 202). The principle elements of
the SPD Sofortprogramm reveal that Social Democrats wanted to influence international
relations positively through support of international organizations but saw Germany’s
appropriate role as providing civilian rather than military contributions to international
security.312
Moderate party leaders were concerned that the strict insistence on Germany’s
traditional role and the emphasis on maintaining the country’s civilizing impact on world
politics would harm the party’s reputation and hence its ability to regain governmental
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“Selbst Geleimt”, Der Spiegel, June 19, 1995, 37.
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SPD Sofortprogramm, Part IV, “Redefining Germany’s Role in the Community of Nations”, in German:
“Deutschlands Rolle in der Völkergemeinschaft neu bestimmen”. SPD Sofortprogramm, August 24, 1992,
http://www.glasnost.de/db/DokZeit/92asylpeberg.html (accessed February 8, 2009).
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control. The ‘separate but equal’ position by which German could remove itself from
military responsibility to serve a ‘higher cause’ and yet remain equal in status with other
powers was viewed as unrealistic. Also considered unrealistic was the attempt to develop
a precise distinction between humanitarian and combat missions in peacekeeping
operations. The party’s attempts to distinguish one from the other through a series of
briefs and declarations only undermined the party’s credibility in the eyes of the public.
The fact that the party position advocated the pursuit of a permanent seat on the UNSC
while ruling out military contributions further increased the problem of credibility. 313 It
also undermined the professed goal of “strengthening the UN and actively help shape
it”314 by jeopardizing the international status of the Federal Republic. In light of the move
towards military missions, the maintenance of a pure civilian power role conception
would increase the possibility of policy singularity315 and make Germany susceptible to
arguments from alliance partners charging unfairness: The soldiers of other countries
would die in faraway places while Germans would help them get there and carry the
dead. Without equality through full participation in combat missions, equal diplomatic
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status for the country could not be accomplished. For these reasons, Hans-Ulrich Klose,
for instance, thought that “the Bremen platform makes us look ridiculous”.316
The party’s apparent inability to win public confidence and electoral support
became a major concern for moderate party leaders including Rudolf Scharping, HansUlrich Klose, Norbert Gansel and Karsten Voigt. Chancellor Kohl’s coalition between
CDU/CDU and FDP had won the 1994 federal elections only narrowly but by early fall
1995, surveys again showed poor results for the SPD. Party support was at 28 percent and
with only 26 percent in Berlin which spelled trouble for the October election (Der
Spiegel, September 10, 1995).
Under the impact of external expectations, solidifying rapid reaction doctrines and
the violence in Bosnia, the pragmatic position of the moderates continued to gain traction
throughout 1995 even under party leader Scharping’s notoriously indecisive leadership
style.317 In early 1995, Scharping, who was also concerned about the growing influence
of contender for leadership Gerhard Schröder, had appealed to party members to support
the reorientation of foreign policy principles to be able to honor German alliance
obligations towards NATO.318 Foreign policy expert Norbert Gansel supported the
deployment of combat troops “because…the lives of human beings in the former
Yugoslavia, the possibility for peace, strengthening the capabilities of the UN,
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international solidarity, [were]…higher goods”.319 By June 1995, about a quarter of the
SPD parliamentarians broke with party discipline by supporting the deployment of
Tornado jets (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54). By the time of the Dayton Agreement, party
support had decisively shifted towards the pragmatists. Last attempts to at least amend
the developing security course in line with civilian power conceptions by placing
restrictions on the potential use of the deployed Tornado fighter jets were defeated as
well when moderate party leaders like Verheugen pleaded with potential dissenters that
‘technicalities’ should not influence the party’s decision to support the deployment.320 In
the eyes of the moderates it was essential that “Germany contribute military to the
protection of peace in Bosnia as had other allied states” (Ibid.). The SPD’s credibility
problem that arose from to the principled rejection of the use of force similarly affected
the Alliance 90/Green Party and hampered both its electoral chances as well as its ability
to be considered as coalition partner. This prompted attempts to achieve
Regierungsfähigkeit by settling the differences between traditionalists and pragmatists
within the party.
With its categorical anti-war stance born out of the ideological traditions of the
European Left, the Alliance90/Greens Party had the most restrictive positions on the use
of force among the parties perceived as capable of partaking in governance. Green Party
Congresses throughout the early 1990s found most delegates supporting non-violent
means to address the Bosnian Civil War (Der Spiegel, August 7, 1995, 32-33a). The
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historical burden, in particular in regards to Yugoslavia, was widely viewed as precluding
the possibility of German military involving in the Balkans. However, the emergence of
genocide in Bosnia helped change that stance and increasingly pitted the party’s
pragmatist wing against that of the traditionalists.
By May 1995, party speaker Krista Sager admitted that a new perspective on
foreign deployment was needed although the country’s history precluded German
participation in a Yugoslavia mission. Other pragmatists or ‘realos’ included Hubert
Kleinert and Joschka Fischer also began to question the logic of opposing combat
missions in the face of genocide. The tragedy of Srebrenica became crucial in this
regard.321 It exposed the dangers of pacifism and underscored the necessity to contribute
militarily to international institutions to strengthen the commitment to prevent genocide.
Fischer argued that “reality has changed since 1989. With the end of the Cold War,
genocide has again become a reality in international politics”.322 This required that “even
as pacifists [the Greens] will have to redefine themselves in a violent world.323 In the
summer of 1995, Fischer wrote an open letter to his party calling for the military
protection of the UN safe areas, arguing that “the left was in danger of losing its moral
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soul if it allowed the Balkan fascism its way”.324 The letter indicates the concern with
moral consistency and represented a major shift in position on the use of force even
though it did not explicitly advocate the deployment of German forces at that time.
Another major concern for Fischer, shared by other prominent left-leaning intellectuals
including Jürgen Habermas was “the inconsistency of sending only the soldiers of other
nations to Bosnia [which] cannot be justified”.325 Accepting external expectations of rolespecific responsibilities for Germany, Fischer stated that “a country as large [in
capabilities] as Germany has to make its contributions within UN parameters” (Focus,
November 27, 1995, 40-42). Thus, crucial factors explaining the change in the pragmatist
position were the acceptance of the view that the security environment had changed and
that Germany had an obligation to militarily contribute to the resolution of international
conflicts just as other countries were prepared to. However, the moral position was not
the only consideration.
A major concern for Green Party Chairman Joschka Fischer, who at that time
enjoyed the status of a political celebrity, was the attempt to shift party principles in order
to position the party for future electoral gains and a coalition with the social democrats.326
Garnering 7.3 percent of the vote, the Green Party had regained full parliamentary
representation after the 1994 Bundestag elections. At the time that he wrote his open
letter to the party promoting the use of force against genocide, Fischer was advised by a
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group of professors close to his party who recommended that the party abandon the
radical pacifism to avoid being politically sidelined.327
Fischer’s concern with electoral viability clashed with the desire of many party
members to maintain the party’s traditional stance on the categorical rejection of war and
intervention. Influential party members opposed to Fischer’s intended course change
used the popularity of the traditional stance on the use of force to shore up support within
the party. Spokesperson Jürgen Trittin and Kerstin Müller, the party’s spokesperson of
the parliamentary faction, coauthored a counterproposal to Fischer’s open letter in which
they wrote that “saying yes to combat missions is not a passport to Regierungsfähigkeit
but a declaration of bankruptcy for a pacifist party”.328 Rejecting intervention, Trittin
warned Fischer and 98 other prominent Green politicians that German participation in
international combat missions entailed an about-face of the party’s foreign and security
program (Focus, November 27, 1995, 40-45). Invoking the traditional stance on the
rejection of force, Trittin and Müller were able to regain leadership over party members
who, just having been swayed by Fischer’s arguments, were reconsidering their position
after new SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine, a declared opponent of the use of force had
publicly rejected alliance solidarity as an argument for the use of force (Ibid.). They
would prevail in the short run when the party voted to oppose both the deployment of
Tornado jets in July and the deployment of Bundeswehr troops as part of IFOR
operations in early December 1995. But within the party, support for radical pacifism
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was eroding with a few party members already breaking discipline during the December
vote. Views of the efficacy of force in international relations were being shifted and
would prepare the Green Party for the embrace of a full UN and NATO mission spectrum
during the years that followed.
Observers of German politics remarked in 1995 that in both the Alliance
90/Greens and the Social Democratic parties, the desire to achieve party unity appeared
to be a more important concern than the plight of Bosnia itself.329 The concern with
public credibility trumped other issues and this required a common understanding upon
which a new elite consensus could be socially constructed. In this process, the shared
normative understandings of the post-Cold War security environment and the subsequent
role expectations of Germany were crucial components as was the desire to continue to
adhere to established values of reliability and calculability understood here as solidarity
with other allies. Maintaining the country’s role required a shift in behavior in line with
the new expectations. The norms provided a logical and socially attractive point of
convergence of actor interests. Not supporting the Dayton peace through the use of force
was, in Kinkel’s words directed at potential dissenters within the ranks of all parties, to
“act immorally” since France alone had already suffered 50 casualties and about 300
wounded.330 Defense Minister Rühe and Finance Minister Waigel argued similarly when
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they claimed that “those who do not help even though they could, act immorally and are
guilty just the same”.331
For the opposition parties SPD and the Alliance 90/Greens, party unity was
integrally linked to the pursuit of Regierungsfähigkeit. The relatively low levels of
support for the SPD during the early 1990s necessitated the search for a viable coalition
partner. The prospects for a coalition between SPD and the Alliance 90/Greens increased
as both parties reluctantly moved towards normalization on the use of force. External
expectations of German role behavior thus established a logical point of convergence for
cooperation between the two parties.

Strategic Culture: Reticence and Antimilitarism
A series of RAND studies conducted between 1990 and 1994 show increased
levels of public support for expanding NATO’s role after the Cold War to address the
new security challenges (Asmus 1994, 34, Figure 6). In addition, large parts of the public,
like the political elites, clearly accepted the normative expectation of an increased role of
Germany in contributing to international peace and stability after reunification. From
1990 to 1992, there were even some indicators to suggest that Germans were ready to
embrace a more active role for their country with over half of the respondents supporting
a more active international role (Figure 7). However, and perhaps due to the international
reaction to the assertive stance over the recognition of Croatia in 1992, there is a return to
the traditional reticence of the culture in 1993.332
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Figure 6: Attitudes Toward Military Intervention

Figure 7: Active versus Reserved Role

Source: Asmus/RAND 1994, 67
67.

Source: Asmus/Rand 1995, 40.

At the same time, the RAND findings confirmed the main elements of the
country’s antimilitant culture and the persistence of political and psychological barriers to
combat missions outside of Germany (Asmus 1994, 62). By a wide margin, the public
perceived the country’s increased responsibilities after the Cold War on the basis of the
traditional civilian power conception of the country’s role by favoring humanitarian
responses and other types of non
non-military actions over the use of force (Figures 8 and 9).
Figure 8: Attitudes toward
oward different Mission Types

Figure 9: Attitudes toward Army Missions

Source: Asmus/RAND 1995, 42
42.

Source: Asmus/Rand 1994, 66.

concerns, it did not have the effect of prompting the general public to abandon its negative views on the
efficacy of force.
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Intervention for the sake of addressing human rights violations such as the ones
witnessed on a massive scale in the former Yugoslavia was still rejected by a significant
number of German citizens (Figure 6).
Figure 10: Attitudes toward Foreign Policy Goals

Source: Asmus/RAND 1995, 43.

The findings supporting the predominance of the main elements of the traditional
civilian power were confirmed by surveys about how the public prioritized foreign policy
concerns. Here, ‘soft’ concerns including proliferation, the global environment and arms
control dominated the goals of protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression and
defending our allies’ security by a wide margin (Figure 10). Only about one out of five
Germans (eighteen percent) considered the defense of allies a very important foreign
policy goal which compared to nearly six out of ten Americans who were asked the same
question (Asmus/Rand 1994, 64, Figure 10).
Overall, public opinion did not support the increased military engagement of the
Bundeswehr. Increasing levels of violence in Bosnia and the massive human rights
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violations were not widely understood to validate the efficacy of the use of force in
international conflict resolution processes. If anything, increasing bloodshed, ethnic
cleansing and the repeated failure of international institutions to bring end to the conflict
seemed to cause more of a disillusionment with the use of force and with the utility of
multilateral peacekeeping interventions in general. In that regard, public opinion differed
greatly from that of the elites.
As has been shown through the chronicling of pacifist positions on the part of the
left, elites were concerned about the violence in Bosnia. They understood this violence in
terms of the efficacy of the United Nations and they seemed to draw different conclusions
from the failures of UN missions in Bosnia and Somalia. While the public grew
increasingly disenchanted with the ability of the UN to contribute to a lasting peace,
elites seemed to grow more concerned with the need to support the UN which they began
to perceive to be a function of Germany’s military contributions. In 1993, for instance, an
editorial in the Hamburg weekly Die Woche, read “I must…plead for an intervention in
Bosnia. Pacifism per se can no longer exist…this would be a wonderful change of roles if
we could do something to help the cause of peace”.333 Of course, the concern with United
Nations effectiveness was a natural outgrowth of the value system of elites since World
War II which had mostly been characterized by an unusually strong commitment to
multilateralism. The possibility of international institutions and multilateralism failing
over Bosnia seemed to have represented an unacceptable outcome.
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Conclusion: Explaining Compliance
During the three and a half year long civil war in Bosnia, German parliamentary
elites were repeatedly forced to confront the country’s role obligations. The increase in
global trouble spots after the Cold War and the consistent expansion of United Nations
peacekeeping operations transformed the generally acknowledged responsibilities of
important system actors. The seemingly intractable situation in Bosnia greatly influenced
the shared conceptions of a new security environment as well as the evolution of the role
of the international institutions themselves. As UN and NATO involvement in Bosnia
grew, Germany was repeatedly asked to contribute to the missions.
Initially, international and state actors showed a certain level of respect for the
anti-militarist outlines of Germany’s unique strategic culture. International expectations
of German military contributions increased as institutional adaptation to the new security
environment culminated in the solidification of new strategies, mission types, force
structures and subsequently, the articulation of new responsibilities of the member states.
These responsibilities were based in part on internal role conceptions as well as external
expectations. Germany, as great power was perceived to carry substantial responsibility
for the maintenance of peace and stability. This responsibility was widely acknowledged
among parliamentary elites as was the change in the security environment after the Cold
War. Leaders of the SPD and the Green Party shared in the widespread acknowledgment
of the changes in the security environment and the need for a reorientation of German
foreign policy.334 Parliamentary elites from a wide political spectrum also accepted the
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need for greater German contributions after the reunification. Indicating the importance
of these external expectations, Chancellor Kohl repeatedly supported security policy
reorientation to meet the “expectations of the community of nations of a reunited
Germany”335 and Defense Minister Rühe stated that “we don’t have the right to deny
solidarity”.336 The July 1994 ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court which allowed for
German participation in multilateral combat missions was also based on considerations of
alliance solidarity.
While the concept of German responsibility enjoyed wide consensus among
elites, disagreement existed over the nature of this responsibility with cabinet elites
pursuing a normalization course and opposition elites holding on to the non-military
civilian power conception. In the persuasion process between elites, foreign role
expectations played a crucial function. As standard of appropriate behavior, they
legitimized the efforts of those individuals that sought the reorientation of security policy
to include the use of force. Conversely, external expectations undermined attempts by
opposition parties to maintain traditional role conceptions based on the civilizing
influence of Germany as a unique state that had learned from history. Elite conceptions of
their country’s role were also influenced by their view of the efficacy of force.
The extraordinary levels of violence in the Bosnian conflict undermined elite faith
in international law and led to the growing acceptance of the use of force to stop
determined adversaries. The deterrence value of the use of force was particularly
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emphasized by conservatives including former President Richard von Weizsäcker and
chairman of the CDU/CSU faction in parliament Wolfgang Schäuble.337 Conservative
and liberal promoters of role adjustment also displayed a growing appreciation of the
value of power and influence. These elements had long been taboo in the German
political discourse after World War II.338 Role promoters linked influence to status and
reputation. Although unwilling to contribute militarily, Germany had become a member
of the Contact Group through its six month presidency of the European Council which
fell in the time that the contact group was formed. After its presidency, it simply held on
to its membership in the group, supported by the United States which probably saw it as a
counterweight to British and French interests which tended to favor Serbia. German elites
enjoyed the equality in diplomatic status provided by its membership in the Contact
Group and it allowed the country to participate in the discussion of central security
questions in Europe.339 Germany’s need to participate militarily in Bosnia can be seen as
logical outgrowth of the country’s membership in the group which conferred a social
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status which elites did not want to surrender.340 Focusing on reputation and invoking role
terminology, Chancellor Kohl considered, in the Bundeswehr White Paper of 1994 that
“the reliability and predictability of German defence and alliance policy are a major
prerequisite for our ability to act on the international stage”.341 The desire for greater
status also explains the growing support among elites for the campaign to acquire a
permanent seat in the UN Security Council which Chancellor Kohl had initially
dismissed as unnecessary in early 1992.342 Increasingly, the achievement of the seat as a
symbol of equal status and the ability to influence important decisions was seen as a
logical function of being able to participate in the organization’s full mission spectrum.343
Unlike the European Union, which Germany had been able to shape through reflexive
multilateralism, full equality within the UN Security Council could not be achieved
without military contributions to peacekeeping missions.344
Very important in explaining the policy shift towards the use of force was the
change on the left which occurred after the human rights violations in Srebrenica when
prominent politicians and intellectuals reluctantly endorsed the use of force. The
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genocide shook elite perceptions about the efficacy of international law and UN actions
such as the establishment of safe havens. Politicians on the left reacted to the challenge to
the capabilities of international institutions to guarantee human rights by embracing the
more active German role. Individuals like Fischer saw German contributions to
peacekeeping as necessary to protect human rights and to strengthen and extending the
scope of global governance.345 In that way, the embrace of the use of force served to
support the failing efforts of multilateral institutions which Germans had helped construct
before and after the end of the Cold War. The moral argument for the use of force to
protect human rights also weighed heavily in a culture still resonating with the impact of
the Holocaust and the generational guilt generated by the failure of most Germans to
resist the Nazi regime.
The Bosnian role episode thus supports important elements of the proposed model
of foreign policy reorientation. Internal debates played out among elites within the
context of continuous social pressure about contributing in line with the perceived
increase in Germany’s capabilities after reunification. The case shows that elites shared
the understanding of increased German responsibility for global peace and stability as
well as the need for a reorientation and engaged in a debate about the nature of
appropriate behavior for the country’s new role. The debate was decided in favor of the
group that managed to present its policy recommendations as closely matching the
international expectations of the appropriate behavior of a great power supporting the
system. Elites opposed to reorientation attempted to present an alternative role model
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based on the traditional civil power conception in which responsibility within the new
security environment was understood as resisting the power-political re-socialization of
Germany’s foreign policy.346 The advocates of the traditional stance rejected the use of
force as part of the civilian role perception and proposed that Germany play a special role
in which the country’s capabilities were deployed in civilizing and humanitarian capacity.
As such, responsibility was understood as rejecting the influence of the country’s natural
capabilities that predisposed it to play the role of a normalized great power. This position
was untenable because it clashed with the requirements imposed by the new security
environment and the role-specific expectations this generated. As civilizing power,
Germany would have played a special role that was not affirmed by the external
environment which was pushing for Germany to embrace the use of force. The country’s
foreign policy would no longer be reliable, predictable or calculable and this proposition
was clearly unacceptable to a majority of parliamentary elites. In the words of Foreign
Minister Kinkel: “[The only lesson from history can be]: Never again to leave the
community of Western nations, never again special paths (Sonderwege), not even out of a
sense of moral superiority…347
Germany’s traditional role conception that eschewed the pursuit of openly
nationalist interests, also inhibited the resolution of major domestic issues foremost of
which was that of asylum reform. Throughout the 1990s, pressure was building on SPD
politicians who had generally supported liberal asylum policies, to agree to measures that
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would reduce the massive influx of asylum-seekers. Role normalization allowed for the
changes in the asylum law to be pursued within the framework of appropriate behavior as
conceptualized under the role of a great power. A normalized great power had the right to
pursue its national interests, even at the cost of its neighbors or the detrimental evolution
of global standards. Politicians in the United Kingdom, France or the United States
certainly reserved for themselves the right to shape asylum policy in a way conducive to
their own national interests.
Social Democrats had for years struggled with the right concept providing for
their return to power. Party leaders had effectively played on antimilitarist tendencies of
the public to win regional elections but throughout the early 1990s, public support was
declining, particularly as the SPD appeared increasingly out of touch with the new
foreign policy agenda. The party platform was anachronistic and inconsistent. It
emphasized a desire to partake in reshaping the world as indicated by the support of the
quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council yet tied greater participation to
reservations about the use of force. Social Democrats appeared as unreliable and unfit to
rule. Diametrically opposed positions on the use of force within the party held by
moderates and traditionalists undermined party unity. The concept of role normalization
promised the reestablishment of party unity as a first step towards a consistent and viable
party platform enjoying widespread electoral support. Moreover, the reorientation of
party principles produced a principled basis on which Social Democrats and Alliance
90/Greens could be welded together in a Red-Green coalition. Within the Alliance
90/Greens, similar problems of discord were addressed by pragmatic leaders like Fischer
who steadily gained influence given the party’s desire for power and its increasing
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attractiveness to the ailing Social Democratic Party. The parties’ slow move to
accommodate the normative context created by external expectations allowed for the
fusion of interests between domestic actors. It also explains why the Red-Green
coalition, when it eventually did take power in 1998, did not miss a beat but would
commit German fighter jets to the first military combat since World War II during the
Kosovo Crisis in 1999. Thus, the normative canvas established by role expectations
converged with important interest of the principal actors on the domestic level to allow
for the reorientation of foreign policy.
All that remained was to convince the general public of the necessity to embrace
the use of force and accept the possibility of casualties in faraway lands for reasons not
directly related to territorial security. The German public remained stubbornly
antimilitaristic throughout the entire period of reorientation. Parliamentary elites appealed
to alliance solidarity. They consistently invoked the argument of greater responsibility
and the need to support human rights which found resonance within the public. They also
conjured up the specter of political isolation. However, they were ultimately unsuccessful
in persuading the public and antimilitarism would remain as powerful constraint on elite
actions to the present day. Germany had started to contribute to combat missions but
contentious public and parliamentary debates accompanying each deployment since
indicate that the process of reorientation is neither complete nor reversible.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
This dissertation asked the question of what caused Germany to reorient its
security policy by embracing the use of force during the mid-1990s. Foreign policy
reorientation was defined as a noticeable departure from a state’s central policy stance. In
the case of German security policy, this central stance was the rejection of the use of
force for non-defensive missions outside of German territory. Explaining changes in the
policy stance on the use of force was particularly significant in Germany because of
constraints on elite action imposed by strong antimilitarism in strategic culture which
predisposed elites and public to oppose reorientation. Strategic culture also should have
rendered the actions of role promoters seeking a change in the stance of the use of force
as inappropriate social behavior while empowering individuals, groups and institutions
standing for the preservation of the traditional policy orientation. The investigation of the
puzzle of German security policy reorientation offers insights on three central questions
in foreign policy analysis: The question of whether internal or external variables explain
state foreign policy, the utility of the concept of strategic culture and the degree of elite
autonomy in the realm of foreign policy-making. This final chapter will provide a brief
restatement of the theory, followed by the presentation of the findings of the dissertation.
Contributions to knowledge in the fields of international relations and foreign policy
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analysis are addressed next with particular attention devoted to the central questions
above. I close by making suggestions for further research.

Restating the Theory
This dissertation employed cultural variables to explain security policy
reorientation in Germany during the mid-1990s. The relevance of social and ideational
variables had been suggested both by the social terminology appearing in the elite
discourse as well as the many claims of scholars and foreign observers that Germany
changed course as a result of outside pressure and demands. The focus on ideational
variables and processes of socialization enabled the study to contribute to the ongoing
constructivist debate on the significance of norms, values and identity in determining the
foreign policy behavior of states. An important secondary objective was to gain a clearer
understanding of social processes of persuasion occurring between leaders of states and
international organizations on one hand and among parliamentary elites within domestic
politics on the other. The central cultural concept used to investigate the process of
German security policy reorientation was that of a social role applied to states within
international society.
The international environment constitutes a cultural environment characterized by
shared security understandings, norms and behavioral expectations of important member
states. The social environment under investigation was that of the early post-Cold War
era with specific focus on shared understandings of new security threats and necessary
responses by international organizations. Within the environment, the concept of role
encapsulates the understanding of a member’s status and behavioral obligations. State
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roles within the social environment guide the policy preferences of political elites by
providing conceptual maps for decision-making. These ‘cognitive maps’ of appropriate
state conduct held by decision-makers are called role conceptions.
As normative standards in the early post-Cold War environment changed and
member obligations became more concrete, Germany was perceived to have special
responsibilities for the maintenance of global peace and stability because it possessed the
wherewithal of a great power. Within the context of an altered threat and response
perception after the Cold War, these responsibilities could only be met through the ability
to deploy the Bundeswehr in combat missions outside of the country’s territory. Since
Germany’s traditional role conception of a civilian power had specifically ruled out such
behavior as inappropriate, socialization took place to adjust role behavior. Socialization
of the Federal Republic to contribute forces to multilateral peacekeeping and peace
enforcement missions occurred through role adjustment processes during which domestic
actors reacted to external pressure by promoting the role suggested by international
society.
Role adaptation occurs through role episodes which are message-sending
processes during which role senders convey community expectations of behavior to a
focal actor. This role pressure is designed to make an actor adapt role behavior in line
with expectations as based on socially appropriate standards of behavior. By complying,
an actor not only validates the norm generating the expectation but adds to its strength
and diffusion throughout the environment. Alternatively, non-compliance may involve
challenges to role senders and system norms and force the adjustment of expectations and
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norms, respectively. Thus, the responses of focal actors also have effects on role senders
and the normative context that generated their behavioral expectations.
Within the domestic environment of the state actor, groups and individuals may
promote the role expectations from the international environment through a range of
strategies designed to persuade others. The primary means of persuasion investigated in
this dissertation was social persuasion through effective argumentation and speech acts in
the social environment created between Germany’s parliamentary elites. Within this
environment, conservative elites acted as role entrepreneurs by persuading politicians
from opposition parties that the maintenance of the role conception as reliable ally and
supporter of Western values necessitated a reorientation of behavior towards the
acceptance of the use of force in missions beyond German territory. Shared elements of
the elite role conceptions and generally accepted threat perceptions allowed role
entrepreneurs to successfully present their case for reorientation. Role entrepreneurs also
used the two important organizational platforms under their control–the government and
the Bundeswehr–to promote and lock-in desired changes by incrementally committing
Germany to the desired behavioral parameters. These high-profile commitments made
maintenance of the traditional stance rejecting foreign involvement more difficult as
foreign involvement began to assume the mantle of normalcy. Growing Bundeswehr
capabilities and experience also served to undermine the opposition’s argument that
Germany’s armed forces were both unprepared and unsuitable for the military tasks
expected of them. Moreover, by consenting to humanitarian missions, the opposition
found itself in a social trap from which it ultimately could not extricate itself without
significant reputational losses to parties and the country within international society.
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External expectations and internal persuasion processes unfolded differently in each one
of the considered role episodes.

Findings: Role Episodes from 1990 to 1995
The Persian Gulf War
The Persian Gulf War role episode between the fall of 1990 and spring 1991 is
considered the first major crisis of the post-Cold War era. Iraq’s invasion and annexation
of Kuwait prompted a military response led by the United States and thirty-one other
states many of which sent combat units that saw action in the conflict. In insisting on the
territorial integrity of Kuwait, the international community chose to uphold norms of
sovereignty with human rights coming in as secondary consideration when allegations of
massive violations became known. The United States and the UN formally and
informally requested military assistance from Germany. The German government turned
down the request and supported coalition efforts through ‘checkbook’ diplomacy.
Germany also honored Turkey’s request for military support when that country invoked
the solidarity provisions of the NATO treaty but only after considerable and contentious
domestic debate. Parliamentary elites reacted to the international crisis in ways consistent
with the behavior of a civilian power. They turned down requests for military assistance
and supported mediation efforts through the United Nations. They also supported
sanctions against Iraq to force compliance with UN resolution 660 and were willing to
dispatch naval units to the Mediterranean to relieve coalition forces naval units once
hostilities ceased. Thus, Germany reacted to international expectations of militarily
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contributing to the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty by partially complying. How do
role conceptions and elite concerns explain this foreign policy action?
The Persian Gulf War occurred at a time of extraordinary political transitions.
Global perceptions of new security threats and necessary responses were only just
beginning to develop into a firm social system of state roles and behavioral expectations.
This created ambiguity about the appropriate course of action to address the invasion of
Kuwait. Strategic interests in the Gulf region were important reasons for the United
States, France and the United Kingdom to act decisively. Having the role conception of a
civilian power, Germany’s elites were unaccustomed to the idea of national or strategic
interests and the open articulation of such concerns was considered inappropriate.
Indirect strategic interest existed in the form of concerns with guaranteeing oil supplies
and maintaining international law but these did not significantly affect elite discourse.
Opposition elites also suspected that the national interests of major powers rather than a
concern for international security constituted the core of the motives for the liberation of
Kuwait. The absence of direct interests in the region and strong antimilitarism in strategic
culture imposed strong restraints on elite actions.
Conservative elites pursued role normalization at this early time. They were
willing to act as role entrepreneurs by honoring external expectations but quickly realized
the futility of their actions given the absence of elite and public support for role
adaptation. Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Greens had been able to successfully
exploit antimilitarism during the January 1991 elections in Hessen. The lost election sent
a clear message of the potential electoral costs of behavioral adaptation at that time. Role
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adaptation also threatened consensus within the coalition which could best be preserved
through the traditional role behavior.
Maintaining the civilian role also served the paramount foreign policy objective
of negotiating the Two-Plus-Four Agreement leading to full sovereignty. Concerns about
renewed German power and strategic interests existed in many European capitals. The
Gulf War also created stresses for US-Soviet relations as Moscow was asked to abandon
a traditional ally in the region. Acting out the civilian power role that the country had
played throughout the Cold War era solved a number of problems for parliamentary
elites. Elites were able to ease fears about the increasing power of their country after
reunification by reaffirming the traditional antimilitarism. The renunciation of weapons
of mass destruction, reductions in troop size, and the intensified commitment to
multilateral institutions all fall within the behavioral pattern of the civilian power.
Maintaining the traditional role also allowed Germany to act as mediator between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
In sum, partial compliance as based on pure civilian power role behavior
represented a logical point of interest convergence between elites. It also enabled elites to
successfully achieve the most important national objective since World War II–that of
achieving reunification and full sovereignty–during a major international crisis with the
potential for profound diplomatic disagreements between the quadripartite powers.
German elites catered to the expectations of important state actors including the United
Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union that were concerned that sovereignty would
increase German power and unilateral behavior while partially rejecting demands of the
United States and the United Nations. The rejection is considered partial because German
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contributions to alliance efforts were not insignificant and indicate that elites were
susceptible to external pressure.
Figure 11: Persian Gulf War Role Episode: Expectations, Elite Interests and Role Performance
Role Context: Persian Gulf
International Norms:
State Sovereignty
Resolute Application

Role Expectations:
Middle Power Obligations
to Aid Hegemon to
liberate Kuwait

Role Perception:
Civilian Power Role
Rejection of Use of Force

German Strategic
Culture:
Antimilitarism

Institutions:
Prohibition on
Out of Area Use of
Force

Role Performance:
Elite Interests
Reunification
2+4 negotiations
Electoral gains

Partial Compliance
(Checkbook Diplomacy)
Conservative Promise to
comply

Public/Media:
Antimilitarism
Support for Israel

The Persian Gulf War represents the beginning of the process of role adaptation
through external socialization. Germany’s mixture of haphazard and belated foreign
policy responses to the crisis and the internal debates indicated a high level of indecision
and ambiguity among parliamentary elites about the role that Germany was expected to
play after the Cold War. The traditional role was one of a reliable and calculable ally. The
intense criticism the country faced over the rejection of the use of force indicated that this
role in international society could not be maintained through behavior based on a pure
civilian power conception. Germany had followed the old script in a new play. Foreign
demands and criticism initiated the search for the appropriate script given altered security
circumstances.
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Unilateralism in Yugoslavia
This role episode took place between the fall 1991 and the spring of 1992. It
represents an example of an actor’s maladaptive response generated primarily by internal
factors. International structures including standards and institutions were as yet
underdetermined within a transitioning social environment. The establishment of a
consensus on humanitarian intervention was hampered by the general adherence to the
principle of state sovereignty which had served to protect the uneasy peace between the
superpowers during the Cold War. But sovereignty norms were being challenged by the
new realities marked by the internal insecurities arising from the rapid disintegration of
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The underdeveloped nature of the international
consensus on state recognition produced mixed external messages which allowed for
domestic factors and micro-level interests to drive German foreign policy during this
episode. Public opinion indicated a profound concern with the horrors of the escalating
civil war together with the demand for some kind of governmental action. Influential
media in print and television heightened the saliency of the issue and quickly began to
suggest recognition as solution. Croatian nationalism, the advanced degree of political
organization that characterized the Croat immigrant community in Germany and religious
affinities of that group with the Bavarian CSU may also have been contributing factors.
Pressed by public sentiment, elites seized the opportunity for electoral gains as
they dropped their initial reservations about recognition and began to bandwagon on the
pro-recognition train. Politicians from the Alliance 90/Green Party were crucial in setting
both course and tone on recognition. At the time, the parliamentary faction was run by
activists from the former East Germany, who had transformed the authoritarian system of
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their country through a successful campaign centered on civil rights issues. These
politicians brought with them a profound distaste for totalitarian systems and a principled
emphasis on human rights standards. The West German Greens were reeling from their
worst electoral showing in the party’s short history with moderate leaders like Joschka
Fischer decisively moving the platform towards the center. Among the changes was a
renewed focus on core issues which included the support for peaceful self-determination
and civil rights. Not to be outdone by the smaller party, most conservative and social
democratic elites quickly followed pace.
Backed by broad electoral and parliamentary support, cabinet elites aggressively
constructed a European coalition in favor of self-determination even though the
experienced Foreign Minister Genscher should have understood the dangers of setting a
diplomatic precedent for states struggling with ethnic diversity including BosniaHerzegovina. The unilateral policy stance also undercut the effectiveness of ongoing
negotiations in Croatia. Without recognition as incentive, negotiators like Lord
Carrington or special UN envoy Cyrus Vance had little in the form of diplomatic leverage
to force Croatia to protect the minority rights of its Serb citizens which insiders suggest
was a major reason for the escalation of interethnic hostilities in Croatia and other parts
of former Yugoslavia.
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Figure 12: Role Expectations, Perceptions and Performance during the Recognition Role Episode
Role Context: The Balkans
International Norms:
State Sovereignty
Ambiguous Application
Institutions:
No Out of Area Use
of Force
Role Expectations:
Reticence/calculability
support of sovereignty
Elite Interests:
Multilateralism
Electoral support

Role Performance:
Non-Compliance
Unilateral Recognition of
self-determination

Role Perception:
Civilian Power

Strategic Culture:
Antimilitarism

Public/Media:
Recognition
Antimilitarism

Germany’s aggressive foreign policy stance leading to the unilateral recognition
was met by widespread criticism from abroad. International criticism was particularly
effective because it frequently involved the accusation that Germany was redeveloping its
great power role by reasserting its historical sphere of interest in the Balkans. Germany’s
policy singularity had exposed it to the threat of social isolation from its reference group
of Western democracies. German elites were faced with the prospect of having their
country play a special role that was not affirmed by international society. The prospect of
isolation was unacceptable to policy-makers who drew the important lesson that their
country would have to develop a different type of role in order to be accepted–a role that
would have to be in compliance with international expectations. Nevertheless, in
challenging Yugoslav sovereignty and supporting norms of self-determination, Germany
may actually have contributed towards the establishment of growing consensus
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supporting norms of humanitarian intervention within European security organizations
after the Cold War. Soon, international support for the norm of sovereignty and noninterference would be challenged by the fast-paced dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Attempts to keep Yugoslavia together appeared increasingly out of sync not just with the
escalating levels of violence but the normative structure of the Cold War which had
emphasized the inviolability of borders and state sovereignty in Europe. Since the
recognition episode also taught German elites a lesson on the limits of non-military
diplomacy towards determined and ‘uncivilized’ adversaries, the episode may be
regarded as an important milestone in Germany’s eventual adoption of the use of force
over Bosnia. Overall, German elites grabbed the mantle of a greater role for the country
without knowing how to act or understand that their country lacked the institutional
capacity to act out the role. The result was a rather awkward performance.

The Bosnian Civil War
The Civil War in Bosnia between the summer 1992 and November 1995
represented the final episode in Germany’s role adaptation process. In what really
constituted a series of smaller episodes, parliamentary elites were pressured repeatedly to
contribute militarily as the conflict produced challenge after challenge for international
organizations after the Cold War. During this episode, security organizations including
NATO, the UN, the EU and the WEU moved decisively towards rapid reaction doctrines
and force structures designed to address instability as part of a general recognition that
the international security environment had become more volatile, unpredictable and that
threats increasingly emanated from processes internal to states. Events in Bosnia
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profoundly influenced the development of organizational threat perceptions, doctrines
and capabilities. German elites were intricately involved in this process of institutional
adaptation which increased the pressure on Germany to change its civilian power role to
contribute equally to the missions by embracing the use of force. The solidification of
security norms increased the social impact of foreign expectations, especially since
German elites had contributed to the formulation of the norms through their participation
in international security organizations. Elites had a major interest in maintaining and
extending the capabilities of the organizations they had helped develop. In addition, they
developed a liking for the increase in international status that joint responsibility in
diplomacy including participation in the Contact Group and IFOR bestowed upon their
country. But elite interest was not just motivated by instrumental logic. Actors who
participate in the formulation of group standards risk their reputation within the group if
they do not comply with those standards of behavior. Even if their interests should
change, they are caught in a social trap of obligations which makes defection less likely.
German elites found themselves in exactly such a position when the United Nations and
NATO began facing determined resistance by domestic actors who committed blatant
violations of human rights in Bosnia.
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Figure 13: Role Expectations, Perceptions and Performance during the Bosnian Civil War
Context/Region: The Balkans
International Norms:
Humanitarian
Intervention

Institutions:
Constitutional Court
lifts out-of-area
restrictions

Role Expectations:
Middle Power
Contributions

To Military Missions

Role Perception:
Civilian Power Role
Rejection of Use of Force

German Strategic
Culture: Antimilitarism

Elite Interests:
Regierungsfähigkeit
Effectiveness of IOs
Status/Influence

Role
Performance:
Compliance
Use of force

Public/Media:
Antimilitarism
Protecting Human
Rights

At the micro-level, parliamentary elites struggled with Regierungsfähigkeit or
electoral viability during the federal elections of 1994 and regional elections before and
after. Conservative parliamentary elites of the CDU/CSU had pursued the country’s role
normalization since 1990. But this course did not enjoy a parliamentary consensus and
produced repeated friction within the CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition. Under the
constant pressure generated by external role expectations, the old role of the civilian
power with its restrictive views on the use of force began to be perceived as inappropriate
political position; particularly, since most party leaders shared the threat perceptions and
were concerned about the effectiveness of international security organizations. The
position that Germany would be an equal partner in global peace and stability by
avoiding contributions to combat missions became unsustainable. Thus, throughout 1994
and 1995, leaders from the SPD and the Alliance90/Greens began to reluctantly embrace
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the use of force. As they increasingly began to accept the argument that a great power
like Germany could not exclude itself from participating militarily without being
irresponsible, they moved closer towards one another in anticipation of the Red-Green
coalition that would take power in 1998. Thus, external pressure made elite interests
coalesce around Germany’s new role conception.

Summary of Findings
The findings of the dissertation support the original model. Role entrepreneurs
used a variety of strategies to force role adaptation. The persuasive power of role
entrepreneurs increased as external demands intensified on the basis of firmed up
intervention standards after 1992. Even though Germany embraced the use of force, its
strategic culture remained characterized by the central value of antimilitarism throughout
the investigated period. Thus, the time lag between the creation of normative standards
and compliance can be explained through constraints imposed by the culture which
reduced the resonance of the external norms. Politicians from the FDP and SPD would
continue to interpret the German constitution in ways prohibiting the use of force until
the ruling of the Constitutional Court in July 1994.
In terms of role conceptions held by elites, the study finds that Germany remained
a civilian power in each episode. However, variations of the civilian power role were
detected: During the Persian Gulf War, Germany shows diplomatic reticence, financial
support and eschewing of military force as central aspects of behavior. During the
recognition episode, diplomatic leadership and support for Croatia and Slovenia and
eschewing of military force are the defining characteristics. Finally during the Bosnian
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Civil War, leadership and military force exhibit policy behavior. The variations are
tentatively called pacifist, assertive and militant civilian power roles. The adjustment in
role behavior indicates that German elites first took on greater leadership functions as
demanded and then added the use of military force. The fact that use of force was
embraced in spite of antimilitarism in strategic culture suggests that leadership functions
in international society are associated with the ability to deploy military force and that
German elites learned this during the early 1990s. Several important findings pertain to
the civilian power concept.
Maull (1990) has suggested that civilian powers mainly rely on non-military
means to resolve differences in international relations but will deploy military force in
multilateral fashion to uphold international law. This means that German actions during
the Persian Gulf War may have been indicative of an incompletely developed civilian
power role which explains the pressure to adjust through the inclusion of the use force.
This also suggests that Germany developed a more stable role during the mid 1990s and
that no further behavioral changes are to be expected. This is confirmed by foreign policy
behavior since reorientation. Germany has not taken on the full mantle of a normal great
power. In other words, normalization occurred but within the contours of the civilian
power role.
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Table 5: Summary of Case Study Findings

Behavioral
Expectations
Foreign Policy
Behavior

Persian Gulf War
Military Contributions
Partial Compliance
(checkbook diplomacy)

Unilateral Recognition
Maintaining Yugoslav
Sovereignty
Non-Compliance
(unilateral Recognition)

Promoters of
Expectations

CDU/CSU politicians

Domestic Concerns

Electoral Viability
Two-Plus-Four Treaty

Dominant Strategic
Culture Value(s)

Antimilitarism

Antimilitarism
Human Rights

Role Expectation
Role Behavior

Reliable Ally
Diplomatic Reticence
Non-Military Action
Pacifist Civilian
Power

Reliable Ally
Diplomatic Leadership
Non-Military Action
Assertive Civilian
Power

Role

FDP politicians (not
Genscher)
Foreign Ministry
Green politicians
Electoral Viability

Bosnian Civil War
Military Contributions
Compliance
(multilateral use of
force)
CDU/CSU politicians
SPD pragmatists
Green ‘realos’
Electoral Viability
Maintaining Party Unity
Antimilitarism
Human Rights
Multilateralism
Reliable Ally
Diplomatic Leadership
Military Action
Militant Civilian Power

Role adaptation occurred on the basis of structural as well as symbolic
interactionist processes. Parliamentary elites were subjected to external expectations that
were based on Germany’s social position as great power within the system. However,
elites attempted to maintain as much of the original role behavior as possible which
indicates the presence of a ‘state identity’ defined by the parameters of strategic culture.
Role performance was a function of German responses to structural guidelines as well as
a desire to interpret and shape these guidelines as symbolic interactionist role theory
would suggest.

Contributions to Knowledge
International Socialization and Domestic Resonance
The primary objective of this study was to test the usefulness of a cultural model
in explaining processes of foreign policy formulation. Of particular interest was the
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question of whether cultural models which are routinely employed to explain stable
political conditions may also be utilized to explain political conditions undergoing
transformation. The central cultural concept used was that of the role conception and the
reorientation of German foreign policy therefore is conceptualized as a function of a role
adjustment process. Role conceptions were defined as elite understandings about their
country’s appropriate function and behavioral obligations within international society.
Changes in role conceptions allow for different policy options. In response to foreign
pressure, German elites adapted role conceptions and were able to embrace the use of
military force in support of peace enforcement missions. The broad cultural model was
combined with an investigation of the micro-interests of sub-state actors to bridge the
divide between reflective and rational approaches as well as provide greater clarity on the
relationship between agents and structures. Thus, an important corollary puzzle
investigated here was the relationship between role expectations and the micro-level
interests of parliamentary elites including the process by which elites contribute to the
evolution of social environments through role performance, role avoidance or role
challenges. I proposed that a combination of insights culled from role theory, norm
diffusion literature, strategic culture and foreign policy analysis would generate insights
on the important phenomenon of foreign policy reorientation. What can be learned about
the proposed relationship between external socialization, the domestic web of constraint
imposed by strategic culture, institutions and public opinion and how do the findings
relate to the study of foreign policy analysis?
The three case studies covering the time period 1990-1995 produced findings that
were consistent with the original theoretical expectations. The impact of foreign
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expectations on German foreign policy reorientation is evident throughout the
investigated time period as German elites could be shown to have been acutely and
consistently aware of the demands generated by global and regional security
organizations and national actors from the external environment. The speculations made
by researchers about German foreign policy being affected by outside demands are
shown to have been correct. Over the covered time period, conservative elites acted as
norm entrepreneurs for the use of force by repeatedly reminding other parliamentary
elites of German obligations towards the alliance and by holding out the specter of
political isolation should German fail to fulfill its responsibilities towards the Western
value community. As the model predicted, the power of conservative elites to act as norm
entrepreneurs by persuading others to accept the use of force outside of German territory
increased as post-Cold War understandings of necessary doctrines and military response
mechanisms as well as the contributions of individual actors towards the maintenance of
peace and stability solidified into an increasingly more established regime. Thus, the first
role episode of the Persian Gulf War finds conservatives attempting to comply with
foreign expectations but ultimately failing to convince their coalition partners from the
FDP and the left-of-center politicians that German military contributions to the effort to
liberate Kuwait were necessary. Conservative elites backed down and compensated with
‘checkbook diplomacy’ through which they validated the external demands. In addition,
they promised that they would pursue the internal changes necessary to be able to comply
with future demands for German contributions. By the end of the Bosnian Civil War
episode, the power of conservatives to change policy had grown considerably.
International norms supporting intervention and rapid reaction doctrines had been
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established by UN, NATO and the European Union. Understandings of a more volatile
security environment had replaced the initial euphoria surrounding the end of the Cold
War with the violence in Yugoslavia constituting an important series of learning events.
FDP politicians including foreign ministers Genscher and Kinkel had already moved
towards a more assertive policy orientation during the recognition of Croatia and
Slovenia during which Germany’s rejection of military force had been shown to have
been a major limitation on effective diplomacy. During the Bosnian role episode,
international pressure on German elites to comply with solidifying humanitarian
intervention norms intensified. The last holdout against role adaptation, politicians from
the Social Democratic Party and the Alliance 90/Greens, caved in as concerns over
human rights violations, the efficacy of multilateral peacekeeping operations to address
regional instabilities and Germany’s diplomatic isolation coalesced with electoral
interests. The combination of external expectations and electoral interests strongly
supported policy normalization as a means to rebuild public confidence in the ability of
Social Democrats and Greens to assume governmental control in post-unification
Germany.
To sum up, role behavior pressure was greatest on German elites when threat
perceptions and normative expectations of national actor contributions had solidified into
institutional guidelines and doctrines such as the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks from 1992. As
such, the social environment exerted its greatest pressure between 1992-1995 with
noticeable effects on elite debates and subsequent changes in foreign policy behavior.
The logical conclusion is that the effectiveness of role socialization through group
expectations tends to increase when normative standards emanating from the external
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environment are clear, consistent, and unchallenged. An important finding in regards to
the existence of unclear norms and variation in the degree of actor compliance pertains to
the effect of dyadic relations.
As intermediate variable, dyadic relations increase the complexity of the
expectations generated within the social environment. This is particularly noticeable
when the expectations of important states within the group exerting pressure on the focal
actor are still based on older role conceptions. For instance, during the Persian Gulf War,
French, British and Soviet foreign policy circles showed profound apprehension about
German power after reunification while the United States and the UN already insisted
that Germany contribute in line with its capabilities. In essence, Germany was exposed to
two mutually exclusive roles expectations and elites showed great policy ambiguity as
they tried to meet divergent expectations of the role of a predictable and reliable state.
During this time, regional security organizations which could have offered an
authoritative role definition were still undergoing redevelopment processes and could not
offer a clear social definition of what constituted appropriate behavior. Towards the end
of the Bosnian role episode in 1994, role expectations and obligations were more clearly
defined. The social ‘noise’ created by dyadic relations gave way to a clear group message
on appropriate great power contributions to international peace and stability.

Culture, Institutions and Public Opinion
During the time period covered by the investigated role episodes, German
strategic culture remained consistently antimilitant. Elites remained hesitant to deploy
force outside of German territory and eventual compliance with external demands to
281

contribute forces came only after much soul-searching. Once the Bundeswehr was
committed to supporting peacekeeping activities in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords, care
was taken to deploy forces in areas least likely to see conflict. The trend to seek out the
least dangerous areas for troop deployment continues to this day. Public opinion also
remained largely pacifist during the studied cases. The detailed RAND studies covering
the period 1990-1994 analyzed by Asmus (1992; 1994; 1995) indicate minor increases in
support levels for a more assertive role for Germany. But public opinion clearly continues
to favor multilateralism and activities centered on peaceful contributions to the
maintenance of international peace and stability. As such, the set of values that
characterizes strategic culture since World War II can be said to have remained largely
intact after reunification. The fact that elites were able to change security policy in spite
of cultural constraints has important ramifications for the research paradigm of strategic
culture.
Strategic culture should be understood as a dependent or intermediate rather than
independent variable. Many scholars who emphasize the independent effect of strategic
culture have viewed Germany’s resistance to become a ‘like unit’ under anarchy as a
function of the persistence of the value of antimilitarism.348 German elites certainly
resisted pressure to conform to external expectations by invoking their country’s
antimilitant institutions and culture. But the existence of a cultural and institutional web
of constraint on the use of force did not prevent political elites from reorienting their
country’s stance on the use of force in response to external stimuli. An emphasis on
strategic culture as independent variable would not necessarily have suggested the change
348

See, for instance, Berger (1998) or Duffield (1999).
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in security policy. The interaction between the external and internal normative contexts is
crucial for understanding the reorientation. In changing security policy, elites did not
ignore cultural values but chose to reinterpret them. The values of predictability and
calculability remained very important to elites as indicated by the continual rhetoric of
alliance solidarity. As the nature of alliance solidarity and corresponding behavioral
expectations changed, so did the views of German elites about the necessity of
contributing militarily. In addition, strategic culture did influence the nature of
compliance with external demands. Military force was deployed but with the attachment
of important qualifications to minimize exposure to combat. Thus, Germany’s
antimilitant web of constraint continues to persist and influence German security policy
in important ways by delimiting the scope of elite action. The cultural and institutional
context will delay and possibly prevent the full development of a ‘normal’ great power
role as predicted by realist scholars. A nonassertive diplomatic style and a strong
preference for multilateralism will continue to characterize German foreign policy in the
foreseeable future. In sum, the findings of studies on German strategic culture are
generally confirmed here with the important caveat that an understanding of elite foreign
policy preferences requires both cultural analysis and a consideration of the normative
context of the external environment.
On a final note on institutional research paradigms, the findings of the dissertation
are also supporting key assumptions of the approach of historical institutionalism in
comparative politics. On the question of the relationship between agents and structure,
historical institutionalists generally assume a mutual constitution of actor preferences and
institutions and an equally interactive process between institutions and culture (Spehn
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2006, 195). Thresh-hold events and path-dependencies are important components of this
view of the impact of institutions in which agents possess partial autonomy from
structures, varying amounts of power and somewhat independent preferences. This
explains their desire and ability to transform institutions during critical times.
The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new security environment
represented a critical juncture which forced elites to redirect security policy during the
1990s. Elites reinterpreted the country’s antimilitant constitution on the basis of alliance
solidarity and began to reorganize the Bundeswehr to allow for deployment in missions
outside of German territory. Throughout the process of reorientation, individuals adapted
institutions and interpreted central values according to their own instrumental designs but
generally guided by the limitations imposed by the broader strategic culture that
enveloped all decision-making. The important lesson for historical institutionalism is that
external normative elements may influence domestic interest formation in establishing an
acceptable convergence point for elite interests. Thus, the design of domestic institutions
is significantly affected by elite interactions with the external environment.

Internal and External Factors in Foreign Policy Formulation
Micro-level interests of elites constitute another important intermediate variable.
Domestic contexts, institutions and actors have long been recognized as important
variables in explaining variations in norm diffusion. This study adds to the tradition that
finds internal actors pursuing both instrumental and normative interests with the
likelihood of norm adoption increasing when the two are congruent. Between 1990 and
1995, German elites strongly contributed to the evolution of institutional capacities after
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the Cold War. Even committed pacifists including Fischer began to act when they saw
the survival and effectiveness of those institutions threatened over the conflicts in
Yugoslavia. Shared threat perceptions, humanitarian intervention norms and concern over
institutional effectiveness came together in a powerful mix driving role adaptation. What
is novel here is that elite concerns like electoral interests may also be relatively unrelated
to the international normative expectations. Yet the norm may still function as a logical
point of interest convergence between the positions of parliamentary elites. Interest
convergence points are also influenced by central values derived from strategic culture.
These establish general parameters of acceptable conduct. As such, elite decision-making
logic is determined by both instrumental as well as social considerations. Germany’s role
shift towards the incorporation of the use of force was facilitated by the emphasis on the
value of multilateralism and the avoidance of political isolation. The relevance of
strategic culture in determining convergence points may indicate that effective role
adaptation requires congruence between external normative expectations and at least one
central tenet of strategic culture. This confirms a hypothesis by Cortell and Davis (2000)
that domestic salience through cultural match increases the likelihood of norm adoption.
This study finds significant evidence for the initial proposition that Germany as
focal actor adopted a new role understanding through the process of socialization.
Without external socialization, strategic culture probably would have predisposed
Germany to adhere to the traditional civilian power role conception. An important puzzle
in the constructivism research agenda remains the process of norm diffusion between
states. This requires a focus on the interaction between external demands, domestic actors
and processes of norm adaptation. This study has focused on persuasion processes
285

between political elites. Persuasion occurred between leaders of foreign states and heads
of organizations on one hand and German political elites on the other. Persuasion
processes also took place among parliamentary elites.
At the systemic level, Germany’s political elites indicated through discursive
statements, public announcements and interviews that they were concerned about how
their country’s role behavior was evaluated abroad. Elites complied with external
expectations as they became supported by clear and consistent international security
doctrines. The terminology ‘partners’, ‘allies’ and ‘Western value community’ appeared
in conjunction with perceived role obligations of having to demonstrate solidarity and
responsibility. The importance of the social reference group of Western states also
appeared in the discourse associated with status considerations which acted as positive
reinforcement for role adaptation. Here the consensus shifted from the reference to the
smaller states in Europe to great or middle power although the status objective frequently
was presented in the language of obligations. In other words, German elites were
concerned about their standing and influence within the group of great powers. The desire
to maintain both status and avoid shame through compliance got stronger throughout the
early 1990s.
The evidence shows that socialization between governmental elites takes place
routinely, that it may affect foreign policy outcomes and that even security policy as
preeminent domain of the state is not immune to external socialization. This refutes
realist perspectives which view socialization as a type of natural selection process. Policy
adaptation in security issues may occur because states adjust to social expectations of
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appropriate foreign policy conduct. This suggests that Germany is normalizing, but for
social rather than competitive reasons. Germany continues to confound realism.
At the domestic level, parliamentary elites engaged in attempts aimed at political
persuasion. Conservative elites invoked elements of the traditional role conception to
affect a change in security policy. Thus, they emphasized responsibility, solidarity, and
the idea of Germany having reaching maturity to rhetorically persuade opposition elites
that maintaining the old role required the change of behavior. Social Democrats and
Greens invoked a very different role conception in which they viewed the renunciation of
international violence as central element of a special role for Germany. They understood
responsibility in a wider sense as Germany’s obligation to help establish a more civil
world order in which the use of force was systematically abolished and differences were
settled through law-based procedures. Germany’s past was viewed as obligating the
country to reject any behavior that resembled great power politics. Even international
organizations were suspect if they appeared to be used for that purpose. The moral
conviction of opposition elites that Germany should continue to play the special role of a
civilizing country in world politics, a role somewhat comparable to the mediator role
played by Sweden, was untenable given external expectations. Given these expectations,
a civilizing role for a great power with alliance obligations would have been abnormal.
Such a special role would have carried the risk of political isolation from the reference
group of Western allies. The prevention of Germany’s isolation served as ‘preferred
premise’ among parliamentary elites.349 The existence of this preferred premise allowed
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Greenhalgh and Russell (2005) argue that policy debates tend to start with premises shared by actors
which are the product of values, value hierarchies and preferences of one abstraction over another.
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conservative elites to act as norm entrepreneurs by connecting foreign expectations of
military engagement with their desire for normalization and present policy reorientation
as way of forestalling the threat of diplomatic isolation.
Public policy is made of language and argumentation is central to understanding
political processes. “Argumentation is the key process through which citizens and
policymakers arrive at moral judgments and policy choices. … Each participant [in
policy debates] is encouraged to adjust his view of reality, and even to change his values,
as a result of the process of reciprocal persuasion” (Majone 1989, 8). The main
argumentation scheme used by role entrepreneurs was that of association. Association
combines elements that were previously regarded as being separate through metaphor or
analogy (Greenhalgh and Russell 2005, 36). Economic power and use of force had been
regarded as separate and incompatible during the Cold War. The former behavior had
been associated with the civilian role. The latter conduct had been viewed as part of a
more assertive, great power role reminiscent of Germany’s role in the past. During the
out-of-area debates of the 1990s, role entrepreneurs argued for the merger of the two role
conceptions under the heading of normalization. They emphasized necessity due to the
transformed nature of the security environment and appropriateness due to external
expectations. Conservative elites cleverly argued that security policy reorientation was
required to preserve responsibility, calculability, predictability and solidarity–the key
values of the traditional role conception. Without behavioral adaptation, so they argued,
parliamentary elites would actually risk violating the central premises of the role their
country had adopted after World War II. The argument became increasingly more
convincing as the international agreement on addressing domestic instabilities through
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out-of-area interventions became essentially uncontested. The moral position of pacifism
defended by more radical opposition politicians became untenable when violence
increased in the Yugoslav civil war and German inaction was increasingly perceived as
tantamount to being a bystander to a crime. As external normative expectations began to
trump the key value of antimilitarism among parliamentary elites, Germany’s role
behavior was adapted to include the use of military force for peace enforcement missions.

The Utility of Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis
Since the landmark study by Holsti (1970), roles in foreign policy analysis have
repeatedly been viewed as useful concepts to understand, categorize and possibly predict
the behavior of national actors. This has not been an easy undertaking and the initial
development of rigid categories of roles based on functional assumptions within stable
social environments failed to yield useful results. The theory used in this dissertation falls
into the category of symbolic interactionism which assumes a more fluent situational
context in which roles are established through a range of social processes including but
not limited to negotiation, persuasion and affirmation. The focus on processes of social
interaction–the role episode–allows us to view security policy reorientation as a type of
social phenomena distinct from individual and group decision-making processes, the
impact of organizational processes, bureaucratic politics or state-society networks. As a
decidedly social account of foreign policy change, role episodes are useful in that they
help uncover a process of change through social messages and responses. The focus on
the process of change as social series of interlinked episodes emphasizes the overall
connection between events through the shared understandings of elites. Socialization
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occurs through events but also through altered understandings which can be traced by
considering the aftermaths of role episodes. In sum, foreign policy making ceases to be a
series of haphazard events and responses but can be conceptualized as exhibiting
significant continuity.
By conceptualizing states as social actors, role episodes and the focus on elite
conceptions contribute to the current constructivist research agenda in adding to our
knowledge on processes of socialization and norm resonance. Role episodes add detail
and depth to accounts of change and norm compliance. But the focus also exhibits
limitations: Material conditions such as the distribution of power within the international
system influence actor decisions and those factors are considered only indirectly in the
model in the form of perceptions of material capabilities. The straightforward focus on
elites leaves out a range of other domestic factors that could potentially influence foreign
policy formation. While an attempt has been made to include public opinion, this was
done only indirectly with public opinion being considered sporadically when figuring in
elite calculations of electoral interests. In addition, the public’s preferences were viewed
as predetermined by strategic culture. The model also excluded other types of structural
determinants at the domestic level including but not limited to state-society relation
models suggested by Katzenstein, Risse-Kappen and others.
The main deficiency of the presented model of foreign policy reorientation is that
it is characterized by relatively low levels of parsimony. The in-depth analysis of security
policy reorientation through normative expectations at the international and the interest
formation of elites at the domestic level produced a rich account that incorporated a
number of important elements at different levels of analysis that are usually not
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investigated in conjunction with one another. This combination yielded an account of
change that has relatively limited applicability to other cases, times and countries. While
this may appear as a disappointment to international relations theorists, scholars in
foreign policy analysis have long learned to live with the dilemma. McClosky wrote in an
early work about foreign policy analysis that its “inordinate complexity … is
unquestionably its greatest shortcoming…” with the scholar “having to collect data about
a great number of variables whose relative importance he can only guess at and whose
influence he cannot easily measure in any event” (1962, 201). The presented model
attempts to retain as much parsimony as is prudent while adhering to the need for an
actor-specific orientation of the field as articulated by Alexander George (1993). As such,
the emphasis on role episodes offers a way to bridge the gap between theory and thick
description.

Agenda for Future Research
Suggestions for further research arise logically from the limitations of this study.
An important methodological concern would involve complementing the current research
based on document analysis with a series of structured interviews with decision-makers.
This would help reveal underlying motivations for particular policy actions. In addition to
the key decision-makers, interviewing individuals engaged in policy implementation at
lower levels may prove to be especially rewarding because these individuals may be
more inclined to truthfully disclose social and utilitarian concerns influencing German
politics at the time. Social interaction processes including persuasion affect individuals in
both formal and informal settings. Including information from interviews would reveal
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informal social pressure on decision-makers from their peers in other countries and from
international organizations.
A second methodological suggestion for further research would be the extension
of the study to include a comparison of several incidents of security policy orientation.
This dissertation examined one reorientation over a five year period and the findings
represent only a first cut at the information that could be garnered on the understudied
phenomenon of foreign policy reorientation through social pressure. Multiple case studies
should help answer questions about the relative weighting of social and instrumental
motivations of decision-makers. Numerous cases should also assist in the effort of
improving role theory.
Social roles of states are largely the product of the international environment
which means that expectations of appropriate role behavior are based on systemic
characteristics. The precise definition of social expectations ultimately requires the
formulation of a comprehensive role theory for the international system. This has turned
out to be a difficult enterprise. Tentative role categories for international relations were
developed by Holsti (1970) and Walker (1987) but no full systemic theory has been
formulated as yet. This dissertation loosely applied assumptions of both structural and
symbolic interactionist role theory to make the claim that Germany had its role behavior
imposed on it by international society due to its social position but also continued to
negotiate its role behavior on the basis of its identity as indicated by the reservations that
continue to be attached to deployments of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the dissertation
sidestepped the question of how the international system creates and confers roles on
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states. The specification of roles and the explication of their origin on the basis of cultural
or material system factors would present a worthwhile venue of future exploration.
Another question that was largely bracketed was the issue of situation-specific
roles. The conceptions of appropriate German behavior in the Persian Gulf region held by
elites would have differed from those in Yugoslavia where involvement was tainted by
the burden of history. Future studies should devise models that take into account both
regional and situational contexts on role conceptions held by state actors.
The final suggestions for future research are addressed to the civilian power
research paradigm. The basic premise of the paradigm resting on the work of Rosecrance
and Maull was that the evolution of international relations towards greater
interdependence influenced state roles within the system. The new category of the
civilian power emerged because states relying on international law instead of military
capabilities were better adapted to system characteristics. But the ‘ideal type’ of the
civilian power seems to have been associated with the more stable bipolar world order.
This ideal type appears to be undergoing changes for great powers in the more unstable
context emerging since the end of the Cold War. Germany and Japan will face pressure to
act in military ways to preserve international peace and security. This suggests that social
position and status as well as systemic parameters have to be more fully included in
future studies of civilian power conduct. At the very least, it appears that the behavior of
great civilian powers has to be distinguished from that of lesser civilian powers.
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Conclusion
The evolution of Germany’s contributions to multilateral efforts that involve the
use of force since the policy reorientation of the mid-90s indicate that policy elites have
decisively shifted their country’s role in line with international expectations. In 1996, the
Federal Republic contributed to NATO’s stabilization force (SFOR) in Bosnia which
succeeded the IFOR deployment. As part of this operation, 1500 Bundeswehr soldiers
including infantry and armored reconnaissance troops were deployed for monitoring and
security functions as part of larger French-German unit (Duffield 1998, 216). At the time,
Defense Minister Rühe commented that Germany had finally assumed the same risks and
responsibilities as other allies (Die Welt, October 5, 1996). In the Bundestag, the mission
received widespread support with 499 parliamentarians supporting the deployment
(Duffield 1998, 216). In a dramatic expansion of German military responsibilities since
reorientation, Luftwaffe jets participated in full combat missions over Kosovo in March
1999. Germany’s contributions to peace enforcement in Kosovo included 5000 ground
troops, making it the largest deployment of the Bundeswehr since World War II. German
politicians also played a leading diplomatic role during the conflict. The action was the
more remarkable because it took place during the rule of the Red-Green coalition
government headed by Chancellor Schröder. Left-of-center elites including Foreign
Minister Fischer who had opposed role adaptation during the early 1990s now supported
Germany’s new role and the use of force. They risked their own political futures and
overcame public and inner-party opposition in the interest of maintaining alliance
solidarity and demonstrating responsibility for international peace and stability.
Struggles between pragmatists and traditionalists within the Alliance 90/Green party
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continued and the party barely survived a fundamental split. Public opinion remained
antimilitant and domestic tension mounted as it became clear that the German public
would not accept Bundeswehr participation in a potential escalation towards ground
combat. In 2001, Germany contributed to the NATO operations in Afghanistan (ISAF)
with about 1000 Bundeswehr soldiers who were deployed in the northern part of the
country. Again, the desire to demonstrate solidarity and responsibility remained a vital
factor in explaining the use of force with Foreign Minister Steinmeier stating like his
predecessors that “the Tornado Deployment is an indication of our support of ISAF and
NATO in Afghanistan in difficult times…I say, in my opinion we owe this solidarity to
the alliance”.350 In another noteworthy action during the process of role adaptation, the
Federal Republic was willing to commit troops and the Federal Navy in its most
significant deployment since World War II in 2006. The forces were dispatched to patrol
the Lebanese-Syrian border as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon after
the end of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.
In their military commitments since reorientation, policy elites have shown
greater compliance with international expectations when these demands came from an
authoritative organization enforcing a clear and coherently applied normative standard.
Thus, Germany declined to comply with US pressure to partake in the military campaign
against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003. Without the support of the multilateral
United Nations, expectations were unclear and allowed German elites greater policy
latitude. Cases since 1995 also show a German tendency to support peacekeeping
missions rather than the more challenging tasks of peace-building. Military contributions
350
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since reorientation continue to be associated with complex limitations on the use of the
provided troop and equipment contingents. The reduction of combat risk continues to be
a major issue in securing cross-party support for the use of force.351 In Afghanistan, for
instance, German forces were deployed in the areas least likely to see extensive combat.
German elites, despite considerable prodding by allies, have also not shown much of an
inclination to increase national defense spending which continues to lack behind those of
other great powers except Japan by a considerable margin.352 These factors suggest that
powerful constraints on the use of force continue to exist that will delay or prevent full
normalization of German role conceptions. The first one of these constraints clearly is the
value of antimilitarism contained in strategic culture which has public opinion showing
no pattern towards the increasing acceptance of the use of force. A second factor is
institutional in nature. The Constitutional Court ruling of 1994 allowed for the use of
force but also limited the government’s ability to deploy the Bundeswehr unless
supported by a Bundestag majority. Coalition politics in the multiparty system of the
Federal Republic will act as break on too ambitious an escalation of Bundeswehr
deployments. The traditional institutions of German civil-military relations will further
limit normalization through the integrative functions they perform in linking state with its
antimilitant society.
In a final word addressed to policy-makers and those interested in contemporary
German foreign policy, major deviations from current parameters in German security
351
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In 2006, Germany spent 1.3 percent of GDP on military expenditures which compared to 2.4 percent for
France, 2.6 percent for the United Kingdom and 4 percent for the United States (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, http://milexdata.sipri.org, accessed March 24, 2009). With that number, the
country is voluntarily approaching Japan’s constitutionally imposed 1 percent barrier.
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policy are not to be expected. Policy will remain predominantly multilateral and military
force will be applied on the basis of a mandate established by authoritative international
institutions. Even though external pressure allowed for reorientation, the country’s unique
burden of history continues to profoundly shape the political possibilities of the present.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AWACS
CDU

Airborne Warning and Control System
Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic
Party)
CSU
Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian-Social Union Party)
CSCE
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPA
Deutsche Presse Agentur (German Press Agency)
DW
Die Welt
EEC
European Economic Community
EMU
Economic and Monetary Union
EPC
European Political Cooperation
EU
European Union
FAZ
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FBIS-EEU
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Eastern Europe
FBIS-WEU Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe
FDP
Free Liberal Party (Freie Liberale Partei)
GDR
German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
IFOR
(NATO) Implementation Force
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NYT
New York Times
OSCE
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDS
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)
PB
Plenarprotokoll Bundestag (Plenary Transcript of the Bundestag)
SACEUR
Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR
(NATO) Stabilization Force
SED
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of
Germany)
SPD
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SZ
Süddeutsche Zeitung
UN
United Nations
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
UNOSOM
United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia
UNTAC
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
WEU
Western European Union
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
WP
Washington Post
WSJ
Wall Street Journal

333

